

1967

SECRET

File No. 1091

FD 10161780

Name of File— Voc 1

MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

EGYPT/ISRAEL DISPUTE

NO MINUTES TO BE WRITTEN HERE

RECORD OF WEEDING

	INITIALS	DATE
2 YEARS		
5 YEARS (CONSULAR POSTS ONLY)		
10 YEARS		



LAST Year's File No.

NEXT Year's File No.

BRITISH CONSULATE GENERAL,

MUSCAT.

13 July, 1967.

(1091)
CONFIDENTIAL

Middle East Crisis

I have written little on this. Before going on leave I will record a few disjointed thoughts which may (or may not) be useful in any reappraisals you may be asked for.

2. First, as far as the Sultanate is concerned the people, as Arabs and Muslims, want an Arab Muslim victory. But being very far away most of them do not feel involved personally. The minority who do are the few educated people in the towns and some of those elsewhere who have returned from working in such places as Kuwait.

3. Second, and straying well beyond my parish, we tend to think the ill-feeling against us in the Middle East now stems from our having been maliciously and falsely identified with Israel, Israel being the final anathema to the Arabs. In this perhaps we overlook the main reason for Israel's being anathema in the first place, namely that it is we and the Americans who fathered an alien Israel on the Arab Middle East. In other words it is au fond Israel's connection with us that damns Israel as much or more than our connection with Israel that damns us. This is a depressing thought and seldom voiced but I think it is one of the roots of the trouble and so needs to be recognised in any thorough consideration of the problem.

4. In any reconsideration of the defence of the Gulf, you could work on the basis that the Sultan would let us set up a base for all three services at Masirah: and so long as they did not import a large local labour force they would be free from trouble as long as the Sultan lived. Terms would have to be negotiated, but I should not expect to find any of the problems insoluble. I mention this only as a piece which may come in handy when you are competing with the whole jig-saw puzzle. As for effects on the Sultanate, the local reactions since 1 June lead me to think that I over-estimated the disadvantages of having a large base in Masirah when I was asked for an opinion in November (I think), 1965. There are disadvantages of course. And I think Shell with their long term interests in mind would not like it. But be that as it may, all that I have said in this paragraph is true.

(D.C. Garden)

Sir Stewart Crawford, KCMG, CVO,
British Residency,
BAHRAIN.

CONFIDENTIAL

26

00715002

FM ABOLHY

TO OO ASOLDL 46367

x200 46
15 JUL 67

FM ASOLBQ

00107

FM BAHRAIN

42

ADDED TO AMMAN TELEGRAM NO 1403 DATE 7/7 RFI TO TEL AVIV , UK MI5 NEW YORK , WASHINGTON, PARIS, JEDDA, TRIPOLI, DEMONAZI, ALGIERS, RABAT, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN (RES) TEHERAN, CAIRO, BEIRUT MARTHOM AND JERUSALEM.

BY TEL NO 1403 TO AMMAN.

FIRST THREE WORDS OF PARA 8 SHOULD READ QUOTE I SAID I UNQUOTE
SUSPA

RECD 0741/0 JULY

1073/380/67

J. R. A. *AB*
J. R. A. *AB*
J. R. A. *AB*

CYPHER

From: Bahrain To: Foreign Office

Telegram No: 451

Date: 2 July 1967

CONFIDENTIAL
IMMEDIATE

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram number 451 of 2 July, repeated for information to (Immediate) UKMIS New York, (Routine) Kuwait, Jeddah, UK HC Aden, and Saving to Bahrain Agency, (126), Doha (72), Abu Dhabi (99), Dubai (131), Muscat (51), Tel Aviv (4) and Amman (5).

Your telegrams No's: 1401 - 2 of 1 July to Amman and other posts: General Assembly Resolution. Please see Bahrain Agency telegram No. 103 (not to all). I have not yet seen reports of action taken in other Gulf States but would not expect situation there to be very different.

2. Reactions in this area are likely to be determined less by content of different resolutions, than by whether we vote with Israel and against the Arabs, especially on the non-aligned resolutions and by the extent to which we then come under violent and persistent propaganda attacks from main Arab countries (Kuwait radio is again likely to be of particular importance).

3. As seen from here, it seems desirable to avoid, if at all, possible opposing non-aligned draft in a small minority including few countries other than U.S.A. and Israel. Can the Latin Americans and a number of others be brought to vote with us? If not, is it out of the question that situation might so develop that we could abstain? This would be most satisfactory way to deflate those who would attack us. Our Votings for Latin American resolution may cut less ice with Arabs, especially if they oppose it. But we might draw some benefit from our action if this resolution attracts a large amount of support, perhaps especially if Israel opposes it.

4. If things go badly for us, in the U.N., I think that any major public disturbances in Gulf States would take a little time to work up, especially as we have time to alert the police forces; individual acts of violence could however occur quickly. We should have to abandon any hope of an early improvement in oil situation e.g. over bunkering Warships, and might find further discriminations introduced quickly under pressure of labour force. The risk of trade discrimination would become more serious, especially after forthcoming Arab boycott meeting on July 15.

CRAWFORD

Distribution
Normal
Saving

15 JUL 67
1091

① Dr. Peter to see PPS

② PA. DD 1617

CYPHER/CAT A
FROM FOREIGN OFFICE
TELNO 905.
DATED 7 JULY
ROUTINE

CONFIDENTIAL.

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM BEIRUT

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TEL NO 773 OF 7/7 REPTD FOR INFMN
TO AMMAN BAHRAIN KUWAIT NICOSIA UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.

MY TEL NO 13 SAYING: SITUATION IN THE LEBANON.

THE INTERNAL SITUATION IS VIRTUALLY UNCHANGED. ARMY CONTROL
OF BEIRUT AND PRESS CENSORSHIP REMAIN. COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY IS
LOW AND NEWSPAPER ARTICLES ~~RECOMMEND~~ ~~SO, SO~~

~~RECOMMEND~~ RECOMMENDING BACK-TO-NORMAL RECIPES
ARE STILL MUTILATED BY THE CENSORS.

2. SO FAR THERE HAS BEEN NO POPULAR REACTION TO THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY'S FAILURE (THE EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR IS AWAY) BUT THE
LEBANESE SECURITY AUTHORITIES ARE STILL URGING THIS EMBASSY
TO MAINTAIN OUR SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS.

3. PRIVATE REACTIONS OF HIGHLY PLACED LEBANESE TO OUR ATTITUDE
IN THE U N HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGING AND I HAVE BEEN TOLD MORE THAN
ONCE THAT BRITAIN IS NOW CONSIDERED TO BE SIGNIFICANTLY LESS
HOSTILE TO THE ARABS THAN THE UNITED STATES.

4. UNLESS THE EGYPTIANS UNLEASH A NEW PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN, I DO
NOT EXPECT ANY TROUBLE HERE, BUT ANY IMPROVEMENT WILL ONLY BE
SLOW AND GRADUAL.

F O PASS BAHRAIN 203. KUWAIT 46.



BATTERIE DE FUSÉES SAM II DANS LE SINAI.
Miracle pour les services secrets.

ARMES

Sam II et Mirage IV

La plus belle prise de guerre de l'armée israélienne excite depuis quelques jours l'intérêt passionné des états-majors occidentaux.

On a, en effet, révélé, à Tel-Aviv, la semaine dernière, qu'une batterie de fusées sol-air Sam II de fabrication soviétique, absolument neuve, a été capturée dans le Sinaï, avec tout son dispositif électronique de guidage.

Or, depuis deux ans, de multiples conférences interalliées, réunissant des experts de la balistique stratégique, essayaient vainement de reconstituer, en échangeant les renseignements des services secrets, le système soviétique de guidage. Les Occidentaux n'auront plus, désormais, à s'inquiéter. A condition toutefois que les Israéliens acceptent de leur montrer leur miraculeuse trouvaille.

Paradoxalement, l'état-major français pourrait être favorisé ; un groupe d'experts appartenant à l'armée de l'Air et à la commission de la Défense nationale doit arriver cette semaine en Israël pour observer, en « première », les fusées soviétiques. Motif de cette amabilité : les services rendus par la France aux Mirage et Mystère de l'aviation israélienne, avec discrétion mais efficacité.

Si les diplomates israéliens et l'homme de la rue montrent beaucoup d'humeur devant la neutralité diplomatique du gouvernement français, les militaires, en revanche, admettent qu'ils « n'ont pas eu à se plaindre ». L'embargo sur les armes a souffert de multiples exceptions. Non seulement on a continué à livrer des pièces de rechange, mais quand, au deuxième

jour de l'offensive, les stocks israéliens de roquettes antichars ont commencé à s'épuiser, Paris n'a pas refusé de les recompléter. On a utilisé des voies de livraisons détournées.

Le 6 juin au soir, un premier avion-cargo israélien s'est posé sur le terrain d'Orly. On l'a obligé à repartir à vide, spectaculairement, pour respecter les consignes officielles d'embargo. Mais on l'a discrètement guidé sur un aérodrome hollandais, pour y embarquer une quantité de roquettes de fabrication française. Il se confirme, d'autre part, comme « L'Express » avait été le seul à le révéler la semaine dernière, que l'armée de l'Air israélienne possède secrètement, depuis quelque temps, outre des Mirage III, des bombardiers Mirage IV, en service depuis dix-huit mois dans l'aviation française.

Raison de cette coopération militaire, contraire à l'embargo et au choix de la diplomatie française : l'exécution de contrats commerciaux antérieurs. Les Etats arabes, eux, n'en avaient pas signé.

GEORGES CHAFFARD ■

Cypher CAT A

From Foreign Office to Bahrain

Telegram No: Guidance 166

Date: 30 June, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY

Oil Prices.

Verbatim No. 304/67

In addition to the substantial increase in tanker rates (see also paragraph 2 of Guidance No. 162), the necessity to draw on supplies of more expensive oil from the Western hemisphere (principally to reduce tanker hauls) has increased the cost of supplying the United Kingdom and the rest of Western Europe. The increase in prices now approved by H.M.G. is broadly in line with increases already made in other Western European countries.

2. If it suggested that, as the Arab States have banned exports to the U.K. and U.S. only, other consuming countries should not have to bear price increases you should point out that the present difficulties (which affect all consuming countries) do not stem from this ban but primarily from closure of the Suez Canal and pipelines. The Common problem is basically a tanker shortage rather than a shortage of total oil availability.

Bahrain pass Saving to Abu Dhabi, Doha, Dubai and Muscat.

1 Ruth.
2 Dr Ruth term ~~10~~
3 PA



CONFIDENTIAL.

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM TRIPOLI.

ADDRESSED TO FB TELNO 619 OF 4 JULY

REPEATED FOR INFO TO WASHINGTON TROOPS MALTA TROOPS
CYRENAICA (FOR WAKEFIELD) RAF EL ADEM KUWAIT JEDDA
BAHRAIN AND ROME.

MY TELNO 609: LIBYAN OIL.

REACTION OF NATIONALIST AGITATORS TO LIBYAN GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ON
RESUMPTION OF OIL EXPORTS HAS BEEN TO CALL THROUGH TRIPOLI EMPLOYEES
OF PETROLEUM COMPANIES FOR A GENERAL STRIKE TO LAST FOUR DAYS.

2. AS A RESULT OF THEIR PRESSURE, MARKETS AND MANY SHOPS IN TRIPOLI
HAVE CLOSED THIS MORNING AND MANY WORKERS, INCLUDING BANK EMPLOYEES
HAVE STOPPED WORK. AGITATORS ARE APPARENTLY MAKING ISSUE OF
INCLUSION OF ITALY IN LIST OF COUNTRIES TO WHICH OIL CAN BE EXPORTED,
BUT GENERAL SUPPORT FOR STRIKE MUST BE REGARDED AS REFLECTING
WIDESPREAD POPULAR DISSATISFACTION WITH GOVERNMENT IN GENERAL, AND
A LEGACY OF STATE OF ANARCHY LEFT BY MAZIQ.

3. CRITICAL TRIAL OF STRENGTH BETWEEN POPULACE AND NEW GOVERNMENT
MUST NOW BE IMMINENT. IF GOVERNMENT TAKE STRIKE ACTION LYING
DOWN WORK OF REASSERTING AUTHORITY WILL BE EVEN MORE DIFFICULT
AND INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION COULD BECOME YET MORE SERIOUS.
WE HAVE BEEN TOLD HOWEVER THAT GOVERNMENT HAVE BEGUN BY ARRESTING
LEADING PETROLEUM STRIKERS IN THE CITY. POLICE ARE NOW OUT IN
FORCE IN THE CITY CENTRE TO PREVENT DEMONSTRATIONS. SO FAR
AS WE KNOW STRIKERS STILL CONFINED TO TRIPOLI AND HAS NOT YET
SPREAD TO OIL TERMINALS ALONG THE COAST. I HAVE NO NEWS AS YET
OF SITUATION IN BENGHAZI.

F.O. PASS KUWAIT 15 JEDDA 18 BAHRAIN 13.

1. *Part 1*
2. *Part 2*
3. *PA*

15 JUL 67
1091

1. ~~Revd~~
2. ~~Mr. Parton~~ ~~to~~ ~~PA~~
3. ~~PA~~

6/7

CYPHER/CAT A

FROM KUWAIT

TELNO 246.

DATED 2 JULY

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO 379 OF 2 JULY RPI TO UKNIS

NEW YORK BAHRAIN JEDDAH AND SAVING TO WASHINGTON.

YOURQTEL NO 1402 TO ANNA : GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION.

THE KUWAIT GOVERNMENT WILL CERTAINLY REACT ADVERSELY. THE STRENGTH OF THEIR REACTION WILL DEPEND LARGELY ON THE LINE TAKEN BY THE MORE POWERFUL ARAB STATES AND ON THE DEGREE OF PRESSURE WHICH THESE STATES CAN BRING TO BEAR ON KUWAIT, WHETHER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH PROPAGANDA.

2. THE KUWAIT GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN ORDER. ON RECENT FORM THEY SHOULD SUCCEED. LIFE MAY BECOME MORE UNPLEASANT FOR BRITISH SUBJECTS, BUT APART FROM LOCAL PRECAUTIONS (WHICH WE SHALL TAKE) I DO NOT RECOMMEND ANY SPECIAL MEASURES IN ADVANCE.

3. KUWAIT WILL BE RELUCTANT TO TAKE FRESH ACTION ON OIL, BUT THERE MAY WELL BE TROUBLE WITH THE UNIONS, AND IT IS POSSIBLE THAT BRITISH FLAG TANKERS WILL BE BOYCOTTED, EITHER BY THE UNIONS OR BY THE GOVERNMENT.

4. BRITISH TRADE AND OTHER COMMERCIAL INTERESTS (E G THE B B M E) WILL PROBABLY SUFFER FURTHER, BUT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO QUANTIFY THIS EFFECT. AGITATION FOR A COMPLETE BOYCOTT OF BRITISH GOODS WILL RECEIVE FRESH RESE INPETUS : ITS SUCCESS WILL DEPEND IN PART ON THE ATTITUDE OF ALTERNATIVE SUPPLIERS, NOTABLY FRANCE AND JAPAN.

2. THE KUWAIT GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN ORDER, ON RECENT FORM THEY SHOULD SUCCEED. LIFE MAY BECOME MORE UNPLEASANT FOR BRITISH SUBJECTS, BUT APART FROM LOCAL PRECAUTIONS (WHICH WE SHALL TAKE) I DO NOT RECOMMEND ANY SPECIAL MEASURES IN ADVANCE.

3. KUWAIT WILL BE RELUCTANT TO TAKE FRESH ACTION ON OIL, BUT THERE MAY WELL BE TROUBLE WITH THE UNIONS, AND IT IS POSSIBLE THAT BRITISH FLAG TANKERS WILL BE BOYCOTTED, EITHER BY THE UNIONS OR BY THE GOVERNMENT.

4. BRITISH TRADE AND OTHER COMMERCIAL INTERESTS (E G THE B B M E) WILL PROBABLY SUFFER FURTHER, BUT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO QUANTIFY THIS EFFECT. AGITATION FOR A COMPLETE BOYCOTT OF BRITISH GOODS WILL RECEIVE PREDOMINANT INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. ITS SUCCESS WILL DEPEND IN PART ON THE ATTITUDE OF ALTERNATIVE SUPPLIERS, NOTABLY FRANCE AND JAPAN.

5. MUCH WILL HANG ON THE ORDER OF EVENTS IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND ON THE CONTENT OF OUR SPEECHES AND EXPLANATIONS OF OUR POSITION. I RECOMMEND THAT WE (UNDERLINE FOLLOWING WORD) ETC. FO KUWAIT. (UNDERLINE FOLLOWING WORD) STATEMENTS OF (UNDERLINE FOLLOWING WORD) SAY QS AS IMPORTANT AS WHAT WE (UNDERLINE FOLLOWING WORD) DO. ABSTENTION ON THE QUOTE NON-ALIGNED UNQUOTE RESOLUTION WOULD HELP.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE NEW YORK 5 AND SAVING WASHINGTON
29 SAVING >

6-3-86-4332891VA

1. Rutherford
2. Dr. Park ¹⁰⁰
3. PD.

CONFIDENTIAL.

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM TRIPOLI

ADDRESSED TO F O TELEGRAM NO. 610 OF 3 JULY REPTD FOR INFMN TO TPS
MALTA ANKARA RAF EL ADEM HQ NEAF MADRID PARIS ROME ATHENS WASHINGTON
JEDDA KUWAIT BAHRAIN ALGIERS KHARTOUM BEIRUT AND TROOP CYRENAICA
FOR WAKEFIELD.

H I P T : LIBYAN GOVERNMENT STATEMENT.

STATEMENT WAS ISSUED TOO LATE TO PERMIT MUCH EDITORIAL COMMENT TODAY,
BUT PRELIMINARY REACTION TO NEW PRIME MINISTER EVEN IN NATIONALIST
PAPERS SEEMS FAVOURABLE. I AM RELIEVED TO SEE THAT OFFICIAL GOVERN-
MENT STATEMENT ON RESUMPTION OF OIL EXPORTS TO CERTAIN COUNTRIES AT
LEAST DOES NOT (GP OMITTED) TERMS DESCRIBE BRITAIN WITH UNITED
STATES AS AGGRESSORS OR AS HAVING SUPPORTED ISRAEL; INSTEAD IT
TAKES COVER BEHIND THE COAT TAILS OF BAGHDAD CONFERENCE RESOLUTION.
NEVERTHELESS I AM TOLD THAT RADIO LIBYA CHARACTERISTICALLY PREFACED
THE STATEMENT BY THEIR OWN GLOSS DESCRIBING OURSELVES AND THE U S
AS AGGRESSORS.

2. THE STATEMENT DOES NOT SPECIFY WHETHER EXPORTS ARE TO BE RESUMED
TO WEST GERMANY. THIS IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT TO OASIS OIL WHO
SEND SOME 50% OF THEIR PRODUCT TO GERMANY. THE PETROLEUM WORKERS
HAVE TODAY REACTED TO THE STATEMENT CALLING ANOTHER STRIKE APPARENT-
LY IN PROTEST AGAINST THE ALLEGED INTENTION TO RESUME EXPORTS TO
WEST GERMANY. THIS STRIKE WILL BE THE FIRST TRIAL OF STRENGTH
BETWEEN THE INTRANSIGENT PETROLEUM WORKERS AND THE NEW GOVERNMENT
AND ON ITS OUTCOME THE PROSPECTS OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN RESTORING
AUTHORITY IN LIBYA WILL LARGELY DEPEND.

3. BP GENERAL MANAGER TELLS ME TODAY THAT UNDER SECRETARY OF MIN. OF
PETROLEUM HAD GIVEN HIM AUTHORITY TO RESUME EXPORTS.

JARONSKI HAD EXPLAINED:

- A) THAT THERE WOULD BE NO RPT NO FLAG DISCRIMINISTION AND THAT
BRITISH FLAG TANKERS WERE ACCEPTABLE.
- B) THAT OIL COULD BE LOADED ONLY FOR FRANCE ITALY SPAIN TURKEY
GREECE AND NOT FOR BRITAIN OR U.S. SHIPMENTS WERE NOT TO EXCEED

LY IN PROTEST AGAINST THE ALLEGED INTENTION TO RESUME EXPORTS TO WEST GERMANY. THIS STRIKE WILL BE THE FIRST TRIAL OF STRENGTH BETWEEN THE INTRANSIGENT PETROLEUM WORKERS AND THE NEW GOVERNMENT AND ON ITS OUTCOME THE PROSPECTS OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN RESTORING AUTHORITY IN LIBYA WILL LARGELY DEPEND.

3. BP GENERAL MANAGER TELLS ME TODAY THAT UNDER SECRETARY OF MIN. OF PETROLEUM HAD GIVEN HIM AUTHORITY TO RESUME EXPORTS.

JARONSKI HAD EXPLAINED:

A) THAT THERE WOULD BE NO RPT NO FLAG DISCRIMINISTION AND THAT BRITISH FLAG TANKERS WERE ACCEPTABLE.

B) THAT OIL COULD BE LOADED ONLY FOR FRANCE ITALY SPAIN TURKEY GREECE AND NOT FOR BRITAIN OR U.S. SHIPMENTS WERE NOT TO EXCEED QUANTITIES TO THESE DESTINATIONS IN PREVIOUS YEAR BUT MR. HAINES THOUGHT THIS MIGHT NOT BE CLOSELY CONTROLLED. ORDERS FROM ANY OTHER COUNTRY SHOULD BE REFERRED TO THE MINISTRY. THERE WAS NO REFERENCE TO WEST GERMANY.

C) CERTIFICATES OF DELIVERY TO DESTINATION ARE TO BE REQUIRED AS ALWAYS BUT THERE IS NO MENTION OF ANY IRAQI TYPE GUARANTEE AGAINST RE EXPORT.

F O PASS BAHRAIN 12.

1. Ruler
2. Your Party to ~~the~~ ^{opp.}
3. P.A.

CYPHER/CAT A
FROM KUWAIT
TELNO 247.
DATED 2 JULY
PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FO TEL NO. 382 OF 2 JULY RPTD FOR INFMN TO
UKMIS NEW YORK, BAHRAIN, JEDDA AND SAVING TO WASHINGTON
YOUR TEL NO. 1401 TO AMMAN : GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS.
I SPOKE ACCORDINGLY THIS EVENING TO THE ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER
(ATIQI). HE TOOK THE EXPLANATION CALMLY. HE THOUGHT THAT
NEITHER RESOLUTION WOULD SUCCEED: THE UNITED STATES WERE
PRESSING THE LATIN AMERICANS TO VOTE AGAINST THE 'NON ALIGNED'
DRAFT, WHILST THE ARABS AND THEIR FRIENDS WOULD BLOCK THE
'LATIN AMERICAN' DRAFT.

2. ATIQI THEN SAID THAT HE WISHED TO SPEAK TO ME IN A FRIENDLY
AND INFORMAL MANNER ABOUT OUR LONGER TERM INTERESTS. ANGLO-
KUWAITI FRIENDSHIP WAS LONGSTANDING. OUR INTERESTS IN KUWAIT
HAD SUFFERED LITTLE DAMAGE SO FAR, AND NO DOUBT THEY WOULD
SURVIVE THIS NEW BLOW; THAT WAS THE WAY THE KUWAIT GOVERNMENT
WANTED IT AT ANY RATE. BUT WE SHOULD NOT GO ON TAKING ARAB
ACQUIESCEANCE FOR GRANTED; SOONER OR LATER WE SHOULD LOSE OUT.
THE KUWAIT GOVERNMENT WERE ALREADY UNDER STRONG PRESSURE
FROM THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE TO BOYCOTT BRITISH GOODS AND TO
TAKE AC

ION AGAINST BRITISH COMMERCIAL INSTITUTIONS. HE
HIMSELF WAS UNDER FIRE FOR DEFENDING THE BBME. THIS COULD
NOT GO ON MUCH LONGER; ONE DAY WE WOULD WAKE UP TO A BOYCOTT.

94 "2972 23 -"7.3 50-5 974 982 8,5343"5" 2343 0499% -0-8, "5

-.-0

GO ON MUCH LONGER; ONE DAY WE WOULD WAKE UP TO A BOYCOTT.
94 "COULD WE ASSUME THAT OUR OIL INTERESTS WERE PROOF AGAINST

TAKE AC

ION AGAINST BRITISH COMMERCIAL INSTITUTIONS. HE
HIMSELF WAS UNDER FIRE FOR DEFENDING THE BBME. THIS COULD
NOT GO ON MUCH LONGER: ONE DAY WE WOULD WAKE UP TO A BOYCOTT.

94 '2972 23 -"7.3 52-5 974 983 6,5343'5' 2343 0499% -0-8, '5

-.-0

GO ON MUCH LONGER: ONE DAY WE WOULD WAKE UP TO A BOYCOTT.

94 'COULD WE ASSUME THAT OUR OIL INTERESTS WERE PROOF AGAINST
DAMAGE, HOWEVER RELUCTANT THE KUWAIT GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE TOA

TAKE ACT

3. THIS RED TO AN HOUR'S AR

DAMAGE, HOWEVER RELUCTANT THE KUWAIT GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE TOA
TAKE ACTION AGAINST THEM.

3. THIS RED TO AN HOUR'S ARGUMENT ABOUT THE HISTORY OF
PALESTINE. ATIQI'S PRINCIPAL COMPLAINT WAS THAT SHE MUST
ALWAYS APPLIED ONE STANDARD TO THE ARABS AND ANOTHER TO THE
JEWS. I REMINDED HIM THAT YOU HAD RECENTLY LECTURED THE HOUSE
OF COMMONS ON THIS VERY POINT, AND HE ADMITTED THAT THE POSITION
YOU HAD TAKEN WAS 'VERY FAIR'. HE COMPLAINED BITTERLY HOWEVER
ABOUT HMG'S ATTITUDE ON THE GULF OF AQABA BEFORE THE FIGHTING
(THIS STILL RANKLES HERE - NOBODY WILL LISTEN TO ARGUMENTS
ON INTERNATIONAL STRAITS). HIS WHOLE ATTITUDE LENT COLOUR
TO THE VIEW THAT OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS MATTER A GREAT DEAL
TO THE ARABS; U COMPARE PARA 5 OF MY TEL. NO. 379

FO PASS UKMIS NEW YORK 1 (IMMEDIATE) AND SAVING TO WASHINGTON 30



02319332

FM ASOLHY

789

TO OO ASOLDQ

230

GUIDANCE 15823

Guidance telegrams Nos. 128 and 157 Middle East

Arab Radios are now distorting part of a press conference given by Rear Admiral Ashmore in Singapore on 22 June in which he is quoted as saying that Buccaneers from his flagship H.M.S. Hermes could have made the round trip from Aden to the scene of fighting on 6 June and adding that tanker aircraft were airborne from the carrier on that day.

2. By suppressing the rest of the Rear Admiral's statements and ignoring the academic nature of the question he was answering Arab propaganda is attempting to renew accusations of British intervention. In rebutting you should use the following:-

(a) The press conference was called specifically to deny charges that aircraft from H.M.S. Hermes were involved and indeed the agencies reported Rear Admiral Ashmore as saying of them, "I have never heard so much nonsense in my life".

(b) He stressed that the carrier was stationary, and in public view, in Aden outer harbour on 5 June, the day of the alleged intervention.

(c) The academic question about the Buccaneers' performance capabilities related only to 6 June when H.M.S. Hermes was at sea (mostly within sight of Aden).

(d) Logs were produced to the press showing that on 6 June no practice sortie exceeded one and one half hours in duration. To reach the Nile Delta required 4 and one half to 5 hours.

SOSFA/CROSEC

Distribution

File
M/F
CCPG
Gulf posts.

P.A.

Xr Paul f
An
6522 Int
YHO

MUSCAT



PA.

7/1
7/2

To P.M. AB

Amz
6302 1W G.

7/2

CYPHER/CAT A
FROM FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. GUIDANCE 164

28 JUNE, 1967

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO CERTAIN MISSIONS TELEGRAM NUMBER GUIDANCE 164 OF
28 JUNE.

ARAB-ISRAEL.

THE FLIGHT RECORDS OF ROYAL NAVY AND R.A.F. AIRCRAFT DURING THE
RECENT ARAB-ISRAEL WAR HAVE NOW BEEN PLACED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS
LIBRARY.

2. THEY REVEAL A NUMBER OF FACTS WHICH COULD BE MANIPULATED TO REVIVE
THE BIG LIE STORIES. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE MAIN EXAMPLES:

(i) H.M.S. VICTORIOUS WAS NOT ACTUALLY IN HARBOUR AT MALTA WHEN THE
FIRST ISRAELI AIR STRIKES WERE TAKING PLACE. HER LOGS THEREFORE DO
NOT BEAR OUT LORD CARADON'S STATEMENT TO THE UNITED NATIONS THAT BOTH
CARRIERS WERE STATIONARY IN HARBOUR AT THE TIME OF THE ATTACKS AND
HIS IMPLICATION THAT R.N. AIRCRAFT COULD NOT HAVE TAKEN PART BECAUSE
AIRCRAFT CANNOT TAKE OFF FROM A STATIONARY CARRIER.

(ii) ANSWERS:

(a) THE SHIPS LOG VERIFIES THAT THE VICTORIOUS PUT INTO MALTA HARBOUR
AT 0900 HOURS ON 5 JUNE AND THAT SHE WAS CLOSE TO MALTA THROUGHOUT
THE TIME SHE WAS AT SEA DURING 4 AND 5 JUNE.

(b) NO AIRCRAFT OTHER THAN HELICOPTERS TOOK OFF FROM H.M.S.

VICTORIOUS AFTER 1500 HOURS ON 4 JUNE: A NIGHT FLYING EXERCISE WHICH

THE BIG LIE STORIES. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE MAIN EXAMPLES:

(1) H.M.S. VICTORIOUS WAS NOT ACTUALLY IN HARBOUR AT MALTA WHEN THE FIRST ISRAELI AIR STRIKES WERE TAKING PLACE. HER LOGS THEREFORE DO NOT BEAR OUT LORD CARADON'S STATEMENT TO THE UNITED NATIONS THAT BOTH CARRIERS WERE STATIONARY IN HARBOUR AT THE TIME OF THE ATTACKS AND HIS IMPLICATION THAT R.N. AIRCRAFT COULD NOT HAVE TAKEN PART BECAUSE AIRCRAFT CANNOT TAKE OFF FROM A STATIONARY CARRIER.

(1) ANSWERS:

(A) THE SHIPS LOG VERIFIES THAT THE VICTORIOUS PUT INTO MALTA HARBOUR AT 0900 HOURS ON 5 JUNE AND THAT SHE WAS CLOSE TO MALTA THROUGHOUT THE TIME SHE WAS AT SEA DURING 4 AND 5 JUNE.

(B) NO AIRCRAFT OTHER THAN HELICOPTERS TOOK OFF FROM H.M.S. VICTORIOUS AFTER 1500 HOURS ON 4 JUNE; A NIGHT FLYING EXERCISE WHICH HAD BEEN SCHEDULED FOR 4 JUNE WAS CANCELLED Owing TO A DEFECTIVE RADAR AND BAD WEATHER OVER THE DIVERSIONARY AIRFIELD.

(1) H.M.S. HERMES WAS IN ADEN HARBOUR DURING 4 AND 5 JUNE BUT:

(A) SHE WAS AT SEA ON 5 JUNE AND

(B) TWO OF HER BUCCANEERS WERE OPERATING FROM KHORNAKSAR ON MONDAY, 5 JUNE.

ANSWER

THE LOGS REVEAL THAT NONE OF THE FLIGHTS DURING THIS PERIOD WAS LONG ENOUGH TO ENABLE AN AIRCRAFT TO REACH EGYPT OR ISRAEL.

(1) THE LOGS FOR BOTH AIRCRAFT CARRIERS SHOW THAT THE PRACTICE OF IN-FLIGHT REFUELLED IS USED, AND THAT THEORETICALLY BY THIS MEANS IT WOULD HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE FOR ANY STRIKE AIRCRAFT FLYING FROM THE CARRIERS TO HAVE REACHED THE BATTLE AREA. (THIS POINT DOES CONFLICT WITH OUR OFFICIAL ASSURANCES THAT THE AIRCRAFT NOT ONLY DID NOT BUT COULD NOT REACH THE BATTLE AREA).

ANSWER

THE LOGS DEMONSTRATE HOWEVER THAT NO SUCH FLIGHTS TOOK PLACE.

IN-FLIGHT REFUELING IS USED, AND THAT THEORETICALLY BY THIS MEANS IT WOULD HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE FOR ANY STRIKE AIRCRAFT FLYING FROM THE CARRIERS TO HAVE REACHED THE BATTLE AREA. (THIS POINT DOES CONFLICT WITH OUR OFFICIAL ASSURANCES THAT THE AIRCRAFT NOT ONLY DID NOT BUT COULD NOT REACH THE BATTLE AREA).

ANSWER

THE LOGS DEMONSTRATE HOWEVER THAT NO SUCH FLIGHTS TOOK PLACE.

(CIV) CANBERRA FLIGHTS FROM AKROTIRI. THERE WERE ALTOGETHER 63 CANBERRA FLIGHTS DURING THE PERIOD OF SUFFICIENT DURATION TO HAVE ALLOWED THE AIRCRAFT TO REACH THE BATTLE AREA AT LEAST ON THE SYRIAN FRONT.

ANSWER

THE DOCUMENTS CLEARLY SHOW THAT THE AIRCRAFT WERE ON ROUTINE TRAINING TASKS NOWHERE NEAR THE BATTLE AREA, AND IN SOME CASES WERE LOADED WITH SMALL NUMBERS OF 25 POUND PRACTICE BOMBS.

(CV3) A SINGLE PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE CANBERRA FROM THE SQUADRON AT LUQA IN MALTA WAS ON A ROUTINE ATTACHMENT TO MUHARRAQ.

THE DOCUMENTS RECORD THAT A PHOTO RECO RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT WAS FLYING ON MISSIONS LABELLED "TASK 703" AND "TASK 704" ON 5 AND 6 JUNE.

ANSWER

THESE TASKS WERE IN FACT TO PHOTOGRAPH DISUSED AIRFIELDS IN MUSCAT.

(CV1) ONE SET OF DOCUMENTS COVERS "OPERATION HYDRAULIC", THIS WAS FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF NO. 74 LIGHTNING SQUADRON TO THE FAR EAST. AS PART OF THIS OPERATION A NUMBER OF VICTOR TANKER AIRCRAFT FOR RE-FUELLING THE LIGHTnings WERE PASSING THROUGH AKROTIRI ON THE DAYS IN QUESTION.

ANSWER

THE DOCUMENTATION SHOWS THAT THE VICTORS WERE BEING USED AS TANKER AIRCRAFT AND NOT BOMBERS, REVEALS THE COMPLICATED NATURE OF THE RE-FUELLING OPERATION, AND THE IMPOSSIBILITY THAT IT COULD HAVE BEEN A BLIND.

FUELLING THE LIGHTnings WERE PASSING THROUGH AKROTIRI ON THE DAYS
IN QUESTION.

ANSWER

THE DOCUMENTATION SHOWS THAT THE VICTORS WERE BEING USED AS TANKER AIRCRAFT AND NOT BOMBERS, REVEALS THE COMPLICATED NATURE OF THE RE-FUELLING OPERATION, AND THE IMPOSSIBILITY THAT IT COULD HAVE BEEN A BLIND.

(VIII) EXERCISE "SUNSPOT" WAS IN PROGRESS DURING THE PERIOD IN QUESTION, THIS IS AN EXERCISE WHICH IS REGULARLY HELD TWICE A YEAR, MAKING USE OF THE TRAINING FACILITIES WE ENJOY BY TREATY WITH THE LIBYAN GOVT, AND INVOLVES THE DEPLOYMENT OF VULCAN BOMBER AIRCRAFT TO LUQA, FOR THE PURPOSE OF PRACTISING LOW-LEVEL FLYING OVER THE LIBYAN DESERT AND BOMBING ON THE EL ADEN RANGE. SIX SORTIES IN ALL TOOK PLACE ON 5 AND 6 JUNE AND NONE ON 7 JUNE.

ANSWER

THERE WAS GOOD REASON AND PRECEDENT FOR THE PRESENCE OF THESE AIRCRAFT IN MALTA AND FOR THEIR EXERCISE WHICH HAD BEEN ARRANGED LONG IN ADVANCE.

3. THE FACT THAT THE DOCUMENTS DO CONTAIN SUCH FULL DETAILS SOME OF WHICH MIGHT BE THOUGHT BY THE ILL-DISPOSED TO REQUIRE EXPLANATION IS ITSELF EVIDENCE OF THEIR GENUINE NATURE.

4. THE ABOVE IS A PURELY DEFENSIVE BRIEF FOR DEALING WITH ANY NEW STORIES ARISING FROM THE DOCUMENTS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. THESE WILL ALSO BE AVAILABLE IN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE TO ACCREDITED CORRESPONDENTS AND SERVICE ATTACHES, BUT NO POSITIVE PUBLICITY IS BEING ARRANGED.

(BAHRAIN PASS SAVING ABU DHABI, DOHA, DUBAI AND MUSCAT)

5/11/67

Circ. Retract 89228

Item. No evidence whatsoever of British intervention says Hussein from LPS Diplomatic Correspondent Eryk James, New York, Wednesday.

King Hussein of Jordan has said on television here that he has no evidence whatsoever that Britain or the United States were involved, directly or indirectly, in the recent Middle East war. He was being interviewed in the NBC programme "Today Show". The interviewer, Pauline Frederick, asked the King 'Your Majesty, do you have any evidence that the United States and/or the United Kingdom were involved, either directly or indirectly, in this war?' King Hussein replied: 'No, we have no evidence whatsoever. He went on to talk of what had been seen on Jordan radar. We had some radar sighting of aircraft that were appearing from the sea, he said. We faced a tremendous and overwhelming enemy air force that covered all the skies of Jordan There were some wrong identifications of aircraft.

King Hussein added that the radar had soon been destroyed. Israeli aircraft. King Hussein continued many of the things we had seen were explained later. For example, these aircraft that we had sighted on radar apparently were Israeli aircraft returning from their attacks on the United Arab Republic, which they had carried out at low level, and on the way back were climbing. 'And that is when we spotted them' he added.

Distribution

File
M/File
CCPG
Gulf Posts.

1. John Dr Park AB
RMC
GSA/LRF
TMO

5 Yr P.M. 26/6/67
(1073/340/67) FCO 21.7.67.

Yrs.

- 5 JULY 1967

Verbatim Service 299

26 June, 1967

Middle East

The following are extracts from supplementaries to statement by Foreign Secretary in House of Commons, today (26 June, 1967) on his visit to New York:-

(Mr. Heath speaking)

Mr. Heath: We are grateful to the Foreign Secretary for making this statement. I hope he realises that the reason for what he described as the mixed reception to his speech here is that by his emphasis of the non-aggrandisement followed immediately in that particular part of his speech by his reference to Jerusalem, he appeared to be doing exactly what he said he did not wish to do, which was to forecast what the eventual arrangements are going to be. This, in fact appeared to be a return to the exact status quo from which the trouble had originally sprung.

May I therefore put to him this question? Is it his view that the final frontiers remain to be settled as one part of the total final package arrangement?.....

Mr. Brown:When we come to a final settlement, the right of the states to live in true dignity, in freedom, to be able to earn their living in peace - that is what I said in New York: that is what I believe - that will have to be balanced against some other demands that will be made. I do not think this is the moment to pre-judge all that.....

Mr. Heath....What evidence was there that Israel was intending formally to annex the old city of Jerusalem? No evidence was or has been produced. The Foreign Secretary owes it to the House to say so....

Mr. Brown.... There are other things to be taken into account. I do know that no annexation of the old city has taken place and I am relieved about that.....

Mr. Shirwell...In view of the conversations he had with Mr. Kosygin, President Johnson and others, did he seek a conversation with the Israeli Foreign Minister before he made his speech at the United Nations in order to ascertain what the intentions of the Israeli Government were? Did he do so?.....

Mr. Brown:As to whether I discussed my speech with Mr. Eban before I made it, the answer is that I most certainly did not. I am about to explain if the House will hold itself for a second.

Many delegates, many other Foreign Ministers, many Prime Ministers, wanted to see me before I made my speech. I decided that if I saw any of them before I spoke there was the gravest risk of it being alleged that what I said was due to the influence of someone or other. For this reason - because I had reason to worry about what was going to happen and I wanted to do what I could to ensure that it did not happen.... I ask my Right Honourable Friend not to ignore the value to us of our friendship with the Arabs and not to ignore the contribution we need to make in that area. But any idea that I will engage in

/double

double talk can be written off straight away.

I spoke to every single delegate in New York privately, just as I did in public, in exactly the same terms and they all know the basis on which I think a settlement should emerge.

Sir d'Avigdor-Goldsid: Can the Foreign Secretary say whether, having failed to speak to the Israeli Foreign Secretary before he made his speech, he took the opportunity of speaking to him afterwards?

Mr. Brown: There was no failure to speak to him beforehand. Would I have spoken to the Egyptians beforehand? Would I have spoken to the Saudi Arabians beforehand? Why does one choose the Israelis as the one to whom one speaks to beforehand while refusing to speak to all the others?

I took the decision that the right position for Her Majesty's Foreign Secretary was to make a speech on behalf of Her Majesty's Government and of this House before I discussed the merits of it with anybody else's Foreign Minister. After I had made the speech I saw the Israeli Foreign Minister twice - twice - and I saw everybody else - every Arab, African, and Asian, who was concerned in the dispute at least once, many of them also twice, and I cannot believe that anybody else in my position would have done it any other way round.

Mr. John Hynd: While it would be difficult for anyone to object to the principle of no territorial aggrandisement as a result of the war, may I ask my Right Honourable Friend to give an assurance that his words do not mean that he expects Israel to withdraw during a state of war which she did not wish for but which has been insisted upon throughout by Colonel Nasser, thereby leaving the Gulf of Aqaba and free access to her own territory again to be subject to Arab aggression?

Mr. Brown: The Rt. Hon. gentleman will see that in the speech which I made I dealt with the question of withdrawal. I said publicly as I said privately to everyone to whom I spoke that withdrawal would be unrealistic unless some other issues were faced by other people. On the question of the Gulf of Aqaba I believe that one of the things that we must do is to get that international seaway, as well as others, opened up on terms that will ensure that no one will again be in any doubt as to their continuance and their remaining open.

Mr. Naudling:.... Will the Foreign Secretary, following up the question immediately before, make it absolutely clear that in talking about territorial aggrandisement he did not rule out the negotiated alterations of frontiers in order to ensure security in future?

Mr. Brown: I frankly believe that these are issues that have to come out in the final settlement which I want to be a lasting settlement. I want it to be acceptable, equitable and justifiable, it will take some little time to reach, and I do not think that I would help very much by prejudging it and offering a view now as to what ought to be done.

Mr. Orme:.... May I ask what progress he has made with U Thant and the United Nations for getting the adviser into the Middle East as soon as possible? Secondly, can he say what the United Nations can do, for the refugee problem?

Mr. Brown:.... I discussed it at great length with U Thant. It would be wrong to say that I made a lot of progress because it is

/rather

rather early in the day. I discussed it at length with members of the Security Council and with very many members of the Assembly. My Rt. Honourable and Noble Friend Lord Caradon who is our Minister there is carrying on with the negotiations about this and I hope that we will have worked out, before the end of this Assembly an arrangement whereby it will come about.

On the question of refugees, it is now being worked on as to how we can arrange for them to be looked after. We have made funds and other comforts available in considerable quantities. We will go on doing that and will do all that we can to ensure that other people do so.

Mr. Paget: Would my Rt. Hon. Friend tell us which of the nations whose boundaries are to be adjusted as a result of the recent war are likely to be influenced by anything we say as to the decisions they take upon that subject? Would not we perhaps get less ill if we were to keep rather quiet upon questions in which we have no power to make our influence felt?

Mr. Brown: There is a widely held view, I am told, that if one keeps quiet, people respect one the more. I am bound to tell my Hon. and Learned Friend that that is not my experience.

Mr. Strausse: Is my Rt. Hon. Friend aware that his statement made it appear that he and the Government were completely opposed to any boundary adjustment which might secure to Israel some greater security against the permanent threat of extermination by armed force by the Arab countries? Can he give us categorical assurance that he did not have that in mind and that the question of boundary adjustments remains open as far as the Government are concerned?

Mr. Brown: I refer my Rt. Hon Friend to what I said, if he will do me the honour of reading it, he will see that his supplementary question could not possibly have been based on what I said.....

Distribution

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Gulf Posts.

Mr Parl. *SP*
 Mr
 9mo 2 Int. L.
 870.

PRODROME BAHRAIN

CENTROFORM LDN

VERBATIM SERVICE 298

Date: 26 June 1967

Middle East

The following is a verbatim text of a statement by the Foreign Secretary to the House of Commons on June 26 on his visit to New York:-

With your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, I wish to make a statement on my visit to New York.

During the five days that I was in the United States I addressed the Emergency Session of the United Nations General Assembly. I had long and valuable talks in Washington with President Johnson and in New York with Mr. Kosygin and Mr. Gromyko, with Mr. Rusk, Monsieur Couve De Murville and with the Foreign Ministers and other representatives of almost all the countries directly concerned in the Middle East crisis.

The main theme of my speech to the General Assembly was to emphasise the urgent need to begin to deal at once with practical problems - the things we could do and ought to be doing now. I spoke also about some of the elements which had to be included in any final settlement, in particular I referred to the provisions of the United Nations Charter which call for all Countries to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of any other country. I made it clear also that in our view all States in the Middle East had a right to live in genuine independence speaking on the lines of the speech I made in Nottingham just before I went. I said that territorial aggrandisement as a result of war was contrary to the provisions of the United Nations Charter and that other elements in a final settlement must be a long overdue solution of the refugee problem, the necessity for free and innocent passage through International Waterways for the ships of all nations and the urgent requirement for an agreement on arms limitation. All this would, no doubt, require long and difficult negotiation and it is too early to see the outcome, meanwhile there are certain practical steps which should be taken now. These included nomination by the Secretary-General of a representative, of unquestioned standing, who should go at once to the area and advise on the whole range of problems resulting from the cease-fire. In particular he could make recommendations for strengthening the work of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation and upon the form which a new United Nations Military presence in the Middle East might take. There were a range of urgent problems also relating to those who had had to flee from their homes as a result of the war, not only must they be allowed to return to their homes, but the United Nations Relief and Works Agency and the voluntary organisations must be provided urgently with the means of relieving their distress.

Apart from these problems I spoke of the urgent need to get the Suez Canal open again and I dealt very firmly with the vicious allegations about British involvement in the fighting. I ended my speech with a solemn warning that if the United Nations made no progress involving these problems, there was a very real danger that it might go the way of the League of Nations.

I had been the first speaker to emphasise the need to tackle urgent practical problems now and I was encouraged by the degree of support that I received for this from subsequent speakers. The speech was I think well received in the United Nations itself and in newspapers, television and radio comment in New York. I gather that it has had a more mixed reception in this country. I must emphasise that we must at all costs avoid falling into the trap of applying a double standard, would a similar line have been taken if the war had gone the other way? - For example, if the Arab Air Force had struck first and if Arab Armies had occupied significant parts of the territory of Israel? What would then have been said about the permanent retention of territorial gains made by conquest?

As for the status of Jerusalem, May I remind the House of the attitude of successive British Governments in the past. The Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan in 1949 left the city divided between Israel and Jordan and this de facto partition persisted until the recent hostilities. But a General Assembly resolution of 9 December, 1949 provided that there should be a unified city under International control. Her Majesty's Government, along with most other Western Governments, have always withheld recognition of the claims to sovereignty over Jerusalem by both Jordan and Israel pending a final settlement. For this reason our Embassy in Israel, like those of most other countries, is in Tel Aviv and not in Jerusalem. Our Consul-General in Jerusalem is subordinate neither to the Ambassador in Tel Aviv nor to the Ambassador in Amman but directly to the Foreign Office.

I therefore went on in my speech in New York to warn the Israel Government not to inject another complication into the situation which is already more than sufficiently complicated by purporting to Annex the old City. This is not simply a problem of religious administration of the holy places. It is not simply a problem of access to the Holy places. Of course we are all in favour of free access by all - Jews, Christians and Moslems - to their places of worship. The problem is one of sovereignty over territory and the Israel Government would in my view be very unwise indeed to attempt to prejudge the form of an eventual settlement. I am not asking for the return of a divided Jerusalem nor do I want to forecast what the eventual arrangements may be, except to repeat that any lasting settlement of which they form part must among other things clearly recognise the right of all States concerned to live in true dignity and true freedom.

I spent the rest of my time discussing the Middle East crisis and bilateral problems with those who had come to New York to attend the Assembly.

It would not be proper to go into details of confidential discussions, but the House may take it that I left those Arab delegates concerned in no doubt about our attitude to their completely unjustified interruption of our oil supplies and to the closure of the Suez Canal. This is a matter in which we must of course work with our friends who share an interest in getting the Canal reopened. I might add that this interest is not all one-sided., The United Arab Republic itself is a heavy loser as a result of the closure of this International Waterway. I also had valuable talks on matters of mutual interest with representatives from areas other than the Middle East.

As regards the future, much will depend on the outcome of the talks which took place between President Johnson and Mr. Kosygin. I would expect the debate in the United Nations Assembly to continue for at least a week and maybe longer. During this time there will be much discussion on the floor and behind the scenes of the kind of resolution which would command a majority vote in the Assembly. Her Majesty's Government are of course taking a full part in these discussions. It is too early to say what will be the outcome.

I believe that my visit to New York enabled me to urge upon all in the United Nations the vital necessity of tackling the immediate practical problems. I was also able to make clear in my speech and in my numerous private discussions that the main interest of the United Kingdom was in a lasting settlement acceptable to all parties: Equitable and therefore justifiable.

Ends Vs 298.

CYPHER CAT A

From: Foreign Office

Telegram: Guidance 160

Date: 26 June 1967

CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY

The Path *aff.*
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XO.

Soviet Arms for the Arab countries.

Arab supplies, especially to the U A R Syria Iraq and Algeria have been a major factor in increasing Russian influence in the Arab world during the last decade. Over that period the Soviet Union and East European countries have delivered about one thousand million pounds sterling worth, about half of it to the U A R (though it is very doubtful whether all this has been paid).

2. The recent U A R losses have been very great. Amongst these there were up to 900 tanks and armoured self propelled guns, several thousand vehicles, several hundred Artillery guns, over two hundred fighter aircraft, and over fifty light and medium bombers, as well as great quantities of smaller arms.

3. The Soviet Union is faced with difficult choices in deciding its policy about future supplies. The following is a reasonable line of speculation on which you may draw discreetly if you think useful.

4. In the short term the Russians must maintain supplies to the Arab countries, particularly the U A R, if they are to recover some of the prestige and influence they have lost by their recent "Let down" of the Arabs. Reports in the press e.g. The London Times of June 22 about deliveries of one hundred and fifty M I G aircraft may not be very far from the truth though we cannot confirm this, still less that they were all M I G 21's as the report states.

5. The Russians would probably have no great difficulty in providing replacements for the Egyptian losses. The cost to them might be fairly high, because in the present state of the Egyptian economy they would have in effect to be free, and the strain on Soviet shipping of any rush deliveries of vast quantities of vehicles and armour might be severe. But if the job were given high priority it could probably be done in a period of months rather than years. Egyptian demands for more up to date equipment or missile systems would probably present the Russians with more difficult problems.

6. Recent events must have impressed the Russians with the dangers of arming the Arabs to the point where they can seriously threaten Israel, without adequate control over Arab actions which they seem unlikely to acquire. They were clearly anxious to avoid the M E crisis giving rise to the dangers of direct Military confrontation with the United States, and they cannot have relished the choice, which recent U A R action forced on them, of either risking such a confrontation or seeing their proteges defeated. A repeat performance would make the Russians look very silly.

7. It seems likely therefore that the Russians will;

(a) Make early and fairly substantial deliveries especially of primarily defensive weapons in an attempt to recover some of their political prestige and influence, and

(b) Do their best to postpone making a decision about providing full re-equipment of the U A R forces.

(c) Be particularly reluctant to let the U A R have more modern, primarily offensive equipment of the kind the U A R would no doubt like.

8. This does not mean that they will necessarily be prepared to contemplate agreements with western countries about arms limitation. But all out exploitation of Arab desire for revenge would be contrary to their own interests and their great power responsibility for avoiding any risk of a wider war.

9. It is significant that President Podgorny's visit to Cairo produced no statement of commitment to specify support for the U A R. There is for example no evidence yet that the Russians are prepared to underwrite losses of revenue which the arab states may inflict on themselves by interrupting oil supplies or the Suez Canal.

(BAHRAIN PASS SAVING DUBAI, DOHA, ABU DHABI AND MUSCAT)

PRODROME BAHRAIN

CENTROFORM LDN.

CORRECTION TO VS 299 27/6/67

Correction to VS 299. After fourth paragraph which ends
"The Foreign Secretary owes it to the House to say so...."
Please insert the following:

Mr. Brown.....There is a very distinguished team of people who serve in our posts abroad most of them know to him, and a very distinguished team of advisers, on all of whom he relied. I had every reason to take the moment for saying what I said.

Mr. Thorpe....Would he not agree that it would be unethical if our present stand now were to indicate that we are seeking to revive friendship with the Arab countries at the price of selling the Israelis down the river?

Mr. Brown.....That is never a charge that could ever be really levied at me with any justice. For very highly personal reasons, I have every reason for caring about the integrity, peaceful defence and the right to live of Israel and there is not the slightest chance of my forgetting that. Britain has important, vital interests in that part of the world and a British Foreign Secretary has to consider them as well as other things, that is what I was trying to do.

||

Mr. William Hamilton.....Can he say whether there has been any response by the Israeli Government to his suggestion that Jerusalem should be regarded as more or less an international free city in view of what is reported in the press today about the attitude of the Mayor of Jerusalem to this matter?

Mr. Brown.....I have had no comment from the Israeli Government about the question of Jerusalem's future, nor would I expect it at the moment. But I said in my speech that this must be part of the final settlement. There are other things to be taken into account. I do know that no annexation of the city has taken place and I am relieved about that....

Please delete the fifth paragraph beginning "Mr. Brown.... There are other things" and ending "I am relieved about that..."

The rest of VS 299 beginning at sixth paragraph "Mr. Shinwell... In view of the conversations" is correct.

PRODROME BAHRAIN

CYPHER/CAT A

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. GUIDANCE 168

30 JUNE, 1967

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO CERTAIN MISSIONS GUIDANCE 168 OF 30 JUNE.

ARAB/ISRAEL.

THE ARABS' RELUCTANCE TO DISBELIEVE ALL VERSIONS OF THE BIG LIE SPRINGS IN PART FROM A NEED TO BELIEVE THAT THE ISRAELIS COULD NOT HAVE DEFEATED THEM SO THOROUGHLY WITHOUT OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE.

2. THIS NEED MIGHT BE TO SOME EXTENT SATISPIED BY DIRECTING THEIR ATTENTION DISCREETLY TO THE DEGREE OF FRENCH SUPPORT FOR THE ISRAELI AIR FORCE, WHICH IS ALMOST ENTIRELY EQUIPPED WITH FRENCH AIRCRAFT. ||


3. IN FACT THE SIZE OF THE ISRAELI AIR FORCE IS SURPRISINGLY SMALL, AND THE DECISIVE FACTOR FOR ITS VICTORY WAS ITS GREAT EFFICIENCY: IT IS ESTIMATED FOR EXAMPLE THAT PILOTS FLEW UP TO 10 SORTIES A DAY, WHICH WOULD ACCOUNT FOR THE IMPRESSION OF QUOTE WAVE UPON WAVE UNQUOTE OF HOSTILE AIRCRAFT WHICH APPARENTLY LED KING HUSSEIN TO ASSUME OUTSIDE INTERVENTION.



1. ~~Reinforce~~ ~~17/7~~
2. ~~Reinforce~~ ~~17/7~~
 The Perfect +
 { Mr. Brown } were no
 { Mrs. Baker } appropriate
3. PA. 8/7

4. NEVERTHELESS IT IS TRUE THAT 50% OF THE OPERATIONAL
ISRAELI AIRCRAFT WERE THE LATEST MIRAGE 3C AND MISTÈRE 4A, WHICH ARE AT LEAST
WITH WHICH THE IAR AIR FORCE WAS PARTIALLY EQUIPPED. ALSO IT
APPEARS THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD DEVELOPED, ON THE BASIS OF A FRENCH
INVENTION, A NEW BOMB INCORPORATING AN EXTRA PROPELLING CHARGE
WHICH DRIVES IT DEEP INTO THE GROUND BEFORE EXPLODING, AND THEREBY
MAKES IT ESPECIALLY EFFECTIVE AGAINST RUNWAYS.

which are at least
as effective
as the
Russian
MIG 21s



5. L'EXPRESS OF 19-23 JUNE HAS AN INTERESTING PIECE OF WHICH
COPIES ARE BEING SENT TO YOU BY SAG ABOUT FRENCH SUPPORT FOR THE
ISRAELI AIR FORCE.

6. YOU SHOULD BE CAREFUL TO USE THESE POINTS OBJECTIVELY AND TO
AVOID ANY IMPLIED CRITICISM OF THE FRENCH POLICY. THE ISRAELI
ARMY WAS AFTER ALL LARGELY EQUIPPED WITH BRITISH CENTURION TANKS,
BUT IT WAS THE AIR BATTLE WHICH WAS DECISIVE.

BAHRAIN PASS SAVING ABU DHABI Doha DUBAI AND MUSCAT.



CYPHER/CAT A

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE

TELNO GUIDANCE CORRIGENDUM 16803

DATED 3 JULY

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO CERTAIN MISSIONS TELEGRAM NO. 168 GUIDANCE (CORRIG)
OF 3 JULY.

GUIDANCE 168 OF 30 JUNE.

PARAGRAPH 4, LINE 2. AFTER QUOTE MYSTERE 4A UNQUOTE INSERT QUOTE
WHICH ARE AT LEAST AS EFFECTIVE AS THE RUSSIAN MIG 21S UNQUOTE.

CONFIDENTIAL



CYPHER/CAT A BY AIRMAIL AND BY BAG

PRIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO CERTAIN MISSIONS

GUIDANCE NO. 176 5 JULY 1967 (IP)

① 2s Porter 11/1
② 3s
③ 1s
15 JUL 67

CONFIDENTIAL.

OIL.

GUIDANCES NUMBERS 162 AND 166.

ON 4 JULY AN ENABLING BILL TO GIVE H.M.G. POWER, IF NECESSARY, TO INTRODUCE OIL RATIONING WAS PRESENTED TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

2. NO (REPEAT NO) DECISION ON RATIONING HAS BEEN TAKEN AND THE TIMING OF THE BILL HAS BEEN DICTATED LARGELY BY THE PARLIAMENTARY TIMETABLE (THE HOUSE WILL BE IN RECESS FROM 28 JULY TO EARLY OCTOBER). IF QUESTIONED ABOUT THE BILL, YOU SHOULD TAKE THE LINE THAT, IN VIEW OF THE PARLIAMENTARY RECESS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES NECESSARY, IT IS ONLY PRUDENT THAT H.M.G. SHOULD SEEK THESE POWERS AT THIS STAGE. THE ACTION SHOULD BE SEEN AS A PRECAUTIONARY STEP ONLY AND NOT AS A SIGN THAT WE ARE PARTICULARLY PERTURBED ABOUT THE OIL SUPPLY SITUATION.

SOSFA/CROSEC SENT 2025Z 5 JULY 1967

BY TELEGRAPH:

COPENHAGEN	U.K.MISSION NEW YORK	WELLINGTON
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CONFIDENTIAL

1036/7/67)

BRITISH RESIDENCY,
BAHRAIN.

10 July, 1967.

Middle East Crisis

Thank you for your letter (1074/67 of 3 July). The picture as you paint it suggests that Abu Dhabi is, rather more quickly than expected, moving into roughly the same situation as Bahrain and Qatar are in already, so far as relations between the Government and oil companies and between the Government and other Arab Governments are concerned. I see no reason to try to prevent this development; we must seek rather to canalise it and to keep it to a realistic pace. Zaid would clearly be unwise to try to go forward too rapidly on to the international stage and I dare say he has no intention of doing so (he was pretty cautious when talking about the Middle East situation with me the other day). For example, I doubt whether we need take too seriously his idea of wanting the Gulf States to participate in all inter-Arab conferences. When emotions are moving the Arab Governments so strongly, this is essentially a time for the Gulf States to keep quiet and wait for things to settle down (as King Faisal himself is obviously doing). Even if the atmosphere was much calmer than it is, Zaid would, if he sought to be represented at inter-Arab political conference (if he had any suitable representative to send) find that he came under pressures which he would be unable to resist but which would be extremely embarrassing for him to comply with. He would clearly do well in the foreseeable future to think only of participation in technical conferences, when he is ready to do so. As you know, the Office are not enthusiastic about Abu Dhabi even joining OPEC and want this played along; Pachachi himself agrees with this, pending the time when Zaid would have a proper foreign affairs department. The selection of personnel for this department would present difficulties and may take some considerable time. It would not help Zaid if, like the Ruler of Qatar, he found himself saddled with a department manned by Palestinians who are ready to lead the hunt against the oil companies.

2. I note what you say about Zaid's possible desire to modernise old agreements. I hope you can ride him off any thought of doing so in the near future. If we

/attempted

A. T. Lamb, Esq., M.B.E., D.F.C.,
ABU DHABI.

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- 2 -

attempted to write an agreement to cover our relationship today, this would not only be difficult to do (as witness the stalemate over the attempt to put into writing our agreement to coordinate the actions of the TOS with ADDF), it would also produce a strait jacket which would inhibit the natural and steady change in our relationship in the future, which will result from Abu Dhabi's growth and modernisation. I have no idea whether H.M.G. will be ready, at the right time, to make an agreement with Zaid on the model of the Kuwait Exchange of Letters, but in any case the time for this would not come until we eventually ceased to be responsible for Abu Dhabi's defence and foreign relations. Meanwhile, I should have thought that the antiquated nature of the present agreement made it less difficult politically for Zaid to be content with its maintenance during the next few years.

3. I am sending a copy of this letter to the other Political Agents and to the Consul-General in Muscat.

(R. S. Crawford)

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Reypt not recd

1. Encl 29.4
2. PA. Hmrc Wm
3. PA

SECRET.

ADDRESSED TO AMMAN TELEGRAM NUMBER 1458 OFE6 JULY 1967
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO TEL AVIV, UK MISSION NEW YORK,
WASHINGTON, PARIS, JEDDA, CAIRO, TRIPOLI, BENGHAZI, ALGIERS.
RABAT, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN (RESIDENCY) TEHRAN, TUNIS.

KING HUSSEIN'S DISCUSSIONS IN LONDON.

FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF KING HUSSEIN'S CONVERSATION WITH THE
PRIME MINISTER AND MYSELF ON 3 JULY.

SETTLEMENT.

2. KING HUSSEIN ADMITTED THAT THERE WERE CONSIDERABLE TENSIONS
WITHIN JORDAN BUT FELT CONFIDENT THAT IF THE ARABS WERE NOT
REBUFFED AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND PROVIDED ISRAEL WERE OBLIGED
TO WITHDRAW FROM THE POSITION SHE HAD OCCUPIED HE COULD HOLD
THE SITUATION. HIS FIRST OBJECT WAS TO CONCERT AN AGREED
ARAB STRATEGY AND A COMMON LINE IN AN ARAB SUMMIT. IF THIS
FILLED THEN HE MIGHT HAVE TO QUOTE GO IT ALONE UNQUOTE.

3. THE ARABS HAD REACHED A CROSS-ROADS. THEY HAD THE CHOICE
OF RE-ARMING FOR ANOTHER FIGHT OR OF CONCENTRATING THEIR
EFFORTS ON PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT. HE HAD NO DOUBT WHAT THE
CHOICE SHOULD BE, BUT HIS OWN POSITION WAS DIFFICULT. THE
ARABS HAD SUFFERED DEFEAT BUT A SETTLEMENT COULD NOT BE BASED
ON FORCE AND MUST BE A JUST AND HONOURABLE PEACE. IT MUST
COVER ALL OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS.

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INTENTION WAS TO GET GENERAL ARAB AGREEMENT ON THE POLICY TO

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Kings?

4. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD KING HUSSEIN'S INTENTION WAS TO GET GENERAL ARAB AGREEMENT ON THE POLICY TO BE FOLLOWED FROM NOW ON, FAILING WHICH HE WOULD HAVE TO PROCEED ON NATIONAL LINES WITH JORDAN'S ARAB FRIENDS. HE HOPED HE WOULD LET US KNOW IF THERE WERE WAYS IN WHICH WE COULD HELP HIM.

WE HAD DONE SOMETHING TO MEET THE IMMEDIATE POST-WAR NEEDS OF JORDAN AND IF THERE WAS MORE WE COULD DO IN THIS DIRECTION HE HOPED KING HUSSEIN WOULD TELL US. WE DID NOT THINK THERE WOULD BE ANY QUICK SETTLEMENT BUT AGREED THAT ANY SETTLEMENT WOULD HAVE TO COVER ALL PROBLEMS.

ANTI-BRITISH PROPAGANDA.

5. KING HUSSEIN SAID HE WOULD LOOK INTO THE QUESTION OF ANTI-BRITISH PROPAGANDA ON AMMAN RADIO.

JORDANIAN OPERATIONAL ORDERS.

6. KING HUSSEIN DECLARED THAT AS FAR AS HE KNEW NO ORDERS WERE GIVEN TO MASSACRE ISRAELIS.

REFUGEES.

7. KING HUSSEIN WELCOMED THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT THAT REFUGEES WHO HAD LEFT THE WEST BANK BEFORE 4 JULY COULD RETURN AND HE HAD EVERY INTENTION OF ENCOURAGING THEM TO DO SO. IT WOULD BE A GREAT HELP WITH THE REFUGEE PROBLEM BUT OF COURSE NOT ALL WOULD WANT TO COME BACK, AND IT REMAINED TO BE SEEN HOW THE ISRAELIS INTERPRETED THEIR DECISION.

JERUSALEM.

WERE GIVEN TO MASSACRE ISRAELIS.

REFUGEES.

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JERUSALEM.

8. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY WAS ANXIOUS THAT KING HUSSEIN SHOULD UNDERSTAND WHAT WE HAD BEEN TRYING TO DO ABOUT JERUSALEM. WE HAD TRIED VERY HARD PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY TO STOP THE ISRAELIS FROM TAKING THE ACTION THEY HAD DONE. WE WOULD BE WILLING TO SUPPORT INTERNATIONALISATION, BUT UNDERSTOOD THAT KING HUSSEIN WAS NOT IN FAVOUR. THE FACT WAS, HOWEVER, THAT ISRAEL WAS IN CONTROL OF JERUSALEM. WHAT WOULD KING HUSSEIN LIKE HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT TO DO ON THIS PROBLEM? KING HUSSEIN SAID THAT JORDAN HAD BEEN CARRYING ON A TRADITION WHICH HAD LASTED FOR MORE THAN 1,000 YEARS AND UNLESS SHE COULD AGAIN BECOME CUSTODIAN OF THE HOLY PLACES FOR EVERYONE, THIS MIGHT BE THE START OF YET ANOTHER CONFLICT WHICH WOULD AFFECT THE WHOLE OF THE MOSLEM WORLD. THE JEWS HAD NOT HAD ACCESS TO THE HOLY PLACES IN RECENT YEARS BECAUSE THERE HAD BEEN NO PEACE SETTLEMENT.

ARMS.

96 I SAID THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO QUESTION OF A RETURN TO THE COMPETITIVE ARMING OF THE STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. KING HUSSEIN RE

IN THE MIDDLE EAST. KING HUSSEIN REPLIED THAT OF COURSE JORDAN WOULD NEED SOME MILITARY RE-EQUIPMENT BUT THE ARABS MUST AVOID ONCE AGAIN MORTGAGING THEIR FUTURE FOR YEARS TO COME IN ORDER TO BUY ARMS.

BY BAG

Pls cat

FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO CERTAIN MISSIONS

GUIDANCE NO. 163

28 JUNE 1967 (IP6)

UNCLASSIFIED

Guidance Nos. 132 and 137 (not to all)

Middle East: Allegations of British military involvements

King Hussein was interviewed in New York by Pauline Frederick on NBC's "Today Show" on 27 June. The following is transcript of passage dealing with alleged Western military intervention.

Begins.

Frederick: "Your Majesty, do you have any evidence that the United States and/or the United Kingdom were involved, either directly or indirectly, in this war?"

King Hussein: "No, we have no evidence whatsoever, and I've heard a great deal of comments on suspicions that we had a telephone conversation that was unfortunately not complete that was broadcast by the Israelis that was supposed to have taken place between me and President Nasser at a certain point.

"There were some indications, we had some radar sightings of aircraft that were appearing from the sea. We faced a tremendous and overwhelming enemy air force that covered all the skies of Jordan. Suddenly the West Bank and everything got moved.

"There were some wrong identifications of aircraft, and we did not know that this was possible radar (?). Our radar was destroyed soon. Many of the things that we had seen were explained later. For example, these aircraft that we had sighted on radar apparently were Israeli aircraft returning from their attacks on the United Arab Republic, which they carried out at low level, and on the way back they were climbing. And that's when we spotted them.

"We have said that we have no physical or definite proof that there was any intervention by Britain or America. And what we really wanted to know was the truth of exactly what happened, because that is so important for us to know it, so that we can move ahead in the future".

ENDS.

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ADDED TO URGENT NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 3364 OF 27 JUNE AND TO AIRMAIL
TEL AVIV BEIRUT BAHRAIN RABAT ALGIERS TUNIS TRIPOLI BENGHAZI CAIRO
KHARTOUM JEDDA AND H.C. ADEN.
MIDDLE EAST.

FOLLOWING ARE EXTRACTS FROM INTERVIEW GIVEN BY FOREIGN SECRETARY
TO TELEVISION PROGRAMME QUOTE THIS WEEK UNQUOTE ON 27 JUNE.

QUESTION. MR BROWN YOU HAVE BEEN AT THE CENTRE OF YET ANOTHER STORM
THIS TIME OVER ADEN AND YOUR SPEECH AT THE UNITED NATIONS.

LET'S START WITH THE US. ARE YOU REALLY PRO-ARAB? ANSWER..NO, MOST CERTAINLY,
NOT. ON THE OTHER HAND I THINK THEY HAVE A CASE THAT IS NOT OFTEN
HEARD ENOUGH NOT OFTEN LISTENED TO ENOUGH; AND I TRY TO TAKE CARE
TO SEE THAT IT IS. I ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT A LOT OF PEOPLE - OTHER PEOPLE
- DON'T SEEM TO UNDERSTAND, THAT BRITAIN HAS TEMENDOUS INTERESTS IN THAT
PART OF THE WORLD, AND THEY HAVE TO TAKE CARE OF TOO.

BUT IF WHEN YOU ASK ME AM I PRO-ARAB - MEANING AS AGAINST ISRAEL -
THE ANSWER IS MOST CERTAINLY NOT. QUESTION.. BUT WHAT IS UPPERMOST IN
YOUR MIND AT THE MOMENT?

IS IT TO RE-BUILD THE BRIDGES WITH THE ARAB NATION? ANSWER.. I HAVE
TO TAKE THAT VERY MUCH INTO ACCOUNT. BUT I WOULDN'T SAY THAT'S UPPERMOST
IN MY MIND. WHAT IS UPPERMOST IN MY MIND IS TO GET THIS TIME A LASTING
SETTLEMENT - MAY I REPEAT THE WORD, LASTING SETTLEMENT - BY WHICH
EACH OF THE COUNTRIES IN THAT AREA CAN LIVE WITHOUT FEAR - AS I PUT IT
IN NEW YORK, WITH TRUE DIGNITY, EARN THEIR LIVING IN PEACE. THIS
IS UPPERMOST IN MY MIND, BUT OF COURSE I MUST TAKE THE OTHER INTO
ACCOUNT.

QUESTION. WITH SUCH AN EMOTIVE PROBLEM AS THIS IS IT POSSIBLE TO SAY ANYTHING, HOWEVER TECHNICALLY NEUTRAL IT MIGHT BE, WHICH DOESN'T OFFEND ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER?

ANSWER I DOUBT THAT - I THINK, THIS IS WHAT I TRIED TO SAY IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS YESTERDAY - I DOUBT WHETHER ANY FOREIGN SECRETARY COULD SAY ANYTHING ON THIS SUBJECT - UNLESS HE WERE AN ABSOLUTE NETR- THAT WOULDN'T, IN FACT, DISTURB SOMEBODY, AN I THINK ONE OF THE PROBLEMS BEING WITH THIS JOB - AND I AM NOT A MAN WITHOUT FEELINGS MYSELF - IS THAT YOU HAVE TO ACCEPT THAT YOU ARE ALMOST CERTAIN TO DISTURB SOMEBODY.

QUESTION THE PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL, MR. ESHKOL, IS ON THE RECORD AS SAYING THAT ISRAEL DOES NOT WANT TERRI-TORIAL AG ^{GRANDI Z H PNT} BY ORDERING ISRAEL TO PULL BACK, WHICH IS THE INTERPRETATION OF YOUR SPEECH, ARE YOU NOT ENCOURAGING THOSE PEOPLE IN ISRAEL, LIKE GENERAL DAYAN, WHO WISH TO HANG ONTO SOME OF THOSE GAINST ANSWER.. I DIDN'T EITHER ORDER ISRAEL TO PULL BACK, OR EVEN SAY THAT SHE SHOULD. WHAT I SAID WAS THAT SHE SHOULDN'T PILE ANOTHER PROBLEM ON THE ONES WE ALREADY HAD AND I ASKED HIM TO BE CAREFUL ABOUT THE OLD CITY OF JERUSALEM. I DIDN'T MENTION WITHDRAWAL. NOW IN MY OWN VIEW, AND I SAID THIS TO EVERYBODY I SAW IN NEW YORK, ALL THE ARAB DELEGATES I SAW, ALL THE AFRICAN DELEGATES I SAW, ALL THE ASIAN DELEGATES I SAW, MR KOSYGIN, MR JOHNSON, I HAD THAT WITHDRAWAL WILL REQUIRE SOME BALANCING THINGS THAT ISRAEL WILL NEED TO KNOW, THIS TIME, THAT SHE CAN LIVE. LIKE OTHER COUNTRIES, JORDAN, WILL NEED TO KNOW THAT SHE CAN LIVE. NOW I MADE THIS ALL QUITE CLEAR, ALL ISAID IN MY SPEECH WHICH PEOPLE FASTENED ON, DON'T PILE ANOTHER PROBLEM ON AN ALREADY COMPLICATED SITUATION. AND I THINK THEY HAVE BEEN VERY WISE NOT TO DO IT. QUESTION.. NOW YOU SAY THAT ISRAEL MUST LIVE, BUT DO YOU MEAN BY THAT A RIGHT OF ACCESS THROUGH THE STRAITS OF TIRAN, OR, AND AS WELL, RIGHT OF ACCESS THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL? ANSWER.. I MEAN THAT INTERNATIONAL WATER-WAYS MUST BE OPEN TO US ALL. NOW I WOULDN'T FUSS. I KNOW WHAT YOU WANT TO DO BUT I WOULDN'T DO IT. I WOULDN'T FASTEN EITHER THE STRAITS OF TIRAN, OR THE SUEZ CANAL ONTO ISRAEL. YOU WON'T HELP ISRAEL IF YOU DO. YOU WON'T HELP THE ARABS IF YOU DO, YOU WON'T HELP US IF YOU DO. BUT I THINK YOU CAN FASTEN BOTH ON THE RIGHTS OF MARITIME NATIONS TO HAVE GUARANTEED ACCESS THROUGH

INTERNATIONAL WATER-WAYS. NOW I THINK WE CAN DO THIS, AND ONE OF THE THINGS I SAID IN NEW YORK WAS THAT WE, IN OUR RESOLUTION THAT WE WORK OUT, WE OUGHT TO HAVE THAT KIND OF GUARANTEE. BUT THEN WE HAVE TO WORK OUT SOME OTHER THINGS, BECAUSE WE HAVE THAT KIND OF GUARANTEE SO FAR AS THE SUEZ CANAL IS CONCERNED ALREADY. AND THEN IT GETS MESSED UP. QUESTION.. BUT IT'S NEVER BEEN OPERATED. ANSWER.. BY THE COMPLICATIONS. WELL I GET'S MESSED UP BY INTERNAL COMPLICATIONS. SO, THEREFORE, WE HAVE NOW TO THINK ABOUT THE OTHER PROBLEMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN COUNTRIES. HOW YOU ARRANGE THEM. HOW THEY ARE SUPERVISED. I THINK THIS IS WHAT WE OUGHT TO ADDRESS OUR ATTENTION TO AT THE MOMENT. QUESTION.. YOU DON'T THINK THAT YOU SHOULD GO INTO THIS QUESTION OF GUARANTEES, AFTER ALL THIS IS WHERE THE PRESENT CRISIS BEGAN. BRITAIN SAID - AT THE TIME THE STRAITS OF TIRAN WERE CLOSED BY EGYPT, THAT THE RIGHTS OF INTERNATIONAL NAVIGATION SHOULD BE ENSURED. WE WERE NOT ABLE TO DO IT. THE ISRAELIS HAD TO DO THAT. NOW WHAT CAN WE DO NOW? ANSWER.. BECAUSE WE STARTED AT THE WRONG POINT. LET'S NOW - IF I MAY SUGGEST - START AT A DIFFERENT POINT. LET'S DEAL WITH THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS. THE REFUGEES. THE RIGHTS OF NATIONS. THEN LET'S LOOK AT THE AUTHORITIES WHO COULD ENSURE THAT THE WATER-WAYS STAY OPEN. IF WE DO IT THAT WAY ROUND WE MAY DO A JOLLY SIGHT BETTER THAN WE DID LAST TIME. QUESTION.. YOU WANT TO HAVE THIS SOLUTION THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS, DON'T YOU? ANSWER.. OH, VERY MUCH - YES. QUESTION.. NOW DO YOU REALLY THINK THAT ISRAEL CAN EXPECT TO GET JUSTICE FROM THE UNITED NATIONS? ANSWER.. YES.

IT'S THE ONLY PLACE WHERE ANYBODY CAN, IN THE END, GET JUSTICE FROM. ISRAEL - ALRIGHT, WON THIS PARTICULAR WAR. ISRAEL COULDN'T BE SURE - ALWAYS, OF WINNING ANY SUBSEQUENT WAR. HER ONLY GUARANTEE IS IN A SITUATION IN WHICH THERE ISN'T GOING TO BE A SUBSEQUENT WAR. QUESTION BUT I CAN'T REMEMBER WHETHER IT WAS YOU OR THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE DEBATE BEFORE THE WAR BEGAN WHO SAID THAT THE UNITED NATIONS WAS EVER MEANT TO CONDEMN ISRAEL FOR AGGRESSION INTO THE ARAB COUNTRIES BUT THEY NEVER CONDEMNED THE ARAB COUNTRIES. ANSWER.. I NEVER SAID THAT - I DON'T KNOW WHO DID SAY IT, BUT I CERTAINLY NEVER DID. BUT I'M SURE - MR. FITCH - I'M SURE AS I CAN BE THAT ISRAEL'S HOPE, AND IT'S THE HOPE OF JORDAN - IT'S THE HOPE OF MANY OTHER COUNTRIES

IN THAT AREA OF THE WORLD, IS THAT THE UNITED NATIONS CAN, IN FACT, ENSURE SOME POLICING ARRANGEMENTS. SOME SUPERVISORY ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WILL WORK AND THIS NOT ONLY APPLIES TO THE WATER-WAYS, I APPLIES TO THE BOUNDARIES - APPLIES TO A LOT OF OTHER THINGS INDEED.

AN I THINK THAT THIS IS WHAT WE OUGHT TO WORK FOR. THIS IS WHY I ASKED WHEN I WAS THERE, THAT WE - THE SECRETARY GENERAL, SHOULD PUT A REPRESENTATIVE INTO THE AREA. THIS IS WHEN I SAID WE SHOULD STRENGTHEN THE TRUCE SUPERVISORY ORGANISATION. THIS IS WHY I SAID WE SHOULD DISCUSS A KIND OF NEW UNITED NATIONS FORCE THAT COULD GO IN.

SOME DAY, SOME DAY ISRAEL, AND HER ARAB NEIGHBOURS WILL LEARN TO LIVE TOGETHER - QUITE NATURALLY. UNTIL THAT HAPPENS, THEN OTHER ARRANGEMENTS HAVE TO BE MADE. QUESTION.. BE, WOULD YOU AGREE THAT THAT UNITED NATIONS FORCE WOULD HAVE TO BE ONE THAT SIMPLY COULD NOT BE ORDERED OUT BY PRESIDENT NASSER AGAIN, WHEN IT WAS CONVENIENT FOR HIM. ANSWER..

MOST CERTAINLY, AND MAY I MATCH THAT BY SAYING THE NEXT TIME THE ISRAELIS MUSN'T REFUSE TO HAVE IT ON THEIR SOIL, AS THEY DID FOR A VERY LONG TIME, AND ONE OF THEIR BIGGEST MISTAKES - AND I'M NOT NOW TALKING WITH HINDSIGHT, BECAUSE I SAID IT THEN A LONG TIME AGO- WAS TO REFUSE TO HAVE IT ON THEIR SIDE OF THE BORDER TOO. QUESTION..

THE CRITISM DIRECTED AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT, BOTH WITHIN YOUR OWN PARTY, AND FROM THE OPPOSITION, IS THAT YOUR POLICY SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS HAS HELPED NOBODY, BUT HAS DAMAGED BRITAIN. ANSWER..

IF YOU ARE IN A SITUATION, LETS FACE IT, WHERE YOU CAN'T TAKE A STAND ON BEHALF OF ONE OR THE OTHER PARTIES, IT IS, AS I SAID YESTERDAY, IN THE HOUSE, DIFFICULT TO HOLD - IT DOESN'T MEAN IT'S DONE US DAMAGE.

QUESTION.. C WELL, ITS CUT OFF OUR OIL HASN'T IT. QUERY ANSWER.. OH NO NO. NO LOOK THE OIL IS FLOWING, THIS IS NOT SOMETHING WE TALK ABOUT TOO PLAINLY- I WOULDN'T WORRY IF I WERE YOU, TOO MUCH ABOUT THAT COLON BUT IF YOU ARE GOING TO HOLD A INDEPENDENT POSITION, OF COURSE YOU ARE VUNERABLE TO CRITISM AND TO ATTACK, BUT MR FFITCH, THE BUSINESS OF OF A MINISTER AT THIS MOMENT IS TO SEE THAT OUR INTERESTS ARE UP - HELD, HOWEVER DIFFICULT IT MAY BE COLON THAT WE ARE DOING.

QUESTION.. SO THERE HAS BEEN NOTHING IN THIS MIDDLE EAST CRISIS WHICH HAS AFFECTED YOUR VIEW OF THE ROLE THAT BRITAIN SHOULD PLAY IN THE WORLD QUERY

8 ER COLON ISMRSX IT HAS RATHER STRENGTHENED IT AS A MATTER OF FACT
- I DONT BELIEVE ITS A ROLE YOU OUGHT TO PLAY WITH SHIPS AND GUNS
AND BATTALIONS. ITS A ROLE YOU OUGHT TO PLAY WITH COMMERCIAL INTERESTS,
REXEX FINANCIAL INTERESTS, AND A GENUINE POLITICAL CONCERN FOR
OTHER PEOPLE, AND ABOVE ALL, OF COURSE, FOR THE UNDERDOG- FOR THE
UNDERDEVELOPED OF THE WORLD. I THINK WHAT THIS HAS SHOWN UP, IS THAT
YOU CAN PLAY THAT ROLE, YOU WILL BE ATTACKED BY THOSE WHO THINK
THEY'RE A LITTLE BIT BETTER OFF THAN THE OTHERS, BUT YOU WILL BE VERY
MUCH WELCOMED BY THOSE WHO NEED YOUR SUPPORT.

QUESTION CLN FOREIGN SECRETARY, WE DO HAVE SHIPS AND GUNS AND PLANES
IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND IF YOU ARE GOING TO FORCE THROUGH THE TIRAN
STRAITS, YOU WOULD HAVE HAD TO USE THEM. PEOPLE WANT TO KNOW WHY ARE
WE MAINTAINING THESE FORCES AT GREAT EXPENSE, NOT JUST AT ADEN,
NOT AT THE PERSIAN GULF, IF THEY ARE NOT IN FACT, ABLE TO GUARANTEE
US OIL SUPPLIES.

ANSWER..YOU CANT GUARANTEE YOURSELVES OIL SUPPLIES BY GUNS, SHIPS
AND AIRPLANES, ON THE OTHER HAND YOU CAN MAINTAIN ALLIANCES AND
ARRANGEMENTS, THIS WAY FOR A TIME. WE ARE NOT MAINTAINING ALL THAT
MUCH - OUR SHIPS THAT WERE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, WERE IN FACT, EN PASSAGE
COLON THEY WERE MOVING COLON WE DIDNT HAVE A SIXTH FLEET THERE COLON
WE ARE UNWINDING OUR COMMITMENTS, BUT IT TAKES TIME TO DO IT, AND
WE ARE DOING IT IN A VERY SENSIBLE WAY. IN THE 1964/6 DEFENSE REVIEW
WE UNWOUND A LOT OF COMMITMENTS OF THIS KIND, WE ARE NOW LOOKING
AT WHAT WE CAN UNWIND IN THE FUTURE SOSFA

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From Foreign Office to Bahrain

Tel. No. Guidance 162

Date: 27 June, 1967

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PRIORITY

Addressed to certain missions telegram No. 162 Guidance of 27 June. Repeated having to Abu Dhabi, Doha, Dubai and Muscat.

The present supply position is:

(a) Exports from Iraq are restricted to Syria, Lebanon, France and Turkey for local consumption, there are no exports from Libya but there is hope that they will be resumed fairly soon.

(b) Oil is flowing from all the other Arab producing States but with governmental bans on exports to the United Kingdom and the United States. In a number of countries exports are below the normal level because of the shortage of tankers arising from closure of the transit routes (see (c) below).

(c) The Suez Canal and the Levant pipelines from Saudi Arabia and Iraq (except for the local supplies to Syria and Lebanon) are still closed and are likely to remain so for some time. (It is not yet clear whether exports of Iraq oil to France and Turkey will be allowed through the Syrian pipelines).

(d) Meanwhile, exports are being maximised, within capacity limits, from Iran, Venezuela and Nigeria (where the internal political differences could, however affect the smooth flow).

As regards oil supplies to the United Kingdom the Arab ban on exports to us is not an insuperable problem since we can switch to non-Arab sources with displaced Arab oil going elsewhere.

2. The shortage of tankers, caused by the longer hauls now necessary is affecting the United Kingdom's and the rest of Western Europe's supplies in terms not only of quantities but also of costs. Stocks, which in most cases (and certainly in the U.K.) are high, have cushioned the effects of the shortfall. When Libyan exports are resumed the situation will be easier because of the proximity of Libya to the European market. But there will be a supply problem (of diminishing severity) so long as the transit routes, and particularly the Suez Canal, remain closed.

3. It is important in dealing with this situation that the international oil industry should be able to cooperate fully in order to maximise world supplies and rationalise deliveries. A key factor is the ability of the U.S. oil companies to collaborate with the rest of the international oil industry to these ends. Anti-trust legislation prevents them, in normal circumstances, from doing so. Action is now being taken in the OECD aimed at agreeing on a formula which, while avoiding as much as possible provoking the Arabs would meet the minimum requirements of the U.S. administration for the necessary waiver of anti-trust regulation.

4. Russian Oil. There has been press speculation about the possibility that the U.K. might import oil from the Soviet Union to make good the shortfall in supplies. We have for some years had an embargo on the import of Soviet crude and products (with /minor

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minor exceptions). For your own information only, consideration is being given to a lifting of the embargo, at least for certain products (e.g. Naphtha). However, there is no assurance that Soviet supplies would be forthcoming, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade on 19 June dismissed press reports that the Soviet Union had offered oil to Britain as "sheer fabrication" and intended to sour Soviet-Arab friendship. The implication is that the Soviet Union would not, in present circumstances be prepared to seal more oil to the U.K.

Guidance

5. All the above is primarily for your background information. We do not wish to stimulate comment.

6. The present supply situation, with Libya not exporting, is potentially serious, but we must avoid giving the impression that we are perturbed. At the same time we wish to avoid comment which might unnecessarily harden the attitudes of those Arab oil-producing States which are showing readiness to return to more or less normal conditions. Where comment is unavoidable, you should take the following line:

(a) We regret of course that the countries concerned should have felt themselves constrained to take the action they did because of what, at its mildest, might be termed a mistake (see Guidance No. 156),

(b) Now that it has become patently clear to everybody that we were not involved in the fighting, we hope that these States will soon lift their various bans,

(c) We fully understand the pressures which operated at the time on the governments concerned, but it is in their interests at least as much as anybody else's that there should be an early return to normal trading patterns,

(d) Meanwhile, of course, the U.K. and other oil-importing countries are taking the practical action necessary to ensure the continued supply of oil pending the return to normal trading. If questioned about the effect on our supply position of the ban on U.K. destinations you should take the line that the ban is highly objectionable, but that though it is inconvenient it is of little practical effect (see para. 1 above). You should, if possible, avoid comment on the Soviet oil point, if pressed, you should merely say that the position might be expected to be under review.

Distribution

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Savings

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TO PP ASOLDQ 80623 PRODROME BAHRAIN FROM LONDON

GR 14/

ADDRESSED TO ALGIERS TELEGRAM NO. 197 of 23 JUNE, and TO AMMAN, BENGHAZI, BEIRUT, CAIRO, JERUSALEM, TELAVIV, TRIPOLI, REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO BAHRAIN, JEDDA, KHARTOUM, KUWAIT, TUNIS, RABAT, UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.

TRAVEL TO THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA.

THE FOLLOWING TEXT WAS RELEASED BY NEWS DEPARTMENT AT 1500 HOURS TODAY.

BRITISH SUBJECTS ARE ADVISED THAT IT MAY STILL BE IN THEIR OWN INTERESTS NOT TO TRAVEL TO THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC (EGYPT), SYRIA, IRAQ, JORDAN, THE LEBANON, LIBYA AND ALGERIA UNTIL CONDITIONS ARE MORE NORMAL IN THE MIDDLE EAST. NO ADVICE IS BEING GIVEN AGAINST TRAVEL TO OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE AREA.

2. TRAVELLERS MAY WISH TO KNOW THAT IN THE COURSE OF RECENT EVENTS BRITISH CONSULAR REPRESENTATION HAS HAD TO BE WITHDRAWN FROM IRAQ AND SYRIA AND THE STAFF OF THE BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION OF THE CANADIAN EMBASSY IN CAIRO HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED. SOSFA

RECD 8526/24 JUNE.

1. Eng in
2. to Parl
3. PA. 17

SYNTHETIC CAT A
FROM FOREIGN OFFICE
TELE 802
DATED 23 JUNE
ROUTINE

+ Bahrain with
provisionally
answering not needed
(in que.)
1. India
2. to Paris add.
3. PR.

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO ALGIERS TELEGRAM NO 196 OF 23 JUNE AND TO ANNAH,
BAHRAM, BEIRUT, BENGHAZI, JEDDA, KHAMIS KHAN, KUWAIT, RABAT,
TRIPOLI, TUNIS. REQUESTED FOR INFORMATION SAYING TO TEHRAN,
ANKARA, TEL AVIV AND CAIRO.

COMET ASSISTANCE FOR COMMERCIAL WORK IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

THE CHAIRMAN OF COMET AND THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE MIDDLE EAST
ASSOCIATION HAVE SUGGESTED TO THE BOARD OF TRADE AND OURSELVES
THAT, AS THE BUSINESS CONNECTIONS OF SOME COMMERCIAL DEPARTMENTS IN
THE MIDDLE EAST MAY BE TEMPORARILY DISRUPTED (E.G. THROUGH
BUSINESSMEN'S RELUCTANCE TO BE SEEN DEALING WITH UNITED KINGDOM
OFFICIALS), IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO SET UP SOME PARALLEL, TEMPORARY
ORGANISATION THROUGH WHICH UNITED KINGDOM BUSINESSMEN,
PARTICULARLY THOSE STILL RESIDENT IN THE AREA, WHOSE CONTACTS
MAY NOT BE THUS PREJUDICED, MIGHT BE ABLE TO MAKE CONTACTS UPON
THEIR COLLEAGUES IN OTHER FIRMS, AND FIND SAME INFORMATION ABOUT
POSSIBLE TRADE OPPORTUNITIES. THEY WOULD NOT UNDERTAKE ANYTHING
AS FORMAL AS CASE-WORK, AND THE ARRANGEMENT WOULD ONLY BE
TEMPORARY; NO NEW INSTITUTIONS OR COMMITTEES WOULD BE INVOLVED.

AND NO PUBLICITY. COMET AND THE N.E.A. ENVISAGE MOST OF THE WORK BEING VOLUNTARILY DONE AS A PUBLIC DUTY BY BUSINESSMEN WHO ALREADY ARE IN, OR ARE GOING TO, THE AREA, ALTHOUGH THEY BELIEVE THAT AN OCCASIONAL AD HOC VISIT, BY U.K. BASED BUSINESSMEN, PERHAPS FINANCED ON 50/50 TERMS, MIGHT BE NECESSARY.

2. A SMALL (TWO-MAN) SECRETARIAT IN OR NEAR BURG HOUSE (COMET/NEA HQ) IS ENVISAGED. THE HEAD WOULD BE A BUSINESSMAN WITH HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS. WE HAVE IT IN MIND THAT THE NUMBER TWO MIGHT BE A MEMBER OF THE SERVICE, TO KEEP THE EXERCISE ON THE RAILS DURING THE LIKELY SIX MONTHS OR SO OF ITS EXISTENCE. THE FUNCTION OF THIS SECRETARIAT WOULD BE, FIRST, TO SECURE WILLINGNESS BY SUBSTANTIAL BRITISH FIRMS TO OFFER THEIR OVERSEAS REPRESENTATIVES' SERVICES FOR THIS WORK, AND SECOND TO ACT AS A CLEARING-HOUSE FOR INFORMATION, MUCH OF WHICH WOULD BE PROCESSED THROUGH NORMAL BOARD OF TRADE CHANNELS.

3. ALTHOUGH THE SCHEME HAS SOME SNAGS, NOT LEAST AMONG THEM THE POSSIBLE RELUCTANCE OF BRITISH FIRMS TO ALLOW MEMBERS OF OTHER FIRMS TO INTRODUCE OR REPRESENT THEM, EVEN IN THE MANNER MAY PROPOSED, WE SEE ADVANTAGE IN GOING ALONG WITH THESE PROPOSALS. THEY MAY BE GENUINELY USEFUL TO FILL GAPS IN SOME PLACES. THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO BE VERY EXPENSIVE, AND WE WANT TO TURN THE COMET/NEA OFFER TO GOOD ACCOUNT IF WE CAN. THE BOARD OF TRADE AND WE HAVE ACCORDINGLY TOLD THE SPONSORS THAT WE WELCOME THEIR PROPOSALS, SUBJECT TO THE VIEWS OF POSTS ON THE SITUATION NOW PERTAINING, OR WHICH MAY ARISE, IN THEIR AREAS.

4. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR ESTIMATE OF HOW FAR, IF AT ALL, YOUR COMMERCIAL DEPARTMENT'S CONTACTS ARE LIKELY TO BE IMPAIRED DURING THE COMING SIX MONTHS. PLEASE SAY ALSO WHETHER BUSINESSMEN IN SUBSTANTIAL U.K. FIRMS RESIDENT IN OR VISITING YOUR AREA ARE LIKELY WITHIN THIS PERIOD TO BE ABLE TO MAKE SOME TRADE CONTACTS WHICH WILL TEMPORARILY NOT BE OPEN TO YOU OR YOUR STAFF. WE HOPE THAT THE SCHEME, IF IT GOES INTO OPERATION, WILL BE DEVISED SO AS TO INVOLVE YOU IN NEITHER EXTRA WORK NOR CONFUSION.

1 R.W.H.
2 Mr. Paul Brown
3 PA. 27

PRODRONE BAHRAIN

CENTROFORM LDN

VERBATIM SERVICE 304/67

29 June, 1967

Oil supplies and costs

Following is text of a statement by the Minister of Power Mr. Richard Marsh, in the House of Commons on 29 June, with extract from supplementary replies.

"Temporarily the cost of oil supplies for the United Kingdom, as for other Western European countries, has increased substantially as a result, principally, of the lengthening of tanker routes and higher tanker freight rates.

These costs have to be met in order to maintain our supplies. They represent, broadly, an average of two pounds sterling a ton.

The oil companies have consulted me in detail about the position and have sought my advice on how to handle the increased costs.

The Government have accepted that a temporary surcharge of twopence a gallon on the price of all petrol products would be reasonable to meet the costs of the present supply difficulties.

I shall keep the whole situation under close review."

Mr. Marsh:.... Governmental calculations have clearly taken place of the effect on the balance of payments.... rationing is certainly very much under consideration. I work on the assumption that it is easier not to use rationing if one finds that it is not necessary, than to find at the very last moment that one is unprepared and then have to use it. I see no prospect of rationing in the immediate future but preparations are being made so that at some time in the future, that we cannot see, we shall be able to deal with it....

Distribution

N/F
CCPG
Gulf Posts.

CYPER/CAT A
FROM FOREIGN OFFICE
TELNO GUIDANCE 152.
DATED 16 JUNE
PRIORITY

For see by.
to Prop. Rep.
by 20th
20th June. ORP
62 (Int.)
Mr. [Signature]

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO CERTAIN MISSIONS TELEGRAM NUMBER GUIDANCE 152
OF 16 JUNE.

MIDDLE EAST. GUIDANCE NUMBER 151.

(I) NASSER WILL FOR SOME TIME BE AN EMOTIONAL NECESSITY FOR ALMOST
ALL ARABS. EVEN THOSE MOST HOSTILE TO HIM WILL RESENT CRITICISM OF
HIM BY US.

(II) WE MUST FEED THE ARABS' OWN CRITICAL PROCESSES, BY RUBBING
IN INDIRECTLY AND GRADUALLY, THE COST AND INCOMPETENCE OF NASSER'S,
AND GENERAL EGYPTIAN, POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERSHIP.

(III) NASSER HAS DISSIPATED THE STRENGTH OF THE ARABS OVER THE YEARS
BY INVOLVING THEM IN HIS PERSONAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST (A) OTHER AND
MORE SAGACIOUS ARAB LEADERS, AND (B) THE UK AND THE US POWERS, WHO, EVEN IF IMPERFECT FROM THE ARAB POINT OF VIEW, HAVE GIVEN MASSIVE AID
TO THE ARABS. (WE OURSELVES HAVE BEEN PARTICULAR FRIENDS OF JORDAN.)
ONLY LATTERLY DID NASSER CONCERN HIMSELF WITH ISRAEL, AND DISASTROUS-
LY.

47-22
20
Arms Supply JUN 54

(CIV) IF BARRIERS (E.G. OVER OIL SUPPLIES AND THE SUEZ CANAL) ARE MAINTAINED AGAINST COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL INTERCOURSE BETWEEN THE ARAB STATES AND THE WEST, EVEN IF THEORETICALLY AGAINST ONLY THE U.S. AND U.K., THE WHOLE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL SUFFER. E.G. THE EXTRA COST AND TIME OF EMERGENCY FOOD DELIVERIES FROM THE U.S.A. TO INDIA. THE WESTERN POWERS WILL BE ABLE TO MAKE OTHER ARRANGEMENTS, EVEN IF AT SOME COST TO THEMSELVES, SOME OF WHICH WILL RUB OFF ON TO OTHER COUNTRIES.

(CIV) ANY PERMANENT ABSORPTION OF THE MIDDLE EAST INTO THE SOVIET SPHERE OF INFLUENCE, WOULD DISTURB THE WHOLE INTERNATIONAL BALANCE, AND HAVE INCALCULABLE CONSEQUENCES, ESPECIALLY FOR THE COUNTRIES OF AFRICA AND ASIA.

(CIV) THE ROOTS OF THE PRESENT ~~ARMED STRUGGLE~~
~~ARMED STRUGGLE~~ SITUATION LIE IN THE ACTIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION IN RAISING THE ARMS LEVEL THROUGHOUT THE AREA, AS A RESULT OF THEIR HEAVY SUPPLIES TO THE U.A.R. OVER THE YEARS, AND THEIR EXCESSIVE ENCOURAGEMENT AND SUPPORT

- But badly phrased.

- The roots lie in own mismanagement of the Palestine mandate + in persecution of Jews in Europe.

~~SUPPORT~~

SUPPORT OF SYRIA ~~THIS~~ THIS YEAR: THIS PRO

UCED IRRESPONSIBLE SYRIAN INSPIRED RAIDS ON ISRAEL, INFLATION OF SHOUKAIRI AND THE P.L.O., ISRAELI WARNINGS TO SYRIA, NASSER'S ASSUMPTION (NEEDED BY SYRIA) OF THE ROLE OF ACTIVE CO-ORDINATOR OF ARAB MILITARY PRESSURE ON ISRAEL, HIS INSISTENCE ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF U.N.E.F., HIS CONSEQUENT CLAIM TO CONTROL THE

GULF OF AQABA (WHICH HE KNEW TO BE A FLASH POINT AND CASUS BELLI FOR THE ISRAELIS), AND THE ADVANCE OF EGYPTIAN FORCES INTO SINAI.

IS PROCESS WENT FORWARD AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF VIOLENT ARAB STATEMENTS ABOUT THE DESTRUCTION OF ISRAEL, AND ISRAELI REPRISAL RAIDS AND WARNINGS. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WHO STRUCK FIRST AND ISRAELI STATEMENTS IMPLY THAT THEY DID IS NOT PARTICULARLY RELEVANT. IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT GENERAL DE GAULLE QUICKLY DROPPED THIS CRITERION FOR DETERMINING THE FRENCH ATTITUDE. IN THE SHORT TERM NASSER, AND IRRESPONSIBLE SOVIET POLICY CREATED THE WAR CONDITION. YD.

(VII) AFRO-ASIAN COUNTRIES SHOULD REALISE THAT THE ISSUES AT STAKE ARE UNIQUE AND OUGHT TO TRANSCEND THE GROUP LOYALTY THEY NORMALLY FEEL. IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT THEY TEND TO SUPPORT THE ARABS OVER E.G. BORDER INCIDENTS AND TO ACCEPT THAT ISRAEL IS USUALLY THE AGGRESSOR. BUT THE BASIC ARAB POLICY NOW IN QUESTION IS THE INTENTION TO DESTROY ISRAEL, WHICH SURELY FEW AFRO-ASIAN COUNTRIES WOULD ENDORSE. IF THEY DO NOT, THEY SHOULD PRESS THE ARABS TO ACCEPT CO-EXISTANCE WITH ISRAEL, AS A NECESSARY BACKGROUND FOR A ~~settlement~~

REASONABLE SETTLEMENT, WHICH WOULD OBLIGE RECURRENT MIDDLE EAST CRISES AND THEIR ATTENDENT RISKS.

not applicable here.

(VIII) WE DO NOT AT THIS STAGE THINK IT USEFUL FOR ANY OF THE 4 POWERS TO PROPOSE TERMS, OR PARTICULAR ELEMENTS, FOR A SETTLEMENT. ON WITHDRAWAL YOU SHOULD BE GUIDED BY MINISTERIAL STATEMENTS BUT YOU CAN TAKE THE GENERAL LINE THAT WE ARE OPPOSED TO THE USE OF FORCE FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES, AND SUPPORT THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF STATES, BOTH PRINCIPLES ESTABLISHED IN THE U.N. CHARTER. IT FOLLOWS THAT IN THIS CASE TOO, IT IS NOT ACCEPTABLE THAT A SOLUTION SHOULD BE IMPOSED BY FORCE. HOW THE PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL CAN BE RELATED TO A SETTLEMENT CONTAINING SATISFACTORY GUARANTEES OF THE SECURITY OF THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED, AND FAIR TREATMENT FOR

✓ MIDDLE EAST MARKET

ALL THE REFUGEES, IS THE PROBLEM FACING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: NEGOTIATION, COMPROMISE AND MEDIATION WILL BE REQUIRED, AND WE EXPECT THAT THE U.N. WILL PLAY A PROMINENT PART IN THE PROCESS. WE RECOGNISE THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE LEGITIMATE GRIEVANCES STRETCHING BACK FOR MANY YEARS.

(IX) NASSER'S BIG LIE ABOUT US/UK AIR SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL HAS INMEASURABLY AGGRAVATED THE SITUATION, AND LED THE ARABS INTO MEASURES AGAINST THE WEST, THE EFFECT OF WHICH WILL CAUSE SENSELESS DAMAGE TO THEMSELVES, AND OTHERS ((IV) ABOVE), AND WHICH HAVE NO RELEVANCE TO THE ARABS' CASE OVER ISRAEL. THIS RECKLESS SLANDER IN WHICH HE INVOLVED AND MISLED KING HUSSEIN WAS AN ALIBI FOR HIS AND EGYPTIAN FAILURE ((I) ABOVE). THE SOVIET UNION'S CAREFUL REFUSAL (DUE TO THEIR VERY SENSIBLE DETERMINATION TO AVOID INVOLVEMENT) TO SPONSOR THIS LIE IS ALONE PROOF OF ITS FALSETY (THOUGH NOW THAT THE DANGERS OF THEIR BEING INVOLVED ARE SAFELY PAST, THEY ARE BEGINNING TO GIVE IT CURRENCY IN VARIOUS FORMS).

(X) NASSER'S EXAGERATED AMBITIONS ((III) ABOVE) LED HIS SUPPORTERS INTO INCREASING DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIET UNION, WHO EXPLOITED BOTH NASSER'S AND INDEED MORE LEGITIMATE ARAB, AIM, TO EXTEND THEIR OWN INFLUENCE, MISCALCULATED THE SITUATION, AND THEN ABANDONED THE ARABS, C.F. THEIR OPPOSITION IN THE U.N. TO AN UNCONDITIONAL CEASE FIRE, WHICH MIGHT HAVE LEFT THE ARABS IN A STRONGER POSITION. THE ARAB STATES MUST BE CAREFUL NOT TO BECOME PAWNS OF SOVIET POLICY.

BAHRAIN PASS SAVING ABU DHABI DONA DUBAI AND MUSCAT.

CYPHER/CAT A

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE

TELNO GUIDANCE 151.

DATED 16 JUNE

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO CERTAIN MISSIONS TELEGRAM NUMBER GUIDANCE 151
OF 16 JUNE.

MIDDLE EAST.

THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS MORE FLUID, AND PRESENTS
WIDER POSSIBILITIES AND GRAVER DANGERS, THAN AT ANY TIME SINCE
194.

2. THE U.K. STAKE IN THE AREA IS STILL VERY IMPORTANT INDEED TO
THE NATIONAL INTEREST. ITS MAIN ELEMENTS ARE RELATIVELY CHEAP
OIL SUPPLIES, A LARGE AND VERY PROFITABLE SHARE OF THE OIL OPERATION,
BIG ARAB INVESTMENT IN LONDON, AND A GROWING EXPORT MARKET. IN
ADDITION WE ARE CONCERNED TO HAVE SECURE COMMUNICATIONS BY SEA
AND AIR TO THE EAST, AND TO DENY EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF THE AREA AND
ITS RESOURCES TO THE COMMUNIST POWERS. WE MUST THEREFORE PERSIST
WITH EVERY POSSIBLE EFFORT, WITHIN THE LIMITATIONS IMPOSED ON US
BY THE SITUATION, TO DEFEND THIS STAKE. IT IS LIKELY TO BE A LONG
HARD FIGHT.

3. THE SOVIET UNION'S ATTITUDE ESPECIALLY IN THE U.N., INDICATES
THAT THEY (WITH THE CHINESE BREATHING DOWN THEIR NECKS) ARE
LAUNCHED ON AN ALL OUT EFFORT FIRST TO RESTORE THEIR POSITION IN

THE ARAB WORLD AND THEN TO EXPLOIT OUR AND U.S. DIFFICULTIES IN ORDER TO ELIMINATE WESTERN INTERESTS AND INFLUENCE FROM THE MIDDLE EAST, AND INDEED THE WHOLE ARAB WORLD. WE MUST EXPECT THAT REVOLUTIONARY ARAB NATIONALISM, STILL LED BY NASSER, BUT WITH THE ALGERIAN REVOLUTIONARY LEADERS IN THE WINGS, WILL BE IDENTIFIED WITH THIS CAMPAIGN, THOUGH NOT WITH WHAT WILL BE THE LONG TERM SOVIET AIM OF ESTABLISHING EFFECTIVE COMMUNIST CONTROL. ✓

4. SOVIET STRATEGY WILL BE TO DIVIDE THE ARABS IRREVOCABLY FROM THE U.K. AND THE U.S. BY IDENTIFYING THESE WITH THE ISRAELI POSITION. INITIALLY ANYWAY THEIR TACTICS WILL BE UNRELENTING PRESSURE IN THE U.N. FOR CONDEMNATION OF ISRAEL, COMPLETE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL BEHIND THE ARMISTICE LINES, AND SANCTIONS TO THAT END. EVERY ARAB WILL HAVE TO SUPPORT THIS LINE. ✓

5. ISRAEL'S AIMS AND STRATEGY ARE NOT YET CLEAR. HER MINIMUM OBJECTIVES, (AND THEY MAY BE A GOOD DEAL MORE) ARE LIKELY TO BE:-

(i) DE FACTO ARAB ACCEPTANCE OF ISRAEL'S EXISTENCE AS A STATE. ✓

(ii) CONSEQUENTIAL TO (i) FREE PASSAGE THROUGH THE GULF OF AQABA, WITH CAST IRON GUARANTEES, AND THE SUEZ CANAL. ✓

(iii) ENJOYMENT OF ALL JERUSALEM PERHAPS WITH AN ELEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROL. ✓

(iv) SUCH RECTIFICATIONS OF THE FRONTIERS AS ARE NECESSARY TO ENSURE THEIR SECURITY. ✓

ISRAELI TACTICS ARE LIKELY TO BE TO RETAIN THE PHYSICAL FRUITS OF VICTORY UNTIL THESE OBJECTIVES ARE REACHED. WHAT CONCESSIONS OR SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS SHE WOULD ACCEPT IN RETURN E.G. OVER REFUGEES, BOUNDARY CHANGES, AND U.N. SUPERVISION MUST REMAIN SPECULATION.

6. NASSER AND THE RUSSIANS START WITH THE MAJOR ADVANTAGES:-

*Note
nearer
"A" here*
(a) THAT ALL ARABS BELIEVE THAT CONSISTENT U.S. U.K. SUPPORT OF ISRAEL OVER THE LAST 50 YEARS IS THE CAUSE OF ISRAEL'S

STRENGTH AND ARAB WEAKNESS: HENCE THEIR READINESS TO ACCEPT
NASSER'S QUOTE BIG LIE UNQUOTE ABOUT U.S. U.K. AIR ATTACKS, OR
ANY OTHER SIMILAR LIE, AS AN ALIBI FOR THEIR, AND HIS, FAILURE.

(B) THAT THE SOVIET UNION CAN ALWAYS OUTBID US WITH PRO-ARAB
PROPOSALS WHICH IT WILL BE EMBARRASSING FOR US TO TURN DOWN, AND ✓

(C) WE GENUINELY SUPPORT THE ISRAELI OBJECTIVES AT 5(C) AND (11).

7. IF ~~THE SOVIET UNION IS PRO-ARAB~~

THE SOVIET UNION COULD MAINTAIN A UNITED ARAB FRONT IN DEED
AS WELL AS WORD, AND WAS ABLE AND READY TO FOOT THE BILL WHICH WOULD
FOLLOW IF THE ARABS AGREED TO CUT OFF THEIR NOSES ALONG WITH
WESTERN INTERESTS, THEN THE OUTLOOK FOR US WOULD BE BLEAK INDEED.

8. THERE IS HOPE THAT TIME WILL ERODE THE STRENGTH OF THIS THREAT
TO OUR INTERESTS, AND THAT THE FOLLOWING FACTORS WILL TELL
INCREASINGLY:-

(A) MORE AND MORE ARABS WILL LOOK BEHIND NASSER'S ATTEMPT TO
PURGE AND ATONE FOR THE ARAB DEFEAT BY HIS RESIGNATION OFFER.

THEY WILL START TO CALCULATE THE MATERIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ^{An interesting point is Egypt's}
COST TO THE ARAB NATION, AS A WHOLE, AND TO THEMSELVES IN ^{Helping the American}
PARTICULAR, OF NASSER'S LEADERSHIP AND FAILURE: ^{company, Phillips, to continue}
^{operations in the Persian area}
^{which failing the state is}
^{stop Am. oil}
^{company from}
^{operating.}

(B) THE CONSIDERABLE ENEMIC, IF OFTEN QUIESCENT, ANTI-COMMUNIST
SENTIMENT IN THE ARAB WORLD. SOVIET PRESTIGE HAS BEEN HEAVILY
DAMAGED BY ITS FAILURE, WHATEVER THE EXCUSES, TO PROTECT THE
ARABS AGAINST ISRAEL.

(C) THE NATURAL TENDENCY OF THE ARAB STATES TO FALL APART, AND

~~THEIR SOLIDARITY SPHERES IS ATOMIZED~~

~~TO PROMOTE HIS~~

~~FALL APART, AND~~

PARTICULARLY OF THE OIL RICH STATES TO RESIST NASSER'S ATTEMPTS
TO PROMOTE HIS REVOLUTIONARY POLICIES AT THE EXPENSE OF THEIR
ASSETS. ✓

9. OUR IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE IS DEFENCE OF OUR DIRECT NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE SHORT TERM. OUR BROADER AIM IS A REASONABLE EVENTUAL SETTLEMENT, OR MODUS VIVENDI, BETWEEN THE ARABS AND ISRAELIS AS THE BASIS OF A MORE STABLE MIDDLE EAST IN WHICH OUR INTERESTS CAN BE SECURE. OUR STRATEGY MUST BE TO AVOID OFFERING FRESH TARGETS FOR SOVIET/EGYPTIAN ATTACKS, TO WEAKEN NASSER'S LEADERSHIP IN THE ARAB WORLD AND TO CONCENTRATE ON IMPROVING OUR POSITION IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES WHERE OUR MATERIAL INTERESTS MAINLY LIE. OUR TACTICS MUST BE FLEXIBLE, AND REALISTIC, AND OUR ARGUMENTS ADAPTED TO PARTICULAR AUDIENCES.

10. ON THE POLITICAL FRONT, AND BEARING IN MIND THE DISABILITIES UNDER WHICH WE SHALL BE WORKING (PARA 7 ABOVE), WE SHALL SEEK TO AVOID ANY INITIATIVES RELATED TO TERMS OF A SETTLEMENT, WHICH CAN BE BROUGHT HOME TO US, WHETHER IN THE U.N. THE FOUR POWER CONTEXT, OR BILATERALLY. WE SHALL HOPE TO BE VISIBLELY ACTING ONLY ON MOVES CALCULATED

~~HOLY ACTIVE ONLY ON MOVES~~

CALCULATED TO STYMIE SOVIET/EGYPTIAN TACTICS, E.G. U.N. OR OTHER INITIATIVES TO ASSIST OR PROTECT ARAB POPULATIONS. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO COUNTER CHARGES OF PRO-ISRAELI ACTIONS AS EFFECTIVELY AS WE CAN.

~~DO NOT REACT TO SOVIET/EGYPTIAN SETTLEMENTS~~

~~HENCE OTHER ACTIONS WE TIRADONALLY~~

~~AS EFFECTIVELY~~

~~AS WE CAN~~

11. AS REGARDS OTHER ACTIONS WE MUST TAKE EVERY OPPORTUNITY BY ALL MEANS OPEN TO US, TO INFLUENCE GOVERNMENTS AND PUBLIC OPINION EVERYWHERE IN A SENSE FAVOURABLE TO US, AND YOU SHOULD TREAT THIS AS A PRIORITY TASK. M.I.F. GUIDANCE LISTS A NUMBER OF RELEVANT FACTORS AND ARGUMENTS OF WHICH POSTS SHOULD TAKE ACCOUNT AS APPROPRIATE TO LOCAL CIRCUMSTANCES.

Rome Pass saving to Holy See

Bahrain Pass Saving to Abu Dhabi, Doha, Dubai
& Muscat

To Phil, PH
Arz. 1
6802 60.
MO. small QD
M.S.

2 017472 P

FM ADCLHY NR724

TO PP ASOLDQ

GR80

CIRCULAR RETRACT 86120

MR. WILLIAM RODGERS UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOREIGN OFFICE
SAID IN WRITTEN ANSWER TO QUESTION IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS TODAY
TUESDAY.

THE GOVTS OF FRANCE, THE UK AND THE US HAD BY THE END OF 1966
CONTRIBUTED 12,451,920 DOLLARS 95,524,004, and 387,368,069 DOLLARS
RESPECTIVELY TO THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR
PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST (UNRWA).

THE GOVT OF THE UNION OF SOVIT SOCIALIST REPUBLICS HAS MADE NO
CONTRIBUTIONS.

GENTROFORM.

RECD 0620Z/21 AJS

744
P 211710
ACKLHY
TO PP ASOLDQ
PP AKW LLJ
GR 300

Mr. Parl. Ref
Arab
Frob. Int.
no min 2.9R1
Ans.

CIRCULAR RETRACT 86721

IN A STATEMENT ABOUT BRITISH AID FOR ARAB REFUGEES AT TODAYS (WEDNESDAY) FOREIGN OFFICE NEWS CONFERENCE, THE SPOKESMAN SAID, THE FINAL CONSIGNMENT OF THE TWENTY THOUSAND POUNDS WORTH OF EMERGENCY SUPPLIES WHICH WE ARE SENDING TO JORDAN IS EXPECTED TO ARRIVE THERE TOMORROW. THE FIRST TWO CONSIGNMENTS HAVE ALREADY BEEN DESPATCHED. THE SUPPLIES ARE BEING FLOWN IN TO JORDAN BY THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS. THE COST OF THE TRANSPORT IS BEING SHARED BY THE ORGANISATION AND OURSELVES. HE ADDED, WE HAVE ALSO OFFERED HALF A MILLION POUNDS FOR REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION AND WE HAVE ALSO ANNOUNCED OUR INTENTION TO MAKE A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN OUR CONTRIBUTION TO THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORK AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES. THE DISASTER EMERGENCY COMMITTEE WHICH REPRESENTS THE PRINCIPAL VOLUNTARY ORGANISATIONS IN ENGLAND, INCLUDING THE RED CROSS AND OXFAM, HAS AGREED TO MAKE A NATIONAL APPEAL FOR JORDAN WHICH IS TO BE LAUNCHED SHORTLY ON TELEVISION. THE APPEAL IS, I THINK, FOR AID FOR REFUGEES. CENTROFORM.

RECD 0630/22 JUNE

Mr. Arthur R. F.
R. A.
MOS. CDA
GPO Int.
MOS

P 201230Z

FM ADCLHY 714

TO ASOLDQ

FM COI

102

CIRCULAR RETRACT 85920. BRITAIN ANNOUNCED AID OF NEARLY TWO MILLION DOLLARS FOR MIDDLE EAST RELIEF WORK IN A LETTER TO UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL U THANT LAST NIGHT (MONDAY). LORD CARADON, BRITAINS PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE AT THE WORLD BODY, SAID JORDAN HAD BEEN OFFERED ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS FOR URGENT REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION PROJECTS AND A SPECIAL CONTRIBUTION OF FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS WOULD BE MADE TO THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY. THE LATTER IS IN ADDITION TO BRITAINS NINETEEN SIXTY SEVEN CONTRIBUTION OF FOUR MILLION, HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS. LORD CARADON HAD PREVIOUSLY INFORMED THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF OTHER EMERGENCY RELIEF FOR JORDAN, INCLUDING THE SUPPLY OF BLANKETS AND MEDICINES FROM BRITISH STOCKS IN CYPRUS.

CENTROFORM.

RECD 1320/20 JUNE

~~SECRET~~ NOT EDITED

Mr Park. *BB*
By JF
720 Summary QD

62 Jt.

MoS

CYPHER/CAT A
FROM FOREIGN OFFICE
TELNO GUIDANCE 157.
DATED 21 JUNE
IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO CERTAIN MISSIONS TELEGRAM NO. 157 GUIDANCE OF
21 JUNE.

GUIDANCE NO 156.

MIDDLE EAST.

GUIDANCE TEL NO 133 (NOT TO ALL) DEALT WITH THE CHARGES OF
U.K. INTERVENTION FROM AIRCRAFT CARRIERS. LATER A NUMBER OF
OTHER STORIES

S WERE PUT ABOUT IN JORDAN, E.G.
(A) BRITISH HUNTERS, LIGHTnings AND SEA VIXENS HAD BEEN IN
ACTION OVER JORDAN.

COMMENT:

(1) THE NEAREST R.A.F. HUNTERS ARE AT BAHRAIN AND ADEN.
THEIR RADIUS OF ACTION IS 400 MILES. FROM BAHRAIN TO JORDAN
IS ABOUT 1,000 MILES AND FROM ADEN TO JORDAN ABOUT 1,500
MILES. SINCE THESE AIRCRAFT CANNOT BE REFUELLED IN FLIGHT IT
WOULD CLEARLY HAVE BEEN IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO HAVE BEEN
OVER JORDAN, EVEN ON THE HYPOTHESIS THAT THEY FLEW ON TO
AKROTIRI OR EVEN THAT THEY LANDED IN ISRAEL. (COULD THERE HAVE
BEEN A CONFUSION WITH IRAQI OR LEBANESE HUNTERS?)

(2) THE SQUADRON OF JAVELINS FORMERLY IN CYPRUS WAS WITHDRAWN
IN MAY. THERE IS STILL A SQUADRON IN THE FAR EAST, BUT THIS

ACTION OVER JORDAN.

COMMENT:

(I) THE NEAREST R.A.F. HUNTERS ARE AT BAHRAIN AND ADEN. THEIR RADIUS OF ACTION IS 400 MILES. FROM BAHRAIN TO JORDAN IS ABOUT 1,000 MILES AND FROM ADEN TO JORDAN ABOUT 1,500 MILES. SINCE THESE AIRCRAFT CANNOT BE REFUELLED IN FLIGHT IT WOULD CLEARLY HAVE BEEN IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO HAVE BEEN OVER JORDAN, EVEN ON THE HYPOTHESIS THAT THEY FLEW ON TO AKROTIRI OR EVEN THAT THEY LANDED IN ISRAEL. COULD THERE HAVE BEEN A CONFUSION WITH IRAQI OR LEBANESE HUNTERS?

(II) THE SQUADRON OF JAVELINS FORMERLY IN CYPRUS WAS WITHDRAWN IN MAY. THERE IS STILL A SQUADRON IN THE FAR EAST, BUT THIS CAN HARDLY BE SUPPOSED TO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED.

(III) SINCE NO FLYING OCCURRED FROM VICTORIOUS OR HERMES ON 5 JUNE, NO SEA VIXENS COULD HAVE BEEN IN THE JERUSALEM AREA. THE SEA VIXEN RESEMBLES THE VAMPIRE (WITH WHICH THE JORDANIAN AIR FORCE IS EQUIPPED) IN GENERAL DESIGN, ALTHOUGH IT IS A LARGER AIRCRAFT, AND IN CERTAIN ATTITUDES MIGHT BE MISTAKEN FOR IT.

(B) AIRCRAFT WEARING R.A.F. ROUNDELS HAD BEEN IN ACTION.

COMMENT:

R.A.F. AIRCRAFT ARE BY NO MEANS THE ONLY ONES IN THE MIDDLE EASTERN AREA WHICH BEAR ROUNDELS. AIRCRAFT OF THE FOLLOWING COUNTRIES ALSO HAVE THEM: IRAN, SYRIA, U.A.R., SAUDI ARABIA, YEMEN AND KUWAIT.

(C) UNCANNY SELECTIVITY OF ISRAELI CHOICE OF TARGETS WAS EVIDENCE OF ACCESS TO FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE.

COMMENT:

THE SELECTIVITY OF THE ISRAELI AIR ATTACKS DOES NOT SEEM TO US IN ANY WAY TO IMPLY THE CONCLUSION THAT TARGET INFORMATION HAD BEEN SUPPLIED BY FOREIGNERS. THE SAME SELECTIVITY WAS NOTICEABLE ON ALL FRONTS. THERE WAS OF COURSE, NO QUESTION WHATEVER OF OUR HAVING GIVEN ISRAEL ANY INFORMATION WHICH MIGHT HAVE HELPED IN PREPARING ATTACKS ON JORDANIAN TARGETS.

BAHRAIN PASS SAVING ABU DHABI DOHA DUBAI AND MUSCAT.

MESSAGE FORM

FOR COMM CEN/SIGNALS USE _____

PRECEDENCE—ACTION PRIORITY	PRECEDENCE—INFO DATE—TIME GROUP DEFERRED	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS
FROM CG MUSCAT		PREFIX GR
TO PRPO		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
INFO		ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER 27104

FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO. GUIDANCE 159.

THIS REACHED ME ON 1 JULY BUT LATE AS IT IS I REGISTER REGRET
THAT WE DO NOT PERSIST IN OUR REQUEST. IF THERE IS NO HEAD OF STATE
AT THE UNITED NATIONS THERE IS PLENTY IN BROADCASTS AND THE CLEARCUT
ACT OF PERSISTING WOULD DO MORE TO CONVINCE THAN ENDLESS DETAILED
ARGUMENT. CARDEN.

Page _____ of _____ pages	REFERS TO MESSAGE		DRAFTER'S NAME		OFFICE	TEL. No.						
CLASSIFIED		<input type="checkbox"/> YES	<input type="checkbox"/> NO									
FOR OPR'S USE	R	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	D	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE	
												RANK

CYPHER/CAT A
FROM FOREIGN OFFICE
TELNO GUIDANCE 159.
DATED 23 JUNE
PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL.~~

MIDDLE EAST.

AS THERE IS NOW LITTLE STEAM AT THE U.N. BEHIND THE ARAB ACCUSATION OF INTERVENTION IN THE HOSTILITIES BY BRITISH AND AMERICAN AIRCRAFT, IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO PRESS HOME OUR REQUEST FOR A U.N. INVESTIGATION.

2. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE RELY ON GUIDANCE ALREADY ISSUED,
AND RELEVANT PASSAGE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S SPEECH IN THE
U.N. ON 21 JUNE (VERBATIM NO 291).

BAHRAIN PASS SAYING ABU DHABI DUBAI DOHA AND MUSCAT.

1 P.M.

This saves a great
trouble. The U.N. investigation
saves ~~to~~ one king
like to nail his lie!

2 in. in
3 in. Paint + ~~100~~ 4.00 xx

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Minutes

Notes on conversation with Minister of the
Interior on 6 July

Arab/Israel conflict

The Minister said that Omanis as Arabs wanted an Arab victory over Israel. But they were more in sympathy with the Saudis than with the Egyptians since the Saudis had spent money on them before. In any case Israel was a long way away; and if as he said they all hoped the Arabs would win, they did not feel it intensely.

Xm
(D.C. Carden)
6 July, 1967.

*To Durban 1000. - I think it
all
about
right.*

By Bag

Muscat

PRIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO CERTAIN MISSIONS

Telno Guidance 161 27 June 1967 (JIPGD)

UNCLASSIFIED

British Aid for Arab Refugees.

The British Government have made a number of announcements recently on the subject of aid for Arab refugees and for Jordan. They can be summarised as follows.

UNRWA

We have made an additional emergency contribution of \$500,000 to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency in addition to \$4.5 million already pledged as our contribution for 1967.

2. Since UNRWA was set up in 1950 we have contributed 14% of its total budget. Our total contribution at the end of 1966 amounted to \$95.5 million. This compares with the contributions of other countries as follows:-

United States	\$387.4 million
Canada	\$ 18.6 million
France	\$ 12.4 million
U.A.R.	\$ 5.3 million
Sweden	\$ 4.5 million
West Germany	\$ 3.6 million
Australia	\$ 3.4 million
Other countries	\$ 20.7 million
Soviet Union	Nil

Jordan

3. We have agreed to provide a grant of £500,000 for urgent rehabilitation and reconstruction projects in Jordan.

4. £20,000 worth of blankets and medical supplies have been sent to Amman from British Government stocks in Cyprus.

5. Please seek to make these facts known in whatever way you consider appropriate.

✓ han done.

FO/CO/WH.DISTRIBUTION
J.I.P.G.D.

QQQQQ

1. R.W.
2. Mr. Amin. - han RF
B.M. Ali - "
Hamid al Ghailani - " " 2
3. xx

(2041)

TELEGRAM

Cypher code en clair

From:—
Bahrain

To:—
Bahrain Residency
(Savinc 10)
and F.O. (91)

Despatched

Received

No. of

26 June.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

Reported for information to Bahrain (10) Abu Dhabi (14)
Muscat (4) and Bahrain Agency (29) (All Savinc)

Your tel. 311 of 23 June to Bahrain: Secretary of
State's speech.

Without exception all those to whom I have spoken
have expressed greatest satisfaction at this statement,
particularly in relation to old city of Jerusalem. They
regard statement and our offer of aid to Jordan, as
clear proof of where our sympathies and endeavours lie.
General atmosphere here much more relaxed as a result.

ROYAL

1. Encl. 100
2. Yr Part 100
3. PN. 1/1

Murad *AB*

*Too detailed for much
use here.*

-1 JUL 67

10915
G

EN CLAIR AND BY BAG

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO CERTAIN MISSIONS

GUIDANCE NO. 158 23 JUNE, 1967 (IP)

UNCLASSIFIED

GUIDANCE TELEGRAMS NOS. 128 AND 157: MIDDLE EAST.

ARAB RADIOS ARE NOW DISTORTING PART OF A PRESS CONFERENCE GIVEN BY REAR ADMIRAL ASHMORE IN SINGAPORE ON 22 JUNE IN WHICH HE IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT BUCCANEERS FROM HIS FLAGSHIP H.M.S. HERMES COULD HAVE MADE THE ROUND TRIP FROM ADEN TO THE SCENE OF FIGHTING ON 6 JUNE AND ADDING THAT TANKER AIRCRAFT WERE AIRBORNE FROM THE CARRIER ON THAT DAY.

2. BY SUPPRESSING THE REST OF THE REAR ADMIRAL'S STATEMENTS AND IGNORING THE ACADEMIC NATURE OF THE QUESTION HE WAS ANSWERING ARAB PROPAGANDA IS ATTEMPTING TO RENEW ACCUSATIONS OF BRITISH INTERVENTION. IN REBUTTING YOU SHOULD USE THE FOLLOWING:-

A) THE PRESS CONFERENCE WAS CALLED SPECIFICALLY TO DENY CHARGES THAT AIRCRAFT FROM H.M.S. HERMES WERE INVOLVED AND INDEED THE AGENCIES REPORTED REAR ADMIRAL ASHMORE AS SAYING OF THEM, "'I HAVE NEVER HEARD SO MUCH NONSENSE IN MY LIFE'".

B) HE STRESSED THAT THE CARRIER WAS STATIONARY, AND IN PUBLIC VIEW, IN ADEN OUTER HARBOUR ON 5 JUNE, THE DAY OF THE ALLEGED INTERVENTION.

C) THE ACADEMIC QUESTION ABOUT THE BUCCANEERS' PERFORMANCE CAPABILITIES RELATED ONLY TO 6 JUNE WHEN H.M.S. HERMES WAS AT SEA (MOSTLY WITHIN SIGHT OF ADEN).

D) LOGS WERE PRODUCED TO THE PRESS SHOWING THAT ON 6 JUNE NO PRACTICE SORTIE EXCEEDED 1 AND ONE HALF HOURS IN DURATION. TO REACH THE NILE DELTA REQUIRED 4 AND ONE HALF TO 5 HOURS.

SOSFA/CROSEC

SENT 1933Z 23 JUNE

BY TELEGRAPH:

U.K. MISSION NEW YORK	BEIRUT	TEL AVIV	TRIPOLI
B.I.S. NEW YORK	JEDDA	ALGIERS	BENGHAZI
WASHINGTON	KUWAIT	KHARTOUM	TUNIS
BAHRAIN	TEHRAN	RABAT	POLAD SINGAPORE
			BHC SINGAPORE

[ALL IMMEDIATE]

ANKARA	U.K. DEL.	NATO	AMMAN	NEW DELHI
ATHENS		MOSCOW	ADDIS ABABA	RAWALPINDI
PARIS		ADEN	DAKAR	VALLETTA

[ALL PRIORITY]

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION
J.I.P.G.D.

24 JUN 67
1091
MUSC

PRIORITY POLITICAL DUBAI 31123.
PRIORITY POLITICAL ABU DHABI 23023.
PRIORITY POLITICAL DOHA 12523.
✓ PRIORITY BRITAIN MUSCAT 19723.

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO DUBAI TELNO 311 OF 23 JUNE AND TO ABU DHABI DOHA
MUSCAT AND SAVING TO BAHRAIN AGENCY AND FOREIGN OFFICE.

R
B.B.C. NEWS BULLETINS MENTIONED POINTS FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S
SPEECH IN THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON 21 JUNE,
PARTICULARLY THAT WAR MUST NOT LEAD TO TERRITORIAL ANNEXATIONS
AND THAT ISRAEL WOULD BE ISOLATED FROM WORLD OPINION IF THEY
PURPORTED TO ANNEX THE OLD CITY OF JERUSALEM. TEXT COMES TO YOU NYR
IN THE BAG TOMORROW (VERBATIM 291).
2. PLEASE TAKE SUCH ACTION AS YOU CAN TO MAKE STATEMENT WIDELY
KNOWN AND TELEGRAPH ANY LOCAL REACTIONS ON PART OF RULERS AND
PUBLIC OPINION.

CRAWFORD.

So far I know of
no local reaction. If
I will report
✓ come upon a ✓

BRITISH CONSULATE GENERAL,

(1091)

MUSCAT.

26 June, 1967.

At present people in the Sultanate take a comparatively objective view of recent events on the borders of Israel. This provides an opportunity to state the British case, an opportunity which would not exist if Omanis were already as prejudiced as Arabs in many other parts of the Middle East. I attach a note which contains some talking points. I send them to you in case you, or people working under you, are likely to have opportunities in conversations with people of the country to establish the main point, namely that we have not helped Israel in the recent fighting and that in general it has been our policy to do as much or more for Arabs in recent years than for Israel.

(D.C. Garden)

1. Brigadier G.W.B. Purdon, MC,
Sultan's Armed Force,
Bait al Falaj.
2. I.P.H. Skeet, Esq.,
P.D.(O.) Ltd., Muscat.
3. Capt. D.S. Lyon,
Gray Mackenzie & Co. Ltd.,
MUSCAT.
4. D. Payne, Esq.,
Cable & Wireless Ltd.,
MUSCAT.
5. J.A.P. Hill, Esq.,
B.B.M.E., Muscat.

Some points :-

- (a) We knew that UAR occupation of the Straits of Tiran was a casus belli. Israel had said so. Once the UAR had occupied the Straits we then did what we could to secure free passage through them partly because we believe in free passage through such straits throughout the world (e.g. the Dardanelles), but also because we feared that there would be war otherwise.
- (b) No British (or American) aircraft gave Israel any form of support. At first the Egyptian story was that the Jordanians had seen British aircraft and aircraft carriers on their radar. There were two British aircraft carriers in the Middle East only. One was in Aden, the other was in Malta. Both were stationary. Both were too far away for any planes from them to have operated over Israel. Subsequently King Hussain has said that the deductions from the radar screens could have been wrong. We have since invited the United Nations to verify this by inspection.
- (c) During the last ten years we have provided far more arms for Arab states than for Israel - incidentally the great bulk of Israel's aircraft came from France.
- (d) Over a similar period we have given aid for development projects totalling £30 million to Arab states and less than £10,000 to Israel.
- (e) British contributions to Palestinian refugees will total by the end of this year US\$.100 million (French and American contributions will be approximately US\$.13 million and US\$.400 million). The USSR has contributed nothing. Since the fighting we have offered over £500,000 to Jordan to help with the new refugee problems.
- (f) The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in speaking at the General Assembly of the United Nations said the following :-
Article 2 of the Charter provides that "All members shall refrain in their International Relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state". Here the words "territorial integrity" have a direct bearing on the question of withdrawal, on which much has been said in previous speeches. I see no two ways about this, and I state our position very clearly. In my view from the words in the Charter war should not lead to territorial aggrandisement.
Reports suggest that one particular point may be of special urgency. This concerns Jerusalem. I call upon the State of Israel not to take any steps in relation to Jerusalem which would conflict with this principle. I say very solemnly to the Government of Israel that, if they purport to annex the Old City or legislate for its annexation, they will be taking a step which will not only isolate them from world opinion but will also lose them the sympathy that they have.

MUSCAT.

22 June, 1967.

2091)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Middle East Crisis

In your letter 1073/162/67 of 9 June to Tony Parsons you asked the recipients of your letter to report on the main events of the emergency and on the principle conclusions to be drawn from it in regard to the conduct of their Rulers and other agencies in their states and on any lessons for the future.

2. On 6 June, that is the day after fighting began between the UAR and Israel, I sent a telegram saying that conditions were normal. This was based on reports from SAF Units and from P.D.(O.) Ltd, working parties scattered throughout Oman. By chance one of P.D.(O.) Ltd.'s senior officials was in the Sharqiya with Shaikh Ahmad bin Muhammad al Harthi when the news first came over the wireless. Shaikh Ahmad said that he cared neither for the Egyptians nor for the Israelis; but he hoped the Russians and Americans would not get involved. My telegram was also based on an afternoon spent walking through the markets and backstreets of Matrah. I found shops crowded as usual and their owners as welcoming as usual. In two I saw people buying radios; but I did not see people listening to the news. Later when I was walking between houses there were probably more radios on than usual but not all of these were tuned to Arab stations. Later still I spent some time talking to two boys in their late teens who had just finished their schooling. They had a radio. It was playing dance music from Pakistan. If there was concern at events in Sinai there was astonishingly little evidence of it.

3. On 9 June I was at the RAF Station at Masirah. The Station Commander had noticed no perceptible reaction amongst the some hundreds of Omani employees.

4. On 9 June also, I reached the RAF Station at Salalah and remained there until 12 June. It had been suggested that 9 June, being Dhofar Liberation Day, would be a day of trouble in Dhofar and perhaps particularly for the RAF Station. There was none, though I was subsequently told that Nasir's resignation produced dismay among some elements in Salalah town.

5. On 10 June, as already reported in my telegram RTT 331 from Salalah, the Sultan said that as between Israel and the UAR he was neutral; with the exception of some sophisticated people in Muscat and Matrah his Omanis would be unconcerned; all oil that would be produced from the Sultanate could go to the UK regardless of the attitude of other Arab states. He made it clear, when he spoke

/in . . .

SIR Stewart Crawford, KCMG, CVO,
BAHRAYN.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

in this fashion, that he was not unaware of the danger that Arab nationalist mobs could be to oil installations. But such a danger was no cause for concern to him. In keeping with this attitude was the readiness with which he agreed on 10 June to extending facilities for watering by Mossoopers in Muscat, and to the R.A.F carrying out low-flying exercises over the Northern Sultanate. On 15 June also he readily agreed to the stationing of V-members at Musirah for the defense of south Arabia in the post-independence era.

6. In reporting the Sultan's assessment of the attitude of his people on 10 June I said that I was in general agreement with it but could not exclude the possibility of some minor bomb outrages. I had in mind, for example, the fact that early in 1955 a bomb had been put into the post Office in the Consulate compound and part of the post Office had been blown in. In preceding years there had been other similar episodes. It seemed to me that if one was an Omani rebel/Arab Nationalist and had a trunk full of aging bombs one might be tempted to get them out. However, to date nothing of the sort has happened and conditions throughout the country, Muscat and Matrah included, remain peaceful.

7. I draw three main conclusions. First the people of Oman are less concerned with the affairs of the Levant than other Arabs; but I suspect that they might soon appear in a different light, if given a different lead by their Government; they are also likely to become more concerned as events of ~~any~~ that start to reverberate on them e.g. by reducing the value of their large holdings of Kuwait dinars. Second the Sultan is a useful friend; so long as he dominates the Government, British interests, whether in the shape of oil-companies, the oil they produce, R.A.F stations, or the freedom of aircraft to fly from them, are likely to suffer less interference here than in other parts of the Arab world. Third the fact that British interests have been so largely free of interference is due in part to policies pursued by the Sultan against the current of British thinking; I have in mind in particular his attitudes to education, the employment of foreign Arabs, and his preference for Indians, Pakistanis and Europeans, all of which have been condemned in the past and will doubtless be condemned again. But be that as it may, they have served our interests well now.

8. I am copying this letter to Parsons in Bahrain, Boyle in Deira, Lamb in Abu Dhabi, Roberts in Dubai, Weir in Arabian Report, and Wilton in Aden.

(D.C. Cardm)

CONFIDENTIAL

REGRET NOT EDITED

The Park Inn ~~100~~

CYPHER/CAT A
FROM FOREIGN OFFICE
TELNO GUIDANCE 156.
DATED 21 JUNE
IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

MIDDLE EAST

SOME MIDDLE EAST POSTS HAVE PROPOSED THAT WE SHOULD NOW LAY OFF ATTACKING THE BIG LIE IN THESE TERMS, AND SPEAK RATHER OF A MISTAKE WHICH MUST BE CORRECTED, SO AS TO GIVE THE ARABS A WAY OUT.

2. WE CONSIDERED THAT REPEATED HITTING OF THE BIG LIE WAS NECESSARY
TO ENHANCE ANY IMPRESSION. HOWEVER NOW THAT THE FOREIGN
SECRETARY IN NEW YORK HAS AGAIN DISPOSED OF IT (VERBATIM 291), AND
THAT KING HUSSEIN HAS SAID THAT HE HAS NO CONCLUSIVE PROOF OF THE
CHARGES, WE AGREE THAT A SWITCH OF EMPHASIS MIGHT PAY. IF YOU
CONSIDER IT WOULD BE EFFECTIVE YOU MAY NOW TAKE THE LINE IN
DISCUSSION THAT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT GENUINE MISTAKES OF RADAR
INTERPRETATION WERE MADE IN JORDAN IN THE TENSE ATMOSPHERE OF
JUNE 5. IT IS ALSO UNDERSTANDABLE THAT OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES WERE
MISLED BY THE CONTINUED ACCUSATIONS BY CAIRO RADIO. THIS HOWEVER IN
NO WAY EXCUSES THE DANGEROUS AND IRRESPONSIBLE ACTIONS OF CAIRO RADIO
IN MAKING ITS PUBLIC AND CONTINUED ACCUSATIONS (A) WITHOUT CHECKING
E.G. WITH THE SOVIET UNION WHO WERE IN A POSITION TO KNOW, AND (B)
IN THE FACE OF SOVIET REFUSAL TO SUPPORT THEM. THIS DETERMINATION
OF NASSER TO FIND HIMSELF AN ALIBI HAS LED OTHER ARAB STATES
INTO UNNECESSARY DIFFICULTIES.

3. THE I.F. GUIDANCE (NOT TO ALLO) CONTAINS MATERIAL WHICH WAS

DISCUSSION THAT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT GENUINE MISTAKES OF RADAR
INTERPRETATION WERE MADE IN JORDAN IN THE TENSE ATMOSPHERE OF
JUNE 5. IT IS ALSO UNDERSTANDABLE THAT OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES WERE
MISLED BY THE CONTINUED ACCUSATIONS BY CAIRO RADIO. THIS HOWEVER IN
NO WAY EXCUSES THE DANGEROUS AND IRRESPONSIBLE ACTIONS OF CAIRO RADIO
IS MAKING ITS PUBLIC AND CONTINUED ACCUSATIONS (A) WITHOUT CHECKING
E.G. WITH THE SOVIET UNION WHO WERE IN A POSITION TO KNOW, AND (B)
IN THE FACE OF SOVIET REFUSAL TO SUPPORT THEM. THIS DETERMINATION
OF NASSER TO FIND HIMSELF AN ALIBI HAS LED OTHER ARAB STATES
INTO UNNECESSARY DIFFICULTIES.

3. THE I.F. GUIDANCE (NOT TO ALL) CONTAINS MATERIAL WHICH WAS
SENT TO H.H. AMBASSADOR IN AMMAN TO REFUTE THE VARIOUS WILD
CHARGES WHICH WERE FLYING ABOUT IN JORDAN. YOU MAY DRAW ON IT.

BAHRAIN PASS SAYING ABU DHABI DUBAI MUSCAT AND DOHA

Yours
W.M.

CYPHER/CAT A
FROM FOREIGN OFFICE
TELNO CORRIGENDUM GUIDANCE 151.
DATED 20 JUNE
PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO CERTAIN MISSIONS TELEGRAM NUMBER GUIDANCE 151 (CORRIGENDUM OF 20 JUNE, 1967.

GUIDANCE 151: MIDDLE EAST.

PLEASE AMEND PENULTIMATE SENTENCE OF PARA 10 BY INSERTING THE WORDS QUOTE OR TO IMPROVE OUR POSITION WITH THE ARAB COUNTRIES UNQUOTE AFTER THE WORD QUOTE TACTICS UNQUOTE.

BAHRAIN PASS SAYING ABU DHABI DOHA DUBAI, AND MUSCAT.

CYPHER CATA
FROM FOREIGN OFFICE
R NO 781
DATED 20 JUNE
ROUTINE

Mr Parker ^{AB}
Mr S.

CONFIDENTIAL

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM BEIRUT
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TEL NO 676 OF 19/6 REPTD FOR
IRFMN TO AMMAN BAHREIN KUWAIT NICOSIA WASHINGTON AND UNKINS NEW YORK.

SITUATION IN THE LEBANON.

AS REGULAR AIR SERVICES HAVE STILL NOT BEEN RESUMED, YOU
MAY LIKE A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE SITUATION
OF SURVEY OF THE PRESENT SITUATION HEREZ

2. NINE DAYS AFTER THE END OF HOSTILITIES WHICH HAD LEFT THE
LEBANON VIRTUALLY UNTOUCHED, BEIRUT REMAINS A CITY AS TENSE AS
POST-REVOLUTIONARY BUDAPEST AND MUCH MORE FRIGHTENED.
ARMOURED CARS AND INFANTRY ARE STILL POSTED AT KEY POINTS
THROUGHOUT THE CITY AND THERE ARE CONSTANT MILITARY PATROLS.
EVEN THE INNOCENT BANG OF ONE OF BEIRUT'S CONSTANT TRAFFIC
ACCIDENTS BRINGS IMMEDIATE INVESTIGATION BY A MILITARY PATROL.

3. ALTHOUGH THE BANKS ARE OPEN, THEIR OPERATIONS ARE SUBJECT TO
SEVERE RESTRICTIONS- FEW SHIPS ARE CALLING AT THE PORT-
BUSINESS IS AT A LOW EBB AND THE SHOPKEEPERS IN DESPA IR-
HOTELS ARE ALREADY CLOSING AND UNEMPLOYMENT IS GROWING.

4. THE LEBANESE GOVT SEEM WHOLLY PREOCCUPIED BY DISCUSSIONS
WITH OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES, AND BY PREPARATIONS FOR THE FORTH-
COMING DEBATE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. ALTHOUGH MANY LEBANESE
ARE ALREADY SAYING PRIVATELY - AND SOME PUBLICLY - THAT IT IS

TIME FOR THE LEBANON TO CONCENTRATE ON HER OWN FUTURE AND THE
WELFARE OF HER OWN CITIZENS, NEITHER THE PRESIDENT NOR THE
MINISTERS HAVE YET SUMMONED UP THE COURAGE TO GIVE ANY KIND OF
LEAD IN GETTING THE COUNTRY GOING AGAIN.

5. THE ARMY COMMAND CONTINUE TO PROVIDE THE ONLY SOURCE OF
RESOLUTE AND RESPONSIBLE LEADERSHIP, AND THEY ARE NATURALLY
CONCENTRATING ON THE MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER, A TASK IN
WHICH THEY HAVE SO FAR BEEN ENTIRELY SUCCESSFUL SINCE THEY
REGAINED CONTROL AFTER THE RIOTS OF 10 JUNE. IN THE IMMEDIATE
FUTURE THEY PROBABLY HAVE TWO MAIN PREOCCUPATIONS:

- (a) A RENEWED ATTEMPT, PERHAPS ON THE EVE OF ANY ARAB
SUMMIT MEETING THAT MAY BE HELD, BY THE EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR
AND HIS HENCHMEN HERE, TO ORGANISE VIOLENT DEMONSTRATIONS
IN SUPPORT OF NASSER-
- (b) THE DANGER OF CLASHES BETWEEN CHRISTIANS AND MOSLEMS.

6. THE ARMY PROBABLY THINK THEY CAN COPE WITH THE FIRST
CONTINGENCY. THOUGH THE EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR IS REPORTED TO HAVE
SPENT LL 400,000 LAST TIME ON HIRING VEHICLES AT LL 50 AND
DEMONSTRATORS AT LL 10 EACH, HE MAY WELL FIND HIS TASK MORE
DIFFICULT IN FUTURE, EVEN IF HE HAS ENOUGH MONEY LEFT. IN ANY
CASE THE ARMY CAN CERTAINLY BE EXPECTED TO DO THEIR UTMOST TO
STOP TROUBLE. ANY FAILURE IN THIS RESPECT MIGHT EXPOSE THEM
TO THE FAR GREATER DANGER OF THE CHRISTIAN PHALANGE
BRINGING THEIR SUPPORTERS INTO THE STREETS. (THEIR LEADER IS
SAID TO HAVE GIVEN THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF A WARNING THAT THIS
COULD HAPPEN). THE ARMY HAVE MANAGED WONDERFULLY WELL SO FAR,
SIMPLY BY SHOWING THEMSELVES IN FORCE, BUT THEY MUST BE DESPER-
ATELY ANXIOUS TO AVOID EVER HAVING TO OPEN FIRE.

7. MEANWHILE H M EMBASSY REMAINS UNDER GUARD OF A STRONG
FORCE OF INFANTRY AND ARMoured CARS. MEMBERS OF OUR DIPLOMATIC
STAFF ARE STILL COMPLYING WITH LEBANESE OFFICIAL ADVICE BY
DRIVING ABOUT IN CARS WITH FALSE NUMBER PLATES- CENSORSHIP
REMAINS IN FORCE- POSTAL SERVICES ARE ERRATIC AND LETTERS
SENT BY THEM LIABLE TO BE OPENED.

6. SYRIA

STORIES ARE REACHING US THAT TROUBLE IS BREWING BETWEEN SYRIAN MOSLEMS AND THE DRUZES, WHO ARE BEING ACCUSED OF COLLUSION WITH ISRAEL. IF THERE IS ANY TRUTH IN THIS, REPERCUSSIONS IN THE LEBANON ARE CONCEIVABLE.

P O PASS BAHRAIN 176

P O PASS KUWAIT 37

CYPHER/CAT 1

MOSCOW

FROM KUWAIT

T. 233.

DATED 19 JUNE

PRIORITY

1000

RESTRICTED

Mr. Parker. 1887
Mr. S.

ADDSD FOREIGN OFFICE TEL NO 340 OF 19 JUNE REPTD FOR INFMN
AMMAN TUNIS TRIPOLZ JEDDA ALGIERS RABAT BAHRAIN AND KHARTOUM
AND SAVING TO UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.

NYTEL 333 (NOT TO ALL): ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS CONFERENCE.

ACTING UNDER SECRETARY IN FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS TOLD US THAT THE MEETING WAS SIMPLY AN ATTEMPT TO SETTLE INTER-ARAB DIFFERENCES IN ORDER TO PAVE THE WAY FOR A SUMMIT MEETING PROBABLY IN KHARTOUM. NO CONCLUSIONS HAD BEEN REACHED AND THE TIME HAD BEEN TAKEN UP WITH STATEMENTS BY EACH MINISTER OF THIS COUNTRY'S VIEWS. THE ALGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAD SOUGHT DECISIONS ON FOUR POINTS OF PRESSURE ON THE WEST COIL EXPORTS, STERLING AND DOLLAR BALANCES, MILITARY BASES AND DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, BUT THE REST HAD RESISTED.

2. ONE DELEGATE (ALGERIAN ACCORDING TO THE PRESS) HAD PROPOSED
THE FORMATION OF AN OIL PRODUCING COUNTRIES
COMMITTEE. THE PRESS REPORT THAT THE PROPOSAL HAD
NOT BEEN PRESENTED TO THE PRESS. WHO PROPOSED
WHAT COMMITTEES SHOULD
BE SET UP IN THE OIL PRODUCING COUNTRIES
TO SUPERVISE THE BAN, WITH A MAJORITY OF MEMBERS DRAWN FROM
OUTSIDE THE HOST COUNTRY. PRESS REPORT THAT THE PROPOSAL HAD
RECEIVED ONLY 29 ~~AMERICAN~~ VOTES WAS NOT CORRECT. IT HAD BEEN
GENERALLY RESISTED.

F O PASS AMMAN 28 TUNIS 4 TRIPOLI 10 ALGIERS 1 RABAT 3
AND KHARTOUM 3 AND SAVING UKMIS NEW YORK 3 AND WASHINGTON 23

(10/7/67)

BRITISH POLITICAL AGENCY,

BAHRAIN.

17 June, 1967

The weekly Arabic newspaper came out after I had drafted my despatch No. 4 to the Political Resident; its contents provide a useful distillation of Arab views as they are beginning to emerge after the military disaster together with some parochial glosses. Its opinions are regrettably representative of the opinions of the educated and semi-educated majority of Bahrainis in the first days of humiliation and defeat.

2. On the Arab side, the appeal in all the articles and commentaries is to the spirit of Dunkirk. There are many references to the eventual hallowness of Hitler's victories in Europe in 1940-41, to the Russian recovery after the first German onslaught, to the Japanese revival after the 1945 surrender, to the Americans after Pearl Harbour etc. Churchill's remark about losing a battle but not the war is quoted. The general exhortation is for an Arab military and moral recovery in order to achieve eventual victory over Zionism and imperialism, for maintenance of the new-found Arab unity and for unqualified support for the supreme Arab hero, Nasser.

3. As regards the outside world, Britain and America are viciously castigated. The aircraft lie is repeated but it has been subsumed in wider accusations of Anglo/American collusion with Israel (history has of course been fully raked over): the Prime Minister and Abba Eban clearly went over the Israeli plan of attack with President Johnston in Washington in May. The whole exercise is referred to as the "new tripartite aggression". The United States are said to have made no secret of their support for Israel (Congress is referred to as the Zionist Congress) while the British press is characterised as being more Israeli than the sternest nationalist Israeli newspapers, as rejoicing in Israel's victory as if it had been a British victory and so on. Her Majesty's Government's declarations of neutrality are scoffed at. Certain articles launch wild attacks on both countries, calling for undying hatred for the British and Americans and for all things British and American and for refusing the hand of friendship or even of self interest. There are many powerful passages of invective on these lines. The centre page article predictably calls on the Arabs to deploy all the weapons for the moment left to them, namely economic sanctions against the Western world on the following lines:-

(1)

W. S. Weir, Esq.,
Arabian Department,
Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W.1

CONFIDENTIAL

- (i) banning Arab oil)
- (ii) closing the Suez canal } to the West
- (iii) closing ports and airports)
- (iv) Banks - accounts should be withdrawn from all British banks and the Bank of Bahrain should sever its financial links with Britain: all Arab governments should withdraw their sterling balances
- (v) withdrawal of all Western officials in administrative posts (one in the eye for Smith)
- (vi) withdrawal of military bases
- (vii) boycott of all Western goods.

4. Two articles attack the Iranians living in Bahrain as a fifth column of the anti-Arab Shah. The Iranian people proper are praised for their opposition to the Shah but the Iranians in Bahrain are accused of trying to split the noble ranks of the demonstrators, of cowardly attacks on women and children etc. The Government is asked to keep a close eye on them and to deport where necessary.

5. Happily, the Soviet Union has also come in for a pasting. Russian aid to the Arabs stopped short of deeds, the break with Israel was a contemptible ploy, the Russians have stabbed the Arabs in the back by pretending friendship and letting them down when the moment of truth came. (These views are warmly expressed in conversation by Bahrainis but we cannot make all that much of them since they are always sandwiched between equally violent attacks on us and the Americans.)

6. All this was probably to be expected and is in line with the closing paragraphs of my despatch under reference. Last week there was a colossal exhalation of steam and it was inevitable that, in the moment of defeat, the venom would pour out. But if, as seems probable, the projected Arab summit reflects these views in the form of resolutions, this will help to keep these emotions on the boil here. The Ruler can be counted on to do his best to minimise the damage done - he will certainly tell the newspaper to pipe down having let it have its head for three weeks - but he will have to swim with the tide to some extent. As I have said already, the present atmosphere is conducive to acts of individual hostility (there have been a few minor stonings of military vehicles in the last four days), to attempts by the local merchants to make life difficult for the British firms and banks, to trouble with the labour force over British military supplies etc. and to a general complication of our lives here. At the time of drafting,

/B.A.P.C.O.

B.A.P.C.O. still do not dare to order the loading of British and United States military tankers if the crews are in uniform (fortunately in our case they are not) and the dockers are refusing to unload two British military supply ships. We can probably expect more of this kind of thing particularly if the pan-Arab line hardens in its present direction (the newspaper was a faithful reflection of one of Ahmad Said's commentaries which I listened to a couple of days ago). All we can do here is to give the Ruler all the encouragement and support possible, to avoid forcing issues while emotions are still running high (e.g. attempting to unload ships with troops, trying to force the police to coerce the B.A.P.C.O. workers etc.) and generally to play it cool until the heat begins to dissipate and the voice of reason can again be heard. But, although we in Bahrain may have to pay the piper, it will be Cairo, London, Washington, Moscow and New York who will be calling the tune down here.

7. I am sending copies of this letter to the Political Resident, to the Political Agents in Doha, Dubai and Abu Dhabi, the Consul-General at Muscat, the UK High Commissioner in Aden and the Chanceries at Kuwait, Jeddah and Tehran.

(A. D. Parsons)

CYPHER CAT A.

From: Kuwait

Mr. P. P. P. 1

Mr. S

Telegram No. 230

Date: 17 June

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to F.O. telegram No. 328 of 17 June repeated for information to Bahrain, Jeddah, Tripoli and saving to Washington and UKDEL OECD Paris.

My telegram Nos: 316 and 318 (Not to Tripoli): Oil.

Minister of Finance and Oil (Atiqi) told me today that Kuwait Government did not recognise unions' right to boycott British and American Tankers. Government's decision on stoppage referred to the destination only, not to the flag of the carrier. KOC should deal with the Government not with the Unions.

2. When I asked him if the appearance of British Flag Tankers would cause trouble, he replied 'We must keep our fingers crossed'. The Government were responsible for security and for dealing with the Unions.

3. The position is nevertheless still confused. KOC recently received advice (understood to come from the Prime Minister) through the Governor of Ahmadi to keep British Tankers away for the time being. I have suggested that they should consult the Governor again in the light of Atiqi's remarks to me. They will do so after the meeting of the Arab Foreign Ministers.

4. Atiqi said at one point that if Kuwait Government (as opposed to Unions) decided on a boycott of British and American carriers it would be a different matter. Such a boycott would apply to dry cargo ships as well as tankers. I thought it wiser not to probe him on this, but I got the impression that he feared that Kuwait might have to concede such a boycott to the pressure of other Arab States.

5. On present expectation of Tanker arrivals KOC estimate THAT production will average 1.1 million barrels a day for the rest of June.

FO PASS PRIORITY TRIPOLI 8, AND SAVING TO WASHINGTON 20 AND UKDEL OECD PARIS 3.

To Paris ABP

M. S.

CYPHER CAT A

FROM JEDDA

Telegram No. 126

Dated: 18 June

ROUTINE

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to F.O. telegram No. 437 of 18 June RFI to Abu Dhabi, Algiers, Bahrain, Doha, Kuwait, Tripoli, Washington and UKDEL OECD.

Your telegram No. 18 to Abu Dhabi: Oil.

Oil production in Saudi Arabia by the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO), is proceeding normally at a rate of a little more than 2 million barrels a day. This is expected to continue.

2. Normal shipments of oil proceed to all destinations except the United Kingdom and the United States which are banned.

3. No restrictions on Flag vessels of any country.

4. No information about Arabian Oil Company production in the neutral zone.

F.O. Pass Priority UKDEL OECD 5, Routine Abu Dhabi 35, Algiers 4, Doha 21, Tripoli 13, Washington 74.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BRITISH POLITICAL AGENCY,

ABU DHABI.

(1074/67)

17 June, 1967.

Middle East Crisis

In your letter 1073/162/67 of 9 June to Tony Parsons you asked for a short term look at Abu Dhabi in the light of the Middle East crisis. I have the following observations gathered under significant headings.

2. Security Situation. I have reported fully on this. Briefly, we had two small demonstrations, mainly schoolboys, never more than forty or fifty, easily dispersed, when required by the police, helped by Shaikh Hamdan and his followers. (The ADDF were not called upon, and neither were the TOS in Buraimi and the West.) Provided the police keep full control of Abu Dhabi town (it is small enough for the task to be possible) and reliable teachers can be recruited, Shaikh Zaid can face the future with considerable confidence, as far as public security is concerned.

3. Arab Oil Workers. No trouble from the mainland fields; some murmurings on Das, where the workers refused to load a British tanker. They soon obeyed a stern order from the Ruler to do as he said; but their murmurings forced him to abide formally by the Baghdad Oil Conference Resolutions.

4. Attitude of Abu Dhabi Government. Shaikh Zaid viewed the whole business as a dangerous nuisance, which might force him into taking steps personally disagreeable to him and damaging to the interests of his country. He has no feelings against Israel and still regards Nasser as Enemy No. 1. But he admitted to me that Nasser is now firmly established as the darling of the Arab people and every Arab Government will have to fall in behind him. No Arab Government would dare or be strong enough to oppose the will of its people. Shaikh Zaid was no more able than any of his fellow Rulers to stand out against external pressure to take an Arab stand. (Shaikhbut would probably have done so, but the effects would have been disastrous.) Zaid was obliged to send a representative to the Baghdad Oil Conference and later to stop oil exports to the U.S. and U.K. (The two oil companies were prepared to accept any orders given to them by the Ruler provided their production and off-take were not affected.) His prompt handling of situations as they arose undoubtedly kept the situation calm. If he had not swiftly arranged the removal of nearly 500 Palestinian and other volunteers by air, there might have been trouble. The Ruler is, however, genuinely sorry for the Arab sufferers in the disaster, and has sent £1.3 million to Jordan.

/5.

Sir Stewart Crawford, K.C.M.G., C.V.O.,
BAHRAIN.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

5. Attitude of people of Abu Dhabi. Disinterested in the war, except as it affected them. Prices in the suq rose sharply (Shaikh Khalid cornered the rice market for a few days by a smart operation which would have brought credit to the most sophisticated Western tycoon) and Government calls to keep prices down went largely unheeded. There is at present no shortage of any basic foodstuffs except flour. The annual summer shortage of fresh vegetables is not being relieved by consignments flown in from Beirut. Frozen foods and dry goods from Europe will run short in a few months' time unless the Suez Canal is reopened, but this will not affect the ordinary people. There is little if any anti-British feeling; the merchants were worried by a rumour that the Boycott Office was to impose a ban on all British goods. On the other hand, such is the influence of Kuwait Radio that few people really believe that U.S. and British aircraft did not support the Israelis.

6. European Community. Mostly calm and sensible. Some rumour-mongering; and, of course, the incredibly stupid behaviour of those involved in the shooting incident. I instituted my "wardens" system and this worked well.

7. Aftermath. The most significant result of the crisis has been the evolution in the Ruler's thinking about the British position in the Middle East. He said to me that there would now be greatly increased pressure in the U.K. for H.M.G. to disengage themselves from their Middle East commitments. I replied that it was the duty of a Government to persuade the people that their policies were right; I had no doubt H.M.G. would do this. The Ruler vouchsafed a highly dubious "Inshallah".

8. I shall be reporting again about Zaid's thinking when I have had several more conversations with him. But I think we should prepare ourselves to receive from him new ideas about the proper relationship between Abu Dhabi and H.M.G.

9. I am sending copies of this letter to Tony Parsons in Bahrain, Ranald Boyle in Doha, David Roberts in Dubai and Bill Carden in Muscat.

(A.T. Lamb)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

(1014)

BRITISH POLITICAL AGENCY

DOHA

16 June, 1967.

MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

Please refer to your letter 1073/62/67 of 9 June, in which you asked for a report on the main events, which occurred in Gulf states, during the recent emergency, and the conclusions drawn therefrom.

2. If I may put my main conclusion first, this is the simple fact, well-known both to us and the Qatari authorities, that there are far too many northern and southern expatriate Arabs in the country in key posts. Yemenis in the Security Forces and Palestinians in important positions in both Government and commercial circles have during the week been a source of considerable worry to the authorities. It was only the skill and flexibility of the Ruler and Deputy Ruler, when under pressure, which prevented demonstrations and damage from being more widespread throughout the town. On the other side of the picture, one must once again acknowledge the advantage, in times of stress, of having a large and powerful ruling family in the country. Anxious to save their own skins and fortunes, as much as anything else, they again sank their differences (as in 1963), showed a united front and did an excellent job with their 'commando-type' retainers (the 'fidawi'), in maintaining order in the 'suq' and chivvying the layabouts elsewhere: things which the police and security forces seemed unable to do.

3. To return now to the beginning, two things occurred before the emergency, which had considerable bearing on the events which followed. One was the intense activity of the Palestine Liberation Organization here in whipping up enthusiasm for the war and making it appear that anyone who did not support them was a 'bad' Arab; the other was the most unfortunate accidental contamination of flour in a Palestinian bakery in the town with deadly insecticide, two days before the emergency began. One expected the P.L.O. to hold meetings, collect money, crowd into the Ruler's 'majlis' and generally pressure everyone into supporting their cause; one did not expect the wave of panic, which swept the town, when 500 people (of whom seven died) were admitted in convulsions to the hospital, because a Palestinian baker accidentally contaminated his flour supply with Gammexane. Inevitably, the rumours started that the English had poisoned the water supply, and these rumours, once started, were very difficult to stop, especially when Nasser had declared his big lie about Anglo-American participation on the side of Israel in the war in the air. It is only now, ten days later, that the rumours are dying down and people are accepting the World Health Organization expert's conclusive report on flour contamination. I suspect that the P.L.O. took full advantage of these rumours to keep people stirred up and emotional.

/4.

H.E. Sir R.S. Crawford, K.C.M.G., C.V.O.,
Political Resident,
Bahrain.

CONFIDENTIAL

4. As regards law and order generally, once the ruling family had held their family conference on Monday evening (5 June) - rather too late to help protect the Agency windows, alas! - and had got their 'fidawi' into the streets with orders to break up any demonstrations and send the people home, the town was outwardly very quiet. Between 8 p.m. on Monday evening (5 June) and 8 p.m. on Friday evening (19 June), there were practically no incidents at all and the town was very quiet. Most people kept to their homes, except to go out shopping and the like, and there was little to report. The only serious demonstration took place the day Arab/Israel fighting broke out, when about two hundred people (mostly Palestinians and Yemenis with a smattering of Qatari youth) passed the Agency twice between 6.45 and 7.30 p.m., shouting slogans such as 'Beat the Consul', 'Down with the flag', and throwing stones at the Union Jack and buildings. The total damage was 16 broken windows, a broken extractor fan, a great many missiles in the garden, and my Omani gardener, always too curious, with a slight cut on his head. Thanks to the reinforced glass doors of both house and office, and the metal shutters on the first floor of the Residency, damage was comparatively slight. Demonstrations on the Saturday (when Nasser was indulging in his play-act of resigning) were very small, well chivvied about and comparatively ineffective. The British Bank of the Middle East lost a couple of windows, some Irani shops were broken into in the 'suq', a few private houses had windows broken, and that was all.

5. By far the most potentially dangerous event took place, unknown to most of the population of Doha, on Friday night 9 June, when a near-mutiny broke out inside the Police Fort. Previously, the forces in the Fort had been strengthened at the beginning of the emergency with the addition of about two hundred men from outside, and there was not enough for them to do. Inevitably, they lay around listening to the radio, talking among themselves and believing all the rumours they heard. By the time Nasser's speech came over at 8.30 p.m. on Friday 9 June, some of the men (mostly Yemeni/Yafi) were already becoming very emotional. The downfall of their god was the last straw. Weeping and chanting broke out, and a form of hysteria began to affect the troops. Cochrane tried to deal with them, but could do little, and there was some danger of a clash. Fortunately, some of the Deputy Ruler's 'fidawi' were in the outer section of the Fort and they were called in to help restore order. Soldiers from the local Bedouin tribes were unaffected and also helped. The Deputy Ruler arrived with his brother and after an hour or so of argument, shouting, persuading and commanding, the tumult died down. Cochrane was struck slightly on the neck. One Jordanian officer was knocked down and kicked (he had several broken ribs). An ugly scene was narrowly averted. The next day, most of the extra men were sent back to the frontier posts, and the ring-leaders, full of remorse (Nasser had by this time been reinstated) petitioned for forgiveness. The whole incident high-lighted the real danger of having a force, over half of whose men come from the Yemen or the Yemen border tribes of South Arabia, being cooped up under emotional strain.

6. Another very unfortunate and unlucky event occurred on 8 June. Very early that morning, two British Council school teachers, who work on the English side of the secondary school, left a dinner party they had been attending and drove in their own cars to Umm Said -presumably for a lark. Both were going too fast and failed to negotiate a dangerous corner, near the Sea Lines. In the ensuing pile-up, one

teacher was killed outright, and the other was seriously injured (he is still at the time of writing unconscious in Doha hospital). What possessed them to drive madly round the country that night may never be known, but it gave rise to all sorts of silly rumours: on the Arab side that they were going to damage oil installations; on the British side that they had been beaten up by hostile persons. These rumours took some time to squash.

7. Briefly, mention must be made of the oil companies. Continental, who have little work on hand at present, have very few staff and many were away on leave; Shell had some trouble with their northern Arab and Qatari staff, but this took the form largely of absenteeism or sitting about instead of working; Qatar Petroleum Co. had no trouble with their staff (they have hardly any northern Arabs anyway), but they did have a pipeline damaged near Dukhan, the causes of which are unknown, but are almost certainly sabotage. The resultant fire from the pipeline lasted about a day, and was quickly repaired. Both Shell and Q.P.C. managed to maintain production throughout the emergency, although after the return of Dr. Kamel from the Baghdad Oil Conference, orders were given to both General Managers not to load tankers, whose destination was U.K./U.S.A., or to load U.K./U.S.A. tankers. This is the position at present.

8. As far as I was concerned, I kept in daily touch with the Ruler and Deputy Ruler, and usually hourly touch with Cochrane, who had set up a communications centre in the Fort. I thus knew the whole time more or less what was going on, and was able to keep in touch with the British community as required. The Ruler, especially, kept his wits about him (he always acts firmly and sensibly in a crisis), giving in a bit when pressure seemed too great, acting firmly when the situation required. The Deputy Ruler also was extremely energetic, and handled the troops in the Fort incident very well, according to Cochrane. He is always less relaxed than the Ruler in a crisis, through being I suspect basically less courageous.

9. As for the British community, they behaved sensibly (with one or two tiresome exceptions), kept out of the way and carried on with their normal lives as well as they could, with sense and discretion. I need hardly add that my own staff was excellent, working long hours and doing everything that was required of them without complaint.

10. To turn once again to conclusions, several things, of which the Ruler and Deputy Ruler are well-aware, now need doing. I hope they will take some energetic action on them before their determination slackens off, as it surely will. These are:-

- 1) Considerably to reduce the Yemeni/Yafi element in the Security Forces and Police, and to do this as quickly as is reasonably possible.
- 2) Similarly to reduce the numbers of northern Arab employees in Government and elsewhere (the Deputy Ruler is already turning his thoughts to India and Pakistan, - quieter and more reliable people, he thinks).

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- iii) Re-organize the police and security forces to ensure that the Government is not caught out again (generally speaking, the Police had too much to do and were very stretched, whereas the security forces spent most of the time sitting on their backsides).
- iv) Somehow prevent organizations, such as the P.L.O., which by its very name assumes the support of all Arabs, putting too much pressure on the local populace and placing the Government in a disadvantageous position.

11. Finally, a word about the Ruler. I have had several long talks with him recently, and have no doubt at all that he is determined to continue the British connection for as long as possible. He has consistently expressed his friendship, and re-assured me continually over the question of the protection of British interests. As for his views on Nasser, he has used the strongest possible language in condemnation of him ('He has led the Arabs to Hell, and is taking them further', 'He is a criminal, and knows only evil', etc.). However, to preserve his position and uphold the security of his country, he has had to play down both his pro-British sentiments and his anti-Nasser feelings. He has done this expertly, and throughout the emergency there has been no question about who has been in control. Now that things are easier, Sheikh Ahmed is turning his mind to the future. He is convinced that if we are to maintain our political connection and trading interests with the Arab states, we must now make some gesture towards the Arabs. British neutrality to them means disregard for the Arabs, even if it also means no support for Israel. His views, which are not particularly antagonistic towards Israel, are that the state of Israel will continue to exist, but that the great powers must show her that she is not loved and that she cannot, despite her victory, have everything her own way. The great powers should be firm with her, and ensure that she withdraws from occupied territory and makes her first task co-operation over the settlement of refugees. As regards the future of Jerusalem, the Israelis must not be allowed to retain it. For Moslems, the city comes only after Mecca and Medina in importance, and Israel cannot be allowed to exercise full control over it. Some sort of 'international' city status must be conferred on it. As for Russia, she has forfeited all support from the Arabs by her antics in and out of the United Nations, and her failure to support Egypt in her hour of need. She will now resume her rôle of mischief-maker to the world, her only supporter in the Middle East being probably Syria.

12. I am copying this letter to the Political Agents in Bahrain, Dubai and Abu Dhabi, to the Consul-General in Muscat, the Head of Arabian Department and to H.M. Ambassador in Kuwait.

(R.H.M. Boyle)

CONFIDENTIAL

, V. Part 6
RSP

CIPHER CAT A

FROM: FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO: 769

DATED: 17 JUNE

ROUTINE

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 3002 OF 17 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION JEDDA, TEHRAN, BEIRUT, (FOR RIO), NAIROBI, HC ADEN (PERSONAL), ADDIS ABABA, AMMAN, BAHRAIN RESIDENCY, KUWAIT, WASHINGTON AND SAVING, MUSCAT, DELHI, RAWALPINDI, CARACAS KABUL.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO: 1379 (NOTAL): U.N. MISSION TO SOUTH ARABIA.

THANK YOU FOR THIS REPORT OF A TIMELY CONVERSATION.

2. IN THE DEBATE ON SOUTH ARABIA ON 19 JUNE I EXPECT TO ANNOUNCE THE FOLLOWING:

(A) OUR DETERMINATION TO PROMOTE SOUTH ARABIA'S INDEPENDENCE IN FREEDOM.

(B) OUR DECISION TO FACILITATE CONSTITUTIONAL ADVANCE BY ASSENTING TO THE EARLY APPLICATION TO ADEN OF AN INDEPENDENCE TYPE CONSTITUTION WHICH WOULD REPLACE THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION FOR THE WHOLE COUNTRY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. FOR OUTLINE AND OTHER POINTS ON THIS SEE PARAS 3 TO 6 BELOW.

(C) OUR RECOGNITION THAT THE CONTINUING THREAT TO SOUTH ARABIA FROM SUBVERSION AND THE POSSIBLE THREAT OF AGGRESSION FROM OUTSIDE REQUIRES MORE HELP TO FEDERAL FORCES, CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR FORCES IN THE EASTERN ADEN PROTECTORATE, AND A MEASURE OF STRONG BRITISH MILITARY REASSURANCE IN THE CRUCIAL PERIOD FOLLOWING INDEPENDENCE IF THE PROGRESS SECURED UNDER (A) IS NOT TO BE OVERTURNED: AND THEREFORE THE DECISIONS AT PARA 7 BELOW.

(D) DECISIONS TO TIGHTEN SECURITY MEASURES AGAINST INVETERATE TERRORISTS COMBINED WITH MEASURES TO MAKE POLITICAL RECONCILIATION EASIER. THE FORMER WILL INCLUDE THE SUSPENSION OF JURY TRIALS SUBJECT TO ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS FOR THE DEFENCE. THE LATTER WILL INCLUDE LIFTING THE PROSCRIPTION OF THE NLF (FLOS Y HAS NEVER BEEN BANNED) AS A CALCULATED MEASURE WHICH, WITHOUT UNDUE RISK, COULD MAKE THE NLF'S ADOPTION OF POLITICAL RATHER THAN VIOLENT MEASURES EASIER.

(E) AN INDICATIONS OF THE EFFORTS BY THE U.N. MISSION AND OURSELVES TO TALK TO FLOS Y WHICH HAVE ALWAYS BEEN FRUSTRATED: AND A STATEMENT OF CONTINUED READINESS, STARTING FROM A POSITION OF SUPPORT FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, TO TALK TO ALL CONCERNED TO TRY TO ENCOURAGE BROADENING OF THE GOVERNMENT.

/(F)

(F) OUR CONTINUED BELIEF THAT THE U.N. HAS A CRUCIAL ROLE, OUR HOPE THAT IT WILL FIND IT POSSIBLE TO PLAY IT, AND OUR HOPE THAT SOUTH ARABIA WILL SECURE U.N. MEMBERSHIP.

(G) OUR CONTINUED CONVICTION THAT NEITHER A DEFENCE TREATY NOR BRITISH FORCES ON SHORE ARE THE RIGHT ANSWER, THAT (B) TO (F) ARE THE CONSTRUCTIVE COURSE AND THAT (B) TO (F) ENABLE US TO PROCEED TO:--

(H) INDEPENDENCE FOR ALL SOUTH ARABIA EARLY IN JANUARY 1968 ON WHICH DECISION IS NOW FIRM.

3. WE ARE SENDING UKMIS NEW YORK COPIES OF THE PENULTIMATE DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION, WHICH THE U.N. MISSION HAD IN FIRST DRAFT FORM. ADEN WILL SEND THEM A LATER DRAFT WHEN AVAILABLE. IT IS BASED CLOSELY ON THE HONE/BELL REPORT OF FEBRUARY 1966 OF WHICH UKMIS HAVE COPIES. VARIOUS CHANGES ARE DESIGNED TO BRING THE DRAFT NEARER THE DESIDERATA OF THE U.N. RESOLUTIONS. IT WILL PROVIDE FOR COUNTRY WIDE ELECTIONS ON THE BASIS OF UNIVERSAL ADULT FRANCHISE, WHICH ITSELF WILL BE BASED ON LIBERAL NATIONALITY LEGISLATION GIVING THE VOTE TO GENUINE "BELONGERS" OF VARIOUS RACES. PRESENT CONDITIONS AND SHORTAGE OF TIME PREVENT ELECTIONS AND THE NECESSARY PRELIMINARY OF A CENSUS FROM TAKING PLACE BEFORE INDEPENDENCE NEXT JANUARY BUT THESE ARE INTENDED AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE. THE CONSTITUTION INCLUDES A CODE OF HUMAN RIGHTS (THE FIRST OUTSIDE ADEN COLONY), PROVISIONS FOR AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY AND PUBLIC SERVICE, A UNICAMERAL LEGISLATURE, A PROHIBITION ON STATE RULERS BEING MINISTERS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PRESIDENT, PRIME MINISTER AND COUNCIL OF MINISTERS.

4. ONE IMPORTANT FEATURE, FOLLOWING THE HONE/BEL RECOMMENDATIONS, IS THAT ADEN WILL BE ENLARGED TO INCLUDE THE PRESENT FEDERAL CAPITAL OF AL-ITTIHAD AND BECOME THE CAPITAL TERRITORY OF SOUTH ARABIA. THIS IS DIFFICULT BEFORE INDEPENDENCE BECAUSE OF CONTINUED BRITISH SOVEREIGNTY IN ADEN STATE AND OUR CONTINUED CONSEQUENTIAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ADEN BUT WE HAVE DECIDED THAT WE MUST ALLOW THIS. THE COMPLICATION WILL BE COVERED BY RESERVATIONS OVER OUR FIELD OF CONTINUING RESPONSIBILITY FOR ADEN AND THE RIGHTS OF ITS INHABITANTS.

5. WE EXPECT CRITICISM THAT WE ARE PREDETERMINING THE FUTURE ASSOCIATION OF ADEN WITH ITS HINTERLAND WITHOUT PRIOR ELECTIONS AND PRIOR DEMOCRATIC TEST OF ITS INHABITANTS VIEWS. THE MAIN ANSWERS TO THIS ARE:

(a) IT IS THE OBDURACY OF MINORITY GROUPS AND TERRORISM AND INTIMIDATION CONDUCTED BY EXTREMISTS AND FOMENTED AND ASSISTED BY THE U A R FROM THE YEMEN WHICH PREVENTS THESE THINGS, NOT WE.

(11) WE ARE SATISFIED THAT THE NEW CONSTITUTION, SWEEPING AWAY THE UNDEMOCRATIC FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, WILL FACILITATE REAL BROADENING OF GOVERNMENT. IT WILL CERTAINLY GIVE THE RELATIVELY ADVANCED ADENIS FULL SCOPE TO PLAY THEIR FULL PART IN THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE.

(111) THE FOUR ADENI MINISTERS IN THE FEDERAL SUPREME COUNCIL, AND THE ADENI REPRESENTATIVES IN THE FEDERAL COUNCIL ARE IN FAVOUR.

(1v) PROVISIONS IN THE CONSTITUTION AND CONVENTIONS TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH IT WILL GIVE ADEN A HIGH PROPORTION OF MINISTERIAL AND OTHER REPRESENTATION, HIGHER THAN ITS PROPORTION OF THE NATIONALS OF THE TERRITORY WOULD JUSTIFY.

6. WE ALSO EXPECT CRITICISM THAT WE ARE PRE-EMPTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES ENVISAGED BY THE U.N. RESOLUTIONS AND LEAVING NO TIME FOR THESE. BUT WE HAVE LONG BEEN COMMITTED TO INDEPENDENCE BY 1968. WE CANNOT LET THE EXTREMISTS WHO BOYCOTTED THE U.N. MISSION VETO DECOLONISATION. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAVE INCLUDED PROVISIONS IN THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION TO MEET MANY U.N. DESIDERATA. THEY HAVE INCLUDED A SPECIAL PROVISION FOR THE FORMATION OF THE "CENTRAL CARETAKER GOVERNMENT" OF THE U.N. RESOLUTIONS IF AND WHEN THIS BECOMES POSSIBLE. AND NOTHING IN THE CONSTITUTION PREVENTS FURTHER CHANGE.

7. THE MEASURE UNDER (C) WILL BE AT BRITISH EXPENSE AND ARE:

(1) ADDITIONAL ARMS AND EQUIPMENT FOR THE FEDERAL ARMY.

(11) A BRITISH MILITARY AID MISSION TO ASSIST THE ORGANISATION AND TRAINING OF THE FEDERAL FORCES AND TO SUPPLY KEY PERSONNEL FOR THESE FORCES' BASE AND MEDICAL SERVICES.

(111) HUNTER AIRCRAFT FOR THE SOUTH ARABIAN AIR FORCE TO DOUBLE THEIR FIGHTER AND GROUND ATTACK STRENGTH, AND SOME RADAR.

(1v) CONTINUED BRITISH PAYMENT FOR THE HADHRAMI BEDOUEIN LEGION IN THE EASTERN PROTECTORATE FOR TWO YEARS INDEPENDENCE. THIS WILL HELP TO PREVENT DISORDER OR BREAKDOWN AND GIVE THE SOUTH ARABIAN GOVERNMENT TIME TO WORK OUT TERMS FOR THE EVENTUAL UNITY OF SOUTH ARABIA, IF, AS NOW SEEMS LIKELY, THE EASTERN STATES ARE STILL PART AT INDEPENDENCE.

(v) A STRONG BRITISH NAVAL FORCE TO BE STATIONED IN SOUTH ARABIAN WATERS FOR SIX MONTHS AFTER INDEPENDENCE, AND A FORCE OF V BOMBERS TO BE STATIONED AT MASIRAH FOR AT LEAST THAT TIME AND FOR LONGER AT BRITISH DISCRETION. THESE TWO FORCES TOGETHER ARE DESIGNED AS ~~THE~~ A POWERFUL AND VISIBLE DETERRENT OF EXTERNAL MILITARY AGGRESSION. IF IT NEVERTHELESS OCCURRED, THE NAVAL AIRCRAFT AND THE BOMBER AIRCRAFT WOULD OPERATE IN SUPPORT OF SOUTH ARABIA TO REPEL IT.

8. PLEASE USE THIS INFORMATION AS YOU THINK BEST WITH THE U.N. MISSION. YOU SHOULD NOT ACT TILL MONDAY MORNING AND ANYTHING YOU SAY BEFORE 1530 BST 1430 GMT THAT DAY SHOULD BE IN STRICT CONFIDENCE

~~170 P.M. 10/10~~

201620Z P

FM ADCLHY

NR 722
TO PP ASOLDQ

GR 250

CIRCULAR RETRACT 86020

PARIS MAGAZINE PUBLISHES BRITISH DENIAL OF AIRCRAFT FOR ISRAEL.

BRITAIN HAS DENIED A MAGAZINE STORY THAT SHE DELIVERED MILITARY AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE RECENT MIDDLE EAST WAR.

THE PARIS PUBLICATION "JEUNE AFRIQUE", WHICH IS DIRECTED MAINLY TO THE AFRICAN CONTINENT, THIS WEEK PUBLISHED PROMINENTLY THE FOLLOWING FOREIGN OFFICE DENIAL:

"THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT FORMALLY DENIES THE ACCUSATION MADE IN YOUR EDITORIAL THAT IT DELIVERED MILITARY AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE RECENT LAUNCHING OF HOSTILITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST".

"IT ALSO DENIES THAT IT KNEW IN ADVANCE THAT A CONFLICT WOULD BREAK OUT IN THE MIDDLE EAST*. THE ONLY OPERATIONAL MILITARY AIRCRAFT SUPPLIED BY THE BRITISH TO COUNTRIES IN THE REGION WERE TO ARAB COUNTRIES AND NOT TO ISRAEL*. IN ITS LAST EDITION THE "JUENE AFRIQUE" EDITORIAL, WRITTEN BY IWS DIRECTOR GENERAL BESHIR BEN YAHMED, DID NAIL THE LIE OF "ACTIVE PARTICIPATION OF THE ANGLO-SAXONS IN THE FIGHTING ON ISRAEL'S SIDE".

SAID THE MAGAZINE "THERE IS NOTHING TO SUPPORT THIS GRAVE ACCUSATION. THE ANGLO-SAXONS DID NOT DO THIS".

CENTROFORM.

MUSCAT.

1. Mr. P. T. W. AB
~~1. Mr. P. T. W. AB~~
~~2. Mr. P. T. W. AB~~

CYPHER/CAT-A
FROM FOREIGN OFFICE
TELNO 736.
DATED 15 JUNE
ROUTINE

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO KUWAIT TELEGRAM NO. 355 OF 15 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, UK MIS NEW YORK, BAHRAIN, JEDDA. THE KUWAITI AMBASSADOR CALLED ON THE PUS AND THE MINISTER OF STATE SEPARATELY ON 13 JUNE AT HIS OWN REQUEST TO DISCUSS THE MIDDLE EAST CRISES.

He argued that Britain should take the lead in working out a settlement and that this would in itself provide the practical answer to the allegations of our involvement with the Israeli attack. He personally would like to see an initiative towards getting the Israelis back to where they were on 4 June. The United Nations was an important factor in the situation but they could not deal with the whole

~~problem although the four~~

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PROBLEM ALTHOUGH THE FOUR GREAT POWERS MIGHT DO SO UNDER A UN UMBRELLA. THERE WAS NO PROSPECT WHATSOEVER OF THE ARABS AND ISRAELIS SITTING DOWN FACE TO FACE THEMSELVES.

2. MR. THOMSON REPLIED THAT TO US THE MOST IMPORTANT PARTS OF THE MIDDLE EAST IN TERMS OF OUR DIRECT INTERESTS WERE THE WGULF AND SOUTH ARABIA. A TRAGIC FEATURE OF THE CONFLICT WAS THAT IT HAD DAMAGED OUR RELATIONS WITH STATES IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA. ABOVE ALL WE HOPED THAT NONE OF OUR FRIENDS BELIEVED THE EGYPTIAN

~~DEPART OF ARABIA/OMAN~~

W279

STORY OF ANGLO/US INTERVENTION ON ISRAEL'S REHALF EVEN IF THEY DID NOT SAY AS MUCH PUBLICLY. WE HAD NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT OUR POWER TO SHAPE A SETTLEMENT. OUR INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAS TO BE COMPARED TO THAT OF FRANCE AND NOT THAT OF THE US OR USSR. FOR THE MOMENT WE WERE CONCENTRATING ON REDUCING THE HUMAN SUFFERING CAUSED BY THE WAR AND WERE SENDING HELP TO THE JORDAN REFUGEES. WE WERE ALSO URGING THE ISRAELIS NOT TO ADD TO THE ALREADY EXISTING REFUGEE PROBLEM.

IT WAS TOO EARLY TO SAY WHAT THE SHAPE OF A FINAL SETTLEMENT MIGHT BE. BUT MAYBE IT WOULD INCLUDE WITHDRAWAL BY ISRAEL AND RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO LIVE.

3. ASKED ABOUT THE RESUMPTION OF OIL SUPPLIES SHAIKH SALEM SAID THE ANSWER LAY WITH BRITAIN. BRITAIN'S ACTIONS WOULD GIVE THE KUWAIT GOVERNMENT THE STRENGTH TO HELP HER AND TO CONVINCE OTHERS THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO BRITISH INVOLVEMENT IN THE WAR. HE SUGGESTED THAT WE WERE WELL PLACED AMONGST THE FOUR POWERS TO SHAPE A SETTLEMENT (FAVOURABLE OF COURSE TO THE ARABS) BECAUSE OF OUR INFLUENCE IN WASHINGTON AND BECAUSE OF THE SYMPATHY WITH WHICH A LABOUR GOVERNMENT WOULD BE HEARD IN MOSCOW.

4. THE AMBASSADOR APPEARED TO DISMISS CAIRO RADIO'S ALLEGATIONS OF BRITISH INVENTION BUT WENT ON TO DRAW A DISTINCTION WITH MR. THOMSON BETWEEN OURSELVES AND THE AMERICANS. HE SAID HE BELIEVED THAT WE HAD NOT BEEN INVOLVED BUT PROFESSED TO BE CONVINCED THERE WAS SOMETHING IN THE STORY OF US INVOLVEMENT. HOW COULD THE ISRAELIS HAVE DEFEATED SUCH OVERWHELMINGLY SUPERIOR FORCES WITHOUT OUTSIDE HELP, INCLUDING FOR EXAMPLE INFORMATION ON JORDANIAN MILITARY DISPOSITIONS ? MR. THOMSON REITERATED THAT WE WERE COMPLETELY CONVINCED THAT THE AMERICANS WERE NOT INVOLVED. WE SHOULD KNOW SINCE WE HAD WORKED CLOSELY WITH THEM ON THE GULF OF AQABA PROBLEM IN AN EFFORT TO AVERT AN OUTBREAK OF WAR AND TO SAVE THE MIDDLE EAST FROM THE DISASTERS WHICH HAD NOW OVERTAKEN IT. NOBODY HAD BEEN MORE SURPRISED THAN WE OURSELVES WHEN THE FIGHTING BROKE OUT. WE HAD EVEN BEGUN TO FEEL THAT AS A RESULT OF OUR EFFORTS THE DANGER WAS RECEDED.

1. *Mr. A. J. ...*
Murcut

By Bag

FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO CERTAIN MISSIONS 24 JUN 67

Guidance No. 143 14 June, 1967

(IPG)

1091

UNCLASSIFIED

My immediately preceding Guidance: Middle East.

Statement issued by the U.A.R. Embassy in Rabat on 10 June.

Begins:

The American and British Government have denied their complicity with Israel and their participation with her in her treacherous aggression on the Arab Nation. We and all Arabs have established, with specific proof, Britain's and America's collusion with their Zionist agent which was created for serving their Colonial purposes. The following is the main conclusive proof which establishes this treacherous complicity.

1. Levy Eshkol's statement in the Knesset last Wednesday, May 29, in which the Israeli Premier announced his expectation that America and Britain would take action outside the United Nations for the lifting the Egyptian blockade on the Gulf of Aqaba.

2. The declaration of Aba Eban, the Israeli Foreign Minister, in Orly in France on May 27th last, on his return from Washington when he said, according to Israeli broadcasts, that the American Government had confirmed to him without leaving room for any other interpretation, that they supported Israel in any actions she might undertake to open the Gulf of Aqaba.

3. A previous statement by Aba Eban that he had come to an agreement with America for measures to be taken outside UNO.

4. The visits of George Thomson the British Minister of State and Harold Wilson the Premier to Washington where they had discussions with leading responsible Americans. It has now become clear that the real purpose of these discussions was to prepare the details of the treacherous complicity and conspiracy with Israel.

5. Harold Wilson declared upon arrival in America that a solution ought to be found within 48 hours: and in fact the Israel attack was made within the time specified by Mr. Wilson.

6. The extreme enthusiasm of the British and Americans in their absolute support of Israel at the onset of the crisis, which subsequently was suddenly reduced, when each of these States announced adoption of a neutral attitude. Such an abatement of enthusiasm no doubt conceals the planned conspiracy between the two States and Israel their lackey.

7. America's and Britain's manoeuvres to group the Naval States together.

8. America's attempt by means of her Foreign Minister Dean Rusk to avoid specifying who was responsible for the commencement of the aggression although the report of U Thant, the UNO Secretary General, clearly confirmed that it was Israel who was responsible for the opening of hostilities.

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9. The stationing of American aircraft carriers near the Israeli coasts and the departure of a large number of American planes from the American air base in Libya for Israel.

10. The American aircraft King Hussein himself had seen on the radar and the Anglo American air cover seen by the Egyptian lines over Israel, as well as the participation of British aircraft of the Canberra type which bore distinctive British markings in the air raids on the Egyptian lines.

11. The confession of the Israeli pilot who was captured in the morning of 6 June over Keneitra in Syria that British and American planes had participated in the battle, and that 17 British bombers had arrived with their pilots before the Israeli hostilities. He said that these took part in bombing UAR airports and Jordan and Syria.

12. The collusion was also confirmed by the fact that some planes which attacked the Canal Zone bore no markings at all: and by the fact that the maps found on the Israeli-pilots whose planes had been brought down by Arab fire were copies of those found at the British War Office. Some of them were taken from air photographs snapped by American espionage planes.

13. The above clearly establishes and confirms Anglo-American complicity with Israel which was created by Anglo-American Colonialism as a front post for it in the heart of the Arab motherland.

Ends.

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION
J.I.P.G.D.

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By Bag

Muscat
Ann
in Paris} to me B.P.

FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO CERTAIN MISSIONS

Guidance No. 142 14 June, 1967 (IPG)

UNCLASSIFIED



MIDDLE EAST

The U.A.R. Embassy in Rabat circulated a statement (text in my immediately following Guidance) on 10 June setting out "conclusive proof" of British and United States complicity with Israel. It is possible that the same statement has been issued by other U.A.R. Embassies and if it comes to your attention you should take such steps as you consider appropriate to refute the points involving the British Government.

2. You should not comment on items 1, 2, 3, 8 and 9 which are not our concern. Items 10 and 11 have already been covered in earlier Guidances and Verbatims (in particular Guidances 128, 129 and 132 and Verbatims 244, 249 and 256 - not to all).

3. Items 4 and 5 at least show that the British Government appreciated the gravity of the situation at an early stage and that they were concerned to prevent hostilities. Item 5 however mis-quotes and exploits out of context what the Prime Minister actually said in North America. The transcript of his Ottawa Press conference records that he said: "The time that we have, if we have a day or two or a few days, must be used" to solve the question of freedom of passage as well as other Middle Eastern problems: when this remark was misquoted at him in Washington he said: "I didn't say one or two days, I said it looked as though we might have only one or two days. I have said all the week that it looks as though perhaps we are fortunate, we have a little more breathing space than looked likely perhaps last weekend, which was a very critical time, but as I said, time is not on our side. Whether we have a week or more or only a day or two, we have to use every minute of that time to try to avoid the crises which may result".

4. Item 6 makes no sense; item 12 is beyond our knowledge and in any case irrelevant.

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTIO
J.I.P.G.D.

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1. BnF
2. Mr. P. M. G. B.
3. PA

(1078/67)

BRITISH POLITICAL AGENCY

BAHRAIN

14 June, 1967

SUMMARY (DESPATCH no. 4.)

BAHRAIN AND THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

Great excitement was aroused in Bahrain by Nasser's call for the withdrawal of U.N.E.F. (paragraph 1 - 2). Concern about local reaction to possible involvement of British troops and mounting pressure from part of the community caused the Ruler to call for an assurance from H.M.G. and to make gestures towards the Arab Cause (paragraphs 3 - 5). The outbreak of war and Cairo's big lie resulted in pro-Nasser demonstrations and labour unrest but few incidents (paragraphs 6 - 8). The subversive organisations were ineffective (paragraph 9). Oil operations stopped partially but later returned almost to normal (paragraphs 10 - 11). The British Community remained calm (paragraph 12).

2. Bahrain came through the crisis remarkably peacefully, thanks to the relaxed internal situation, skilful reduction of pressure by the Ruler, restraint by the Police, the deterrent effect of the presence of British troops, the small number of Palestinians in Bahrain and the absence of a violent propaganda attack from Cairo (paragraphs 13 - 17).

3. Bahrain is vulnerable to the pressure of Arab extremism on her commercial interests but will find it impossible not to keep in step (paragraph 18). There is some anti-British feeling and the possibility of further unrest. Much depends on Her Majesty's Government's attitude to the ensuing negotiations (paragraph 19).

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DESPATCH NO. 4
(1078/67)

BRITISH POLITICAL AGENCY,
BAHRAIN.

14 June, 1967

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to give an account of and to offer comments on events in Bahrain during the recent Middle East crisis, that is to say during the period between the 14th of May when President Nasser requested the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force from the border between the United Arab Republic and Israel and the 10th of June when President Nasser withdrew his resignation and the cease-fire between Syria and Israel came into effect. I have of course already reported much of the factual detail by telegram.

2. When Egyptian forces took up position on the Israel border and occupied Sharm El Shaikh considerable excitement was aroused locally and transistor radios began to work overtime. However, by the week which ended on the 27th of May there was still no tension in the accepted sense of the word and no signs of hostility towards foreigners. There was some food hoarding but this seemed to have been caused by rapacious merchants taking advantage of a rise in prices in Qatar. On the 25th of May the Ruler sent a telegram of support to the Arab League. He had already come under pressure from Palestinians and Arab nationalist Bahrainis to "do something". The message was broadcast on Bahrain Radio the same day and the temperature went down. On the

His Excellency,
Sir Stewart Crawford, K.C.M.G., C.V.O.,
Her Majesty's Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
BAHRAIN.

/24th of May

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24th of May the editor of the weekly Arabic newspaper had devoted his front page to a swashbuckling attack on the United States for their alleged support of Israel. But there was no mention of the United Kingdom, perhaps because the editor believed that it was thanks to us that his newspaper had been allowed to open in 1965 and that we were quite capable of having it shut down at a snap of the fingers.

3. Excitement continued throughout the following week which began with some anxious moments for us when the minesweepers normally based in Bahrain were withdrawn from an exercise with the Iranian Navy and sent to Aden in connexion with possible operations in the Straits of Tiran. This event aroused some comment among the public but nothing more serious happened thanks to the absence of wide-spread publicity and to the fact that Cairo Radio did not use it as a stick with which to beat us in the Arab world. In order to forestall the possibility of the Ruler being obliged to take up a public position hostile to us, I briefed him about the move: he was very worried and asked for an assurance that British forces based in Bahrain would not become involved in the crisis: he said that he understood our motives and policies but argued that his people did not and that only such an assurance would enable him to convince them that Britain was not about to use Bahrain as a base from which to support Israel against the Arabs: they regarded Her Majesty's Government's attitude towards freedom of shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba as nothing more than an anti-Nasser and pro-Israeli ploy.

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4. A Jewish owned car was burnt on the night of the 28th of May and another on the night of the 30th of May. Gangs of youths were believed to be responsible for these incidents which aroused considerable alarm amongst the small Jewish community. An uninspiring pamphlet signed by the Baathist Party of Bahrain was circulated on the 29th of May but Shia religious processions that evening passed off without incident. In order to relieve further pressure on him to allow demonstrations, processions etc. the Ruler authorised a collection of money for the Arab cause and sent a telegram of support to Nasser. He also sent two representatives to the meeting of Arab oil exporting countries which began in Baghdad on the 4th of June. Again the pressure eased and there was a general feeling that the critical moment for Bahrain had passed and that, provided the situation on the Arab/Israel borders remained unchanged and there was no violent propaganda attack directed at Bahrain from Cairo, all would be well.

5. The hostilities which broke out on the 5th of June radically changed the situation. Bahrain got off to a noisy start. I have never heard so many transistor radios blaring as I heard in Manama that day. Excitement reached fever pitch and there was considerable speculation about the attitude of Her Majesty's Government and the possible involvement of British forces in the conflict. The Secretary of State's statement to the House of Commons on the afternoon of the 5th of June, particularly the passage saying that British forces in the area had orders that they should not in any way become involved, had an immediate calming effect. The Ruler was delighted

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and considered that this was the assurance for which he had asked (paragraph 3 above). Sensibly he broadcast on Bahrain Radio supporting the Arab cause and sent a second telegram - also broadcast - to Nasser. These and his previous actions earned him unreserved praise in the weekly newspaper which claimed that he had put Bahrain into the forefront of the Arab struggle.

6. However, the temperature rose rapidly on the morning of the 6th of June when Cairo Radio and other Arab stations began to broadcast the allegation that British and American aircraft were providing air cover for Israel and that they had attacked Arab positions. This lie was repeated throughout the day by Kuwait Radio which broadcasts on the medium wave and is much easier than Cairo to hear in Bahrain. In spite of Bahrain Radio's courageous broadcasting, at the Ruler's orders, of our denials, the damage had been done. Major demonstrations started on the afternoon of the 6th of June and mounted on the 7th to massive proportions. Most of the schools closed. However, the demonstrations remained more pro-Palestine and pro-Nasser than anti-British although there were plenty of anti-British and American banners and slogans. Demonstrations continued during the morning of the 8th of June and reached their climax on that day with the turbulent Shia villages starting to join in. The Ruler thought that they were getting out of hand and broadcast an appeal at midday for the crowds to stop demonstrating and an announcement that an office for volunteers would be opened on the 10th of June. This had the desired

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effect and, although demonstrations continued throughout the 9th of June, they were on a diminishing scale. By the evening only hard-core hooligans were left. After evening prayers an argument started between a group of Iranians and a group of Bahrainis, a free fight broke out and some damage was done to passing cars. The Police Commandant himself led a riot squad to the scene and gave the rioters a thorough beating; this quietened the situation. This riot, the only serious outbreak to take place, was an expression of the current tension and the mutual dislike between Bahrainis and Iranian immigrant labour and of anger at Iran supplying oil to Israel. After Nasser's resignation speech small but ugly looking groups began to assemble. The Commandant sent riot squads around the town arresting all who refused to disperse. The night was quiet.

7. On the morning of the 10th of June there were small demonstrations and one or two minor clashes between Bahrainis and Iranians. The Arab labour force at R.A.F. Muharraq drifted away but returned to work on the 11th of June. Dock workers refused to unload a services supply ship at Mina Sulman. However, by the 11th of June life began to return to normal. No one had died; there had been no serious injuries and no fresh crop of detainees.

8. The demonstrations were throughout in essence remarkably peaceful. The crowds contained a large proportion of respectable citizens who discouraged the more unruly elements from creating trouble. The riot between the Bahrainis and the Iranians was the only time the situation became serious. There was inevitably

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a number of minor incidents when service vehicles were jostled and stones were thrown, particularly on the Manama/Muharraq causeway which was frequently blocked by groups of demonstrators. A few stones were thrown at the R.A.F. transit Rest House in Manama on the 10th of June. On the same day a number of people broke into the ground floor of a block of flats occupied by service families opposite the office which had been opened for recruitment of volunteers: a private car was damaged. On the 8th of June a Russian hand grenade (one of a batch already believed to be in Bahrain) was thrown at the house of the chief announcer at the Bahrain Radio station: it caused no damage. An abortive attempt was made to burn a Jewish shop on the same day by means of a petrol bomb. There were also two reported attempts to burn servicemen's private cars and there was an unsuccessful attempt on cars outside the British Club. This is not an exhaustive list of all incidents - Gray Mackenzie's flag was pulled down by demonstrators earlier in the proceedings - but it illustrates their minor nature in the circumstances. At no time was any attack made on this Agency in spite of the frequent presence of milling demonstrations and processions in the street outside.

9. The subversive organisations in Bahrain were rather late in the field and their leadership was strangely ineffective. The A.N.M. showed no sign of life until the evening of the 6th of June; the N.L.F. not until the 8th of June and another Baathist pamphlet appeared on the 9th of June. Although both the A.N.M. and N.L.F.

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were active in bringing mobs on the streets and keeping them there, the advice which they gave to their followers seems to have been contradictory and was disregarded so far as planned acts of violence were concerned.

10. BAPCO heard on the morning of the 7th of June that ARAMCO's operations had closed down due to strike action. BAPCO had already filled their tanks to capacity with Saudi oil and they make a parade of closing the empty pipeline from Saudi Arabia and temporarily suspending refining and loading operations. This was made easier by the fact that there was only one tanker at the wharf at the time. They did not stop operating the Bahrain field. BAPCO hoped that these measures would satisfy their Bahraini employees and the public in general and would enable the Ruler to avoid having to make a public declaration that oil supplies to the United Kingdom and United States were cut. But by the late morning of the same day pressure for a public announcement about oil had become very great. The Ruler therefore announced that oil was cut off from any country participating in "the aggression against the Arabs". The Ruler's brother told me that he and his brother were convinced that if they did not take this action the demonstrators would turn against the regime. They had deliberately not mentioned Britain or America and would do as little as they could to implement the cutting off of oil. Shaikh Khalifah assured me that, if the Royal Navy or the United States Navy needed to refuel their

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ships normally stationed in Bahrain, he would arrange for this to be done surreptitiously by barge.

11. On the 9th of June BAPCO employees, although not on strike, refused to load any tankers for fear of reprisals against them and their families. They insisted that they would not change their attitude until the Government gave them a clear lead. The Ruler and Shaikh Khalifah judged that, at the time, only the banning of the loading of British and American flag tankers as well as the export of oil to the United States and the United Kingdom would suffice to persuade the workers to resume loading. For reasons of principle as well as expediency - a large proportion of Bahraini oil goes to the United States forces in Vietnam in United States flag tankers while many tankers calling at Sitra are under the British flag - they were reluctant to take these steps. They decided to play for time in the hope that their neighbours, particularly ARAMCO, would get their operations under way on a less unsatisfactory basis. The days passed and neither side budged. On the 13th of June it emerged that ARAMCO was beginning to load on the basis of the banning of exports to the United States and the United Kingdom only with no discrimination against flags. Similar reports came in from elsewhere in the Gulf. After a long discussion the Ruler decided to make no public announcement but to write a letter to BAPCO referring to the Baghdad resolutions and simply banning the export of oil to the United States and the United Kingdom. This letter was shown to the workers

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who, for a few hours, still refused to take it as the assurance which they required. The Ruler's second brother, Shaikh Mohammed bin Sulman, who had not played a particularly distinguished rôle in the crisis, unexpectedly turned up trumps. He arrived unannounced at the Sitra jetty and harangued the crowd. His persuasion was effective and loading began in the late afternoon of the 13th of June. At the time of drafting, loading continues including British and American flag tankers.

12. Throughout the crisis the British community in Bahrain behaved admirably. In the early stages we instituted a system of wardens through whom we kept twice daily contact with the whole community so that we could keep them up to date with the latest situation and pass on necessary advice. The leading members of the community co-operated whole-heartedly in this scheme and everyone obeyed instructions to lie low and not to panic; this pattern of behaviour must have helped to avoid fortuitous incidents taking place. We also kept in touch with the other communities for whom we are responsible in Bahrain: they all behaved well. I do not count the Indians and Pakistanis, both of whose Governments had declared full support for the Arabs and who were therefore in no danger. The Indian community, so far as I know, played its usual discreet part but the Pakistanis, characteristically, decided to join in the fun and I saw several Pakistani groups under their own banners amongst the demonstrations.

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13. The question which everyone here, including intelligent Bahrainis, is asking is - how has Bahrain, with her tradition of political effervescence and her large urban population with its preponderance of educated and semi-educated youth, managed to emerge almost unscathed from the cataclysmic events of the past week? There is no simple answer. Many factors have played their part. The following are some of the more important, not set out in any particular order of priority. First, when the Middle East crisis began, the internal political situation in Bahrain was more relaxed than it had been at any time since the troubles of March/April 1965. As I have reported from time to time since the autumn of 1966, the atmosphere has been becoming progressively easier. The new regime in the Bahrain State Police can claim at least some of the credit for this state of affairs. From his arrival Commandant Bell regarded the improvement of relations between the police and the public as one of his main objectives. The March/April 1965 disturbances had left a bitter taste: there was a widespread feeling that the police had used excessive force while the presence of over 100 detainees on Jidda island acted as a continuing irritant. Commandant Bell decided that the gain which would result from the progressive release of the detainees (only two remain in detention) would greatly outweigh the risk of setting them at large. He has been proved correct. At the same time, by various unobtrusive devices, he has managed to improve the image of the Bahrain State Police to the extent that Bahrainis

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have started to volunteer for service for the first time for many years. In parallel, Chief Superintendent Henderson, Head of the Special Branch, took the opportunity offered by a period of tranquillity to make deep inroads into the clandestine organisations, particularly the National Liberation Front and the Arab Nationalist Movement. He has also completely dispelled the atmosphere of brutality with which his predecessor had invested the Special Branch and which had helped, in the parochial atmosphere of Bahrain, to perpetuate bitterness and tension. Against the tranquil background which these and other factors had helped to produce, it took the populace some time to work up an appreciable head of steam while it was correspondingly difficult for the clandestine organisations and the agitators from the ranks of the Egyptian and Palestinian school teachers to whip up enough emotion to translate slogans into physical violence.

14. Secondly, the shaikhly system of rule worked and the Ruler and Shaikh Khalifah bin Sulman demonstrated that, in a crisis, they were capable of handling the affairs of the country with skill and nerve. In the early days the Ruler told me that he had one main objective, namely to keep in step with his people in order to shorten their stride so that they would do nothing which would damage the interests of the country, the regime or the British. He said that, so long as he could maintain a situation in which the militants came to him for advice and permission before taking action, the line could be held. Here the system of the Ruler's

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daily open council, the majlis, to which any Bahraini or foreigner is free to go, proved invaluable. The majlis was full day and night of deputations from all shades of opinion in Bahrain, merchants, lawyers, graduates, villagers, Palestinians, etc. The Ruler was able to gauge the temperature accurately at every stage and to judge how much or how little he need do in order to prevent matters from passing beyond his control. Hence, when the agitators first asked to demonstrate he compromised with the telegram to the Arab League; the next request for action was met with the telegram to Nasser and so on until the final day of demonstrating when he cleared the air with the announcement that volunteer offices would be opened. Meanwhile his brother took over the responsibility for organising the collection of funds for the Arab cause. He thus managed to control the enthusiasm of certain of the merchants and to keep himself informed of public opinion by spending two or three hours every morning walking round the market with the collecting boxes. His advice to the Ruler was invaluable. The two brothers kept in the closest touch with me. At times we were meeting or communicating by telephone as often as five times a day. I had expected Shaikh Khalifah to show up well but the Ruler's performance exceeded my expectations. He may be maddeningly indecisive over matters like administrative reform, infuriatingly parochial over his quarrels and disputes with his neighbours, limited in his grasp of long term issues, extravagant in his private life, but he has shown that, when the crunch comes,

/he

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he is capable of displaying good judgement, decisiveness and courage. For example, one of the turning points was the moment when, on the morning of Thursday the 8th of June, the Ruler drove into Manama while one of his relations in the Police was haranguing a large demonstration gathered outside the Police Fort. The Ruler's appearance drew loud cheers from the demonstrators who immediately dispersed in order to follow his car to the Government Offices where he announced the decision to open volunteer recruiting centres amidst shouts of jubilation: the morning ended with the Ruler's staff distributing cups of water to the by this time thirsty demonstrators.

15. Thirdly, the Bahrain State Police did extremely well. Commandant Bell was determined that nothing should be done to provoke the populace. He therefore withdrew all the British officers to the Fort and left the outlying police stations manned entirely by Arab officers and men. The wireless cars and patrols accompanying, but not attempting to disperse, the demonstrations provided they remained peaceful, were entirely Arab as was the small extra guard which he sent to this Agency. These measures were successful. Not only did the morale of the Arab officers rise considerably, but they did their duty while remaining on good terms with the crowd. (At one stage a demonstration of a few hundred people started to march through the back gate of the Agency: an Arab police sergeant on a scooter rode in front of them and signalled them to continue down the main road: they did so without

/hesitation

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hesitation). Commandant Bell was throughout being kept closely informed by the first-class information centre which was operated day and night by Superintendent Henderson and his staff. This enabled him to strengthen his force at trouble spots etc. without delay. For example, Henderson had advance warning of the possible trouble between Iranians and Bahrainis on the evening of the 9th of June. As soon as fighting and stone throwing broke out the Commandant was in position with a riot squad and dealt very severely with the demonstrators. This action unquestionably had a quietening effect on Manama as the populace realised that the police were as ready to act with firmness as they had been to behave with restraint. Furthermore, when the demonstrators decided at one stage to march to the Fort to demand arms to fight in Palestine, plans to receive them had already been made thanks to advance information of their intentions. Commandant Bell chose the best man in the police to deal with them. Instead of the demonstrators being faced by a row of British veterans of the Palestine Police armed with Greener guns (as they would have been in 1965) they were met by the Head of the Traffic Department, Shaikh Ibrahim Al Khalifah, resplendent with his four Egyptian Suez medals awarded when he was at the Egyptian Police College in 1956! It was Shaikh Ibrahim who conducted the deputation to Shaikh Mohammed bin Sulman Al Khalifah, Head of Police and Public Security, and who did the talking at the interview; it was he who harangued the crowd afterwards and satisfied their feelings without conceding

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their demands. The Bahrain State Police from the Commandant downwards deserve the highest praise and there was at no stage any unsteadiness even amongst the lower ranks in spite of the emotional pressures of the crisis. Only Shaikh Mohammed bin Sulman proved something of a passenger. His appearances at the Fort were short and perfunctory, his contributions at meetings puerile. The Commandant had to act without political guidance and, through force of circumstances, with virtually no direct contact with the Ruler. But he managed to adapt the actions of the police to the policies of the Ruler without mishap. And even Shaikh Mohammed (see paragraph 11 above) came up trumps in the end over the oil problem.

16. Fourthly, the British military presence in Bahrain undoubtedly acted as a major deterrent to violent action against British lives and property. The Special Branch have convincing evidence of this. The forces as usual behaved with admirable discipline. They remained ready in the background but they kept their presence as unobtrusive as possible in order to avoid provocation. I am convinced that this policy of unobtrusiveness has been wholly vindicated by the events of the past week. If there had been unnecessary military movement or other activity by the armed forces there could easily have been serious incidents which might have swelled into a serious emergency. As it was, there was no such provocation, but all members of the population were well aware of the presence behind the scenes of the infantry battalion and the other elements in Bahrain.

/I am

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There is a lot
in this. The
same applied in
Libya to anyway
until 62 when I left.
But this is not a
panacea.

I am sure that this awareness helped to deter possible attacks on e.g. this Agency, the British banks, Gray Mackenzie's building, etc. Whatever certain writers in the British press may argue, we have had an effective demonstration of how a British military presence in a foreign country, when discreetly handled, can have a calming rather than an irritant effect on a dangerous internal situation.

17. Finally, we must be grateful for two additional factors. Unlike most of the Gulf States, there are scarcely any Palestinians in Bahrain. At most the Palestinian community amounts to about 300, many of whom are responsible officials in Bahrain Government service while by no means all the Palestinian school teachers are subversive agitators. There are no Palestinian masses such as exist in Kuwait and elsewhere. If there had been things would have been much worse. Moreover, for some unaccountable reason, the Cairo propaganda machine never lashed out at Bahrain. It did no more than casually mention the possible use of Bahrain as a base to support Israeli aggression against the Arabs and made nothing of the move of the minesweepers to Aden. We were most grateful for the effective way in which publicity in the British press for this move was dampened down ("The Daily Telegraph" was the main offender) but it was interesting that Mohammed Hassanein Heykal in El Ahram, when quoting "The Daily Telegraph's" articles on British ship movements, omitted to mention where the minesweepers at Aden had come from. Kuwait Radio did much more to

/inflame

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inflame passions here than Cairo, which is, as I have mentioned, difficult to hear. Here again, Kuwaiti fulminations, although making much of Nasser's lie about the use of British and American aircraft, prudently refrained from drawing attention to the British bases in Bahrain.

18. It is too early to draw any profound lessons for the future. We are now moving into a new phase in which, for Bahrain, the protection of her oil and other commercial interests against Arab extremism may prove to be her main pre-occupation. Bahrain is extremely vulnerable in this sense. With her economic and demographic problems and her almost total dependence on the export of refined products as opposed to crude oil and on international commerce with the Western world (about 35% of Bahrain's imports in 1966 came from the United States and the United Kingdom), pan-Arab action such as oil boycotts or boycotts of Western goods could be ruinous to the economy in a very short time. But, despite the consequences, the Ruler would find it impossible in the present temper of his people to be the odd man out if the rest of the Arab world agreed on such action. However, for the moment, the phases of crisis and hostilities through which we have lived have at least indicated that the optimistic remarks about the Bahrain Government, the Bahrain State Police and the general internal situation which I included in the paper enclosed with Your Excellency's letter (1013/4/3/67) of 27 May to Mr. Weir were not groundless.

19. This last remark may sound euphoric and conceited. This impression may be inevitable in an area of the world

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where optimistic forecasts have so often proved groundless and from which encouraging reports can so rarely have been written in recent years. And I am acutely aware of the hair-breadth escape we have had from a serious outbreak of anti-British civil commotion which could have led to incalculable consequences. If the Ruler and Shaikh Khalifah had been less experienced, if the Bahrain State Police had been under its old management, if a fortuitous incident had touched off attacks on the armed services or on British property, if Cairo Radio had directed a timely blast at the over-heated emotions of the Bahraini people; any of these ifs could have produced circumstances requiring a report of a profoundly different nature. My Bahraini friends can still scarcely credit our good fortune. Furthermore we are far from being out of the wood. At the time of drafting the dock workers are still refusing to unload a services supply ship and I cannot believe that further difficulties do not lie ahead for BAPCO with all that this means for the economy of Bahrain. There are doubtless many phases of the crisis to be endured. We, the British, are distinctly unpopular: there must be no mistake about this. There are few Bahrainis who do not believe Nasser's aircraft lie, fewer who are not convinced that Her Majesty's Government and Britain as a whole are pro-Israel (the British press have not helped in this regard). Already, in their humiliation and wounded pride, some of the younger merchants are talking of boycotting British goods, of cancelling export orders from Britain, of refusing to import British and American cigarettes, while the two

/British

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British banks are, for purely political reasons, losing savings deposits (mainly small sums) at the rate of thirty to forty a day. The feeling in Manama is ugly. In this atmosphere isolated acts of hostility against British subjects or property or further industrial action by the labour force cannot be excluded. Whatever happens in the future the scars will take some time to heal. All that can be said for the moment is that we have emerged from the first two phases of the crisis remarkably unscathed. Much will depend in the weeks to come on the policies and public utterances of Her Majesty's Government. (Seemingly pro-Arab policies in the period of settlement will do more than anything else to reduce the effect of Nasser's lie: insistence on Israeli withdrawal, particularly from Jerusalem and the West Bank, and on U.N. forces being stationed on both sides of the frontier are obvious examples.) The Ruler understands our problems but, to retain control of the situation, he must keep in step with his people in order to shorten their stride. His main anxiety throughout has been what will emerge from London. Will we be able to keep quiet about potentially inflammable moves such as the transfer of the minesweepers to Aden? Will Her Majesty's Government firmly declare neutrality? Will they give an assurance that the British military presence in Bahrain will not be used in support of Israel? And so on. He believes that events in Bahrain are dictated more by the pronouncements of London and Cairo than anything else. He has co-operated with us to the full so far and has been hyper-sensitive to the necessity of

/avoiding

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avoiding damage to British lives and property and to Her Majesty's Government's interests. He will be watching our words and actions very closely as the crisis continues to unfold. I hope very sincerely that we shall do or say nothing which will make his task more difficult. As he is fond of saying to me, Bahrain's security is indivisible from Britain's security in the Gulf. If we act in such a way as to enable him to protect his country's interests, we are protecting our own.

20. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Jeddah, Kuwait and Tehran, to the Political Agents at Abu Dhabi, Doha, and Dubai, to Her Majesty's Consul-General at Muscat, to the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Aden and, for information, to the Arabian Department of the Foreign Office.

I have the honour to be
with the highest respect,

Your Excellency,
Your obedient Servant

(A. D. Parsons)

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A

FROM: FOREIGN OFFICE

Telegram No: 726

Dated: 14 June

ROUTINE

CONFIDENTIAL

Following received from Jeddah telegram number 404 of 13 June to F.O.

Middle East situation: Anglo/Saudi relations.

I called on UMAR SAQQAF Permanent Under-Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs today at my request, owing to extreme pressure of work he could give me only a short time but hoped to have a longer discussion later.

2. I asked to know Saudi Arabia's present position and then look at Britain's position in Saudi Arabia and her future.

3. SAQQAF said that Saudi Arabia's position in the present conflict has been of conforming to the Uniform Joint Arab support against Israeli aggression and this was still her position. She has had friendship and good relations with the United Kingdom and the United States and wants this to continue but her doing so has placed her in a difficult position and subjected her to much Arab criticism because of United Kingdom/United States support of Israel particularly during the present crisis. He affirmed that "we" (meaning the Saudi Government) did not believe the story of British intervention but it is widely believed in the Arab World and in Saudi Arabia and the British attitude throughout the crisis has been on the side of Israel particularly noticeable has been our failure to condemn Israel as an aggressor a fact which is beyond dispute. Nor has there been any other sign yet from Britain since the crisis began of support or help to or concern for the Arab World whereas all that we have done and said has seemed to the Arabs to lend support to Israel.

4. Despite this, Saudi Arabia has maintained her relations with us and not asked for the recall of the Ambassador at a time when so many others were breaking and she was subject to criticism on this account. Saudi Arabia and Britain were friends and she wished to continue her friendly relationship with us and therefore looked to us for some sign of reciprocation and one which would help her in maintaining these relations in face of Arab criticisms. We could best do this by early condemnation of Israel as the aggressor: This was essential and justified. We should not call on the Arabs to accept humiliating conditions which they could not do such as recognising Israel and quote coming to terms with Israel unquote and direct negotiations. (In this context he quoted recent statements by the Prime Minister and Mr. Heath who had advocated these points). If the peace settlement, should be handled through an intermediary body I.E. the United Nations, we should insist on Israel withdrawing to her previous frontiers. Achieving this would have the greatest possible effect in restoring our position. Also it was of cardinal importance not to let Israel retain possession of the new land she had now seized since this would confirm her in her policy that aggression pays and would encourage her even more towards the future aggression she undoubtedly contemplates. Other

/settlement

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-2-

settlement terms could include some of those which had been suggested by Britain, e.g. A United Nations Force on the borders separating both sides a settlement of the refugees (in Palestine as well as the return of those from the current conflict) and internationalisation of Jerusalem. We must realise however, that the Arabs can never recognise Israel and that she will always be regarded as their enemy. He admitted that the Arabs had suffered a heavy defeat but even in their defeat they could not be forced to give this recognition.

5. In the short time available I recapitulated our position of not taking side, non-intervention during the hostilities, endeavours to prevent the conflict starting, working for a solution through the United Nations, and peace negotiations. I strongly reaffirmed our wish and intention to continue to have good and friendly relations with Saudi Arabia as before and it was to reassure him on this point and to see how best our good relations could continue that had been the primary purpose of my meeting. I also expressed gratification at Saudi Arabia's continued maintenance of relations and at all the courtesies and protection which we had received during the recent time of strain.

6. SAQQAF concluded by asking that I should convey as a formal request from his Government to my Government that Britain should now condemn Israel for her undoubtedly aggression and should ensure in the peace settlement that Israel was made to revert to her previous boundaries. These were the two points of overriding importance. If we could do this soon we could best and firmly restore our position in Saudi Arabia and the Arab World and the trust of the Arabs in us. He pointed also to the danger of Russia who had suffered a severe reverse by her failure to support the Arabs. If we now leave it to Russia to lead the way peace settlement to exact terms against Israel, she will re-establish her former position and thus the communist presence will revert even more strongly in the Arab World. We must stop this in all our interests and should take the initiative ourselves.

7. I am reporting separately on the oil situation but SAQQAF agreed that even if, as is likely, the ban on oil exports to Britain (and the United States) is finally confirmed it would be a gesture which Saudi Arabia felt obliged to take in conformity with Arab solidarity and would not affect diplomatic relations between us. I pointed that the effect of a ban would be to class Britain as an aggressor since the Government announcement had been that the ban would be imposed on aggressors, but this was not our position and we had not taken sides and could not therefore be an aggressor. SAQQAF admitted this but said that Saudi Arabia had to make some kind of gesture towards Arab unity at this difficult time and a gesture like this was unavoidable in reply to my question he implied agreement that when the situation settled down the ban would be withdrawn.

FO PASS BAHRAIN 109.

From: Jeddah
 Telegram No.: 108
 Date: 13 June 1967

ROUTINE

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1. Lns.
 2. Mr. Paine *lwm*
 3. PA. *Reb.*

Addressed to F.O. telegram No. 108 of 13 June, repeated for information to Moscow, Amman, Bahrain, Tunis, Kuwait, Beirut, Tripoli, Algiers, Rabat, Washington, UKMIS New York, UKDEL NATO Paris, Tel Aviv.

Your telegram No. 1085 to Amman: Soviet intentions in the Middle East.

Saudi Arabia is in an exceptional position in that she has never had relations with Soviet Russia or any other communist country and has for long been the foremost Arab country in opposing communism and any form of contact with the Soviet Union. She has repeatedly warned Nasser and other Heads of the danger of committing themselves to Russia. From the start of the present situation therefore she would not have looked to Russia for anything nor would have expected Russian help to the Arabs to the extent that other Arab Countries probably did. She can therefore be expected to be pleased at this Russian setback.

2. Your para 2 (a). The standing of the Soviet Union amongst the Arabs must inevitably have been damaged by its failure to give physical support during the hostilities and seeming failure to give political support to the Arab cause overall whereas formerly it had made itself out to be the leading protagonist on behalf of the Arabs. It must weaken Arab confidence in the Soviet Union that at their time of greatest difficulty she appeared unable actively to help them. Nevertheless the feeling remains that during the crisis, Russia stood out in support of the Arab cause, and was the one great power on the side of the Arabs whereas Western powers, symbolised by the United States and Britain, were regarded as the supporters of Israel. For their defeat it seems from here the Arabs tend to blame their military weakness and unexpected Israeli strength and surprise aggression and the, in their view, active support given to Israel by the United States and Britain, namely support over the Tiran Straits issue prior to hostilities, alleged air support, secret assurances of support prior to hostilities, and their consistent support of Israel since its foundation. The emphasis of blame will therefore, be on the West rather than on Russia.

3. Your para 2 (b). Although Nasser probably feels he has been let down by the Soviet Union, he could not admit to this publicly and is likely to look to the Soviet Union since he needs material support and there is no other to turn to. A change in this position now would be a public admission that he had been wrong in the past for looking to the Soviet Union. His personal position in the Arab World at present has probably been strengthened and by his act of resignation and restoration at the call of the people since it has created a seemingly widespread emotional appeal well beyond Egypt which temporarily obscures many aspects of his failure. He is likely to thrive on this rather than on the extent of Russian support in the immediate future. But if Nasser is disillusioned with Russia there could perhaps be a chance that he would seek through France to get some source of aid and support which would not leave him completely dependant on the Soviet Union.

-2-

4. Your para 2 (c). Despite disillusionment the Arabs will still look upon Russia as the one Major power which stood on their side whilst the West in their view supported their enemy. In these circumstances she could quickly restore her position and influence if she takes a strong anti-Israeli line in the peace settlement.] YD.

F.O. Pass Priority, Moscow 1, Routine Amman 36, Tunis 2, Beirut 144, Tripoli 7, Algiers 1, Rabat 3, Washington 64, UKMIS New York 28, UKTEL NATO Paris 1, Tel Aviv 6.

CRAWFORD.

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CYPHER/CAT A AND BY BAG

Largely wishful thinking

18/6

1091
24 JUN 67

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO CERTAIN MISSIONS

GUIDANCE NO. 135

9 JUNE 1967 (IPG)

CONFIDENTIAL.

GUIDANCE.

MIDDLE EAST.

SOVIET PRESTIGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST MUST BE HARD HIT BY NASSER'S DEFEAT AND THEIR FAILURE TO SUPPORT HIM.

2. WE DO NOT INTEND AT THIS STAGE TO EXPLOIT THIS SITUATION PUBLICLY, AS SOVIET CO-OPERATION WILL BE NECESSARY IN WORKING OUT A SETTLEMENT. WE CAN HOWEVER RUB THE LESSON HOME DISCREETLY WHENEVER OCCASION OFFERS ON THE THEME THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE:

- (A) CYNICALLY EXPLOITED THE LARGEY LEGITIMATE ARAB GRIEVANCES IN ORDER TO EXTEND THEIR OWN INFLUENCE (FOUGHT TO THE LAST ARAB)
- (B) HAVE NEVER IN PRACTICE SUPPORTED THE CAUSE OF AN ARAB NATION BUT HAVE PICKED AND CHOSEN AMONG THE ARAB STATES ENCOURAGING FRICTION BETWEEN IN SOVIET INTEREST,
- (C) ENCOURAGED SOME ARABS TO EXTREME AND PERILOUS COURSES
- (D) LET THEM DOWN IN THE HOUR OF NEED (THEY DROPPED THEIR DEMAND FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO ACCOMPANY THE CEASE FIRE WHEN THE ARABS WERE STILL FIGHTING)
- (E) PRESUMABLY SHARED IN NASSER'S DISASTROUS JUDGEMENTS
- (F) MADE A BAD JOB OF ELEVEN YEARS OF EQUIPPING AND TRAINING THE EGYPTIAN FORCES.

3. THE FOLLOWING POINTS ILLUSTRATE THE TWISTS OF SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS THE ARABS DURING THE LAST 20 YEARS:

- (A) AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR THE SOVIET UNION WAS COLD TOWARDS THE ARAB NATIONALIST MOVEMENT WHICH HAD BEEN PRO-GERMAN, AND ATTACKED THE ARAB LEAGUE WHICH IT CALLED A QUOTE BRITISH AGENCY UNQUOTE
- (B) IT CHOSE INSTEAD TO SUPPORT THE ZIONISTS AS ITS CHOSEN INSTRUMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND IN 1947 VOTED IN THE U.N. FOR THE PARTITION OF PALESTINE. THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE AT A DINNER IN NEW YORK ON 31 DECEMBER 1947 CALLED ISRAEL AN INSTRUMENT QUOTE / FOR THE

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FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. GUIDANCE 135

-2-

FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE PEOPLES OF THE ARAB EAST FROM THE
LAST SHACKLES OF COLONIAL DEPENDENCE UNQUOTE

(C) CZECH ARMS WERE SENT TO THE ZIONISTS IN PALESTINE IN
MARCH 1948, AND THE ARAB ATTEMPTS TO OVERTHROW ISRAEL WERE ATTACKED
AS BRITISH INSPIRED.

(D) IN 1951 THE SOVIET UNION ABSTAINED ON A SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION SUPPORTING PRESSURE ON EGYPT TO OPEN THE SUEZ CANAL
TO ISRAELI SHIPPING, AND REFUSED TO SPONSOR AN EGYPTIAN COUNTER
RESOLUTION.

(E) FOR THE FIRST TWO YEARS AFTER THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION OF
1952 THE SOVIET ATTITUDE WAS EITHER RESERVED OR HOSTILE.

(F) SINCE 1955 IT HAS CAST ITSELF AS PROTECTOR OF THE ARAB
NATIONALIST REVOLUTION: WITH WHAT RESULT ?

SOSFA/CROSEC SENT 2237Z 9 JUNE

BY TELEGRAPH:	Ankara	Madrid	Havana	Rabat
	Athens	Stockholm	Montevideo	Tripoli
	Bonn	Vienna	B.H.C. Aden	Abidjan
	Brussels	Bucharest	Amman	Addis Ababa
	Copenhagen	Budapest	Bahrain	Bujumbura
	The Hague	Moscow	Beirut	Dakar
	Lisbon	Prague	Jedda	Kinshasa
	Luxembourg	Sofia	Kuwait	Cape Town
	Oslo	Warsaw	Tehran	Ottawa
	Paris	U.K. Mission	Tel Aviv	Canberra
	UKDEL NATO	New York		Wellington
	UKDEL Strasbourg	B.I.S. New York		New Delhi
	Rome	Washington		Karachi
	Belgrade	Buenos Aires		Rawalpindi
	Berne	Caracas		Dacca
	Dublin	Mexico City	Algiers	Colombo
	Helsinki	Rio de Janeiro	Cairo	Kuala Lumpur
	Singapore	Accra	Bathurst	Nairobi
	Freetown	Lagos	Kampala	Malta
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				[PRIORITY]

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J.I.P.G.D.

Off Muscat

1091

By Bag

FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO CERTAIN MISSIONS

Guidance No. 137 9 June, 1967 (IPG)

UNCLASSIFIED

Middle East.

At military briefing for foreign Press in Tel Aviv on 8 June, translation in English of alleged Israel Radio intercept of conversation between Nasser and Hussein was released and tape recording in Arabic of alleged conversation was played back to them.

2. Text which has already been published widely in British Press, is as follows:

"Conversation between Nasser and Hussein on 6 June 1967 at 4.50 a.m. by Cairo-Amman radio telephone link. Conversation between Cairo and Amman - hello - His Majesty is ready? The President is coming. - Hello Amman is His Majesty ready? - Hello, His Honour the President is ready - how are you? I hear His Majesty, the brother wants to know if the fighting is going on along all the Front? - Yes. Shall we include also the United States do you know of this, shall we announce that the United States is cooperating with Israel? - Hello, I do not hear, the connexion is the worst - the line between you and the Palace of The King from which The King is speaking is bad. Nasser - Hello, will we say the United States and England or just the United States? Hussein - the United States and England. Nasser - does Britain have aircraft carriers? Hussein - answer unintelligible. Nasser - good. King Hussein will make an announcement and I will make an announcement. - Thank you. - Do not give up. - Yes. - Hello, good morning brother. Never mind, be strong. - Yes. I hear - Mr. President if you have something, or any idea at all ... at any time. Nasser - we are fighting with all our strength and we have battles going on on every front all night and if we had any troubles at the beginning - it does not matter, we will overcome despite this. God is with us. Nasser - will His Majesty make an announcement on the participation of Americans and the British? (answer not clear). Nasser - by God, I say that I will make an announcement and you will make an announcement and we will see to it that Syrians will make an announcement that American and British airplanes are taking part against us from aircraft carriers. We will issue an announcement, we will stress the matter and we will drive the point home. Hussein - Good. All right. Nasser - Your Majesty, do you agree? - (not clear). Nasser - A thousand thanks, don't give up, we are with you with all our heart and we are flying out planes over Israel today, our planes are striking at Israel's air fields since morning. Hussein - a thousand thanks, be well".

[Copies sent to D.T.D. for Overseas Distribution].

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24 JUN 67

1. Ruler
2. Mr P. in Rep.
3. PA.

SAVING
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTED

IMMEDIATE

From:- DUBAI

To:- BAHRAIN

Addressed to Bahrain telno. 058 (saving) of 6 June, r.f.i. Foreign Office and saving to Abu Dhabi, Doha, Muscat and Bahrain Agency.

My telno. 317 of 5 June (not to all) and your telno. 280 of 6 June (not to F.O.).

ARAB/ISRAEL.

I attended the emergency meeting of the Ruler's Council this morning. I went over the general lines of my proposed remarks an hour before with Shaikh Rashid of Dubai who was in agreement with me and professed himself unable to understand the reason for a meeting. The Ruler of Ras al Khaimah as Chairman asked to see me privately a few minutes before the meeting to explain his proposals. I left him in no doubt that one of them (see para. 5 below) was preposterous.

2. In opening the meeting the Chairman invited me to explain H.M.G.'s policy in the present situation. I did so on the lines of the Secretary of State's speech stressing:

- (i) that orders had been given to H.M. Forces not to become involved;
- (ii) that H.M.G. attached great importance to a peaceful solution through the United Nations.

I added that H.M.G. were also seeking a meeting of the Great Powers to achieve a settlement and were working hard for a cease-fire. This appeared to be generally accepted.

3. Secondly, I was asked if they might send a telegram to H.M.G. expressing the hope that H.M.G. would maintain its position of neutrality and not aid Israel. They also wished to send telegrams of support and solidarity to the other Arab states. I said that they were free to send telegrams. In the event they resolved each to send a separate telegram under both headings (texts by bag).

4. The Chairman then proposed for consideration that persons from the Trucial States might be allowed to volunteer to serve with the Arab forces. I said that nobody could stop them travelling and that public transport was no doubt available to take them to their destination, adding that perhaps the demonstrators outside the building might lead the way (this was less well received). A follower of one of the Rulers had the audacity to propose that the Development Fund should be used to facilitate the travel of volunteers. This was simultaneously squashed by Shaikh Rashid and myself.

.../5.

RESTRICTED

- 2 -

5. Finally, despite my warning the Chairman actually proposed that the Trucial Oman Scouts should be sent to the front. I pointed out:

- (a) that H.M.G. paid the T.O.S.;
- (b) that its Commander-in-Chief was the Political Resident, not the Rulers' Council;
- (c) that its object was the maintenance of peace and stability in the Trucial States, defence against external aggression, and the prevention of interference on the part of any one Trucial States in the affairs of any other;
- (d) that if the Scouts left the Trucial States the result would be tribal war. (I made special reference to the possibility of the Shihus and Habus invading Ras al Khaimah territory);
- (e) the Scouts would not in any case be moved outside the Trucial States, whatever might be resolved.

No more was heard of that proposal.

6. The whole meeting was an ill-conceived stunt by the Ruler of Ras al Khaimah, who took care to bring and induce other Rulers to bring a large number of followers into the Council Chamber. A small demonstration took place around my car as I left the meeting but nothing particularly untoward occurred. My impression is that the demonstrators were mainly Kuwaitis instigated by Palestinians. I shall be calling on the Ruler of Dubai tonight to thank him for his help (and that of the Director of the Dubai Municipality). The Ruler of Ras al Khaimah is, I think, sufficiently chastened for the moment and can be left to brood.

7. The Rulers of Abu Dhabi and Fujairah although invited were un-represented.

Bahrain please pass to F.O. (PRIORITY) as my telno. 270.

ROBERTS.

MUSCAT (Regret not edited)

1. ^A
1. Ruth
2. ⁱⁿ Ruth from BP
2. Ruth from BP



GUIDANCE 135.

CONFIDENTIAL.

GUIDANCE.

MIDDLE EAST.

SOVIET PRESTIGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST MUST BE HARD HIT BY NASSER'S
DEFEAT AND THEIR FAILURE TO SUPPORT HIM.

2. WE DO NOT INTEND AT THIS STAGE TO EXPLOIT THIS SITUATION
CONCERNING PAFERIA. BURRO-OPERATION WILL BE NECESSARY AND
SOVIET CO-OPERATION WILL BE

N

PUBLICLY, AS SOVIET CO-OPERATION WILL BE NECESSARY IN WORKING
OUT A SETTLEMENT. WE CAN HOWEVER RUB THE LESSON HOME DISCREETLY
WHENEVER OCCASION OFFERS ON THE THEME THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE:

- (A) CYNICALLY EXPLOITED THE LARGELY LEGITIMATE ARAB GRIEVANCES
IN ORDER TO EXTEND THEIR OWN INFLUENCE (FOUGHT TO THE LAST ARAB)
- (B) HAVE NEVER IN PRACTICE SUPPORTED THE CAUSE OF AN ARAB
NATION BUT HAVE PICKED AND CHOSEN AMONG THE ARAB STATES ENCOURAGING
FRiction BETWEEN IN SOVIET INTEREST.
- (C) + ENCOURAGED SOME ARABS TO EXTREME AND PERILOUS COURSES
- (D) LET THEM DOWN IN THE HOUR OF NEED (THEY DROPPED THEIR DEMAND
FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO ACCOMPANY THE CEASE FIRE WHEN THE ARABS
WERE STILL FIGHTING)
- (E) PRESUMABLY SHARED IN NASSER'S DISASTROUS JUDGEMENTS
- (F) MADE A BAD JOB OF ELEVEN YEARS OF EQUIPPING AND TRAINING THE
EGYPTIAN FORCES.

3. THE FOLLOWING POINTS ILLUSTRATE THE TWISTS OF SOVIET POLICY
TOWARDS THE ARABS DURING THE LAST 20 YEARS:

- (A) AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR THE SOVIET UNION WAS COLD

3. THE FOLLOWING POINTS ILLUSTRATE THE TWISTS OF SOVIET POLICY
TOWARDS THE ARABS DURING THE LAST 20 YEARS:

(A) AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR THE SOVIET UNION WAS COLD
TOWARDS THE ARAB NATIONALIST MOVEMENT WHICH HAD BEEN PRO-GERMAN,
AND ATTACKED THE ARAB LEAGUE WHICH IT CALLED A QUOTE BRITISH AGENCY
UNQUOTE

(B) IT CHOSE INSTEAD TO SUPPORT THE ZIONISTS AS ITS CHOSEN
INSTRUMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND IN 1947 VOTED IN THE U.N. FOR
THE PARTITION OF PALESTINE. THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE AT A DINNER
IN NEW YORK ON 31 DECEMBER 1947 CALLED ISRAEL AN INSTRUMENT QUOTE
FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE PEOPLES OF THE ARAB EAST FROM THE
LAST SHACKLES OF COLONIAL DEPENDENCE UNQUOTE

(C) CZECH ARMS

WERE SENT TO THE ZIONISTS IN PALESTINE IN
MARCH 1948, AND THE ARAB ATTEMPTS TO OVERTHROW ISRAEL WERE ATTACKED
AS BRITISH INSPIRED.

(D) IN 1951 THE SOVIET UNION ABSTAINED ON A SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION SUPPORTING PRESSURE ON EGYPT TO OPEN THE SUEZ CANAL
TO ISRAELI SHIPPING, AND REFUSED TO SPONSOR AN EGYPTIAN COUNTER
RESOLUTION.

(E) FOR THE FIRST TWO YEARS AFTER THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION OF
1952 SHE WAS NEUTRAL OR HOSTILE.

(F)

IN 1952 THE SOVIET ATTITUDE
WAS EITHER RESERVED OR HOSTILE.

(G) SINCE 1955 IT HAS CAST ITSELF AS PROTECTOR OF THE ARAB
NATIONALIST REVOLUTION: WITH WHAT RESULT?

J. EnR

1055/2 167
1973/21/67 3 PA. 1001

CYPHER

From: Bahrain To: Foreign Office

Telegram No: 412

Date: 12 June 1967

1071

CONFIDENTIAL
IMMEDIATE

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram number 412 of 12 June, repeated for information to Amman, Jedda, Kuwait, Beirut, HC Aden, Khartoum, Tunis, Tripoli, Rabat, Tel Aviv, UKMIS New York, and Saving to, Cairo(1), Washington (8), Bahrain Agency (108), Doha (64), Dubai (115), Abu Dhabi (91) and Muscat (41).

Your telegram No. 260 to Rabat of 11 June:
Nasser's alibi.

The lie about UK/US involvement is almost universally believed by Arab population outside some of the Rulers. It will be very difficult to reverse this as the lie is pumped out steadily by all the information media of the revolutionary Arab States and repeated by Kuwait. I hope that the BBC Arabic Service is hammering away equally persistently at the truth.

2. As to action to destroy the effects of the lie and weaken Nasser's alibi;

(a) HMG have already proposed U.N. investigation but this has not been taken up. Is there any way in which we and the Americans can effectively insist on Secretary-General investigating the point, difficult as it is to prove a negative? I assume that there will be operational logs on all relevant naval vessels and RAF stations which can be inspected. Object should also be to demand evidence from Nasser supporting allegation.

(b) It would help if we could now make a move in support of the Arab case against Israel, to balance our attitude on Straits of Tiran. Is it not by now clear that Israel was responsible for starting actual fighting and if so, could we not say so? Secondly, since contrary to earlier indications, Israel Ministers statements now show that their territorial ambitions have gone far beyond restoring position at Sharm al Shaikh can we not say something to deflate these? I do not know whether Arab Governments can be brought to accept relatively small adjustments of frontier as part of future security arrangements, but it seems inconceivable that they could ever accept Israel advance to River Jordan. Indeed are we not likely to be confronted in the U.N. with a Soviet-inspired resolution requiring Israel to vacate all her territorial gains? If we do not support this, and possibly if we cause it to fail by our abstention, we and U.S. are likely to be regarded all the more as pro-Israel. In that event, current difficulties over restarting oil exports in the Arab countries round the Gulf will become even more intense and prolonged, and we may run into many other serious problems, in the protected Gulf States as elsewhere.

Distribution
Normal
Saving

CRAWFORD



J. Z. HUSSAIN

12 JUN 67

-707



NNNN

ZCZC VM053 DV91 AP24

NBNU CO GJD0 053

DOHA 53/51 12 1330

ETAT

BRITAIN MUSCAT 00912

ADDRESS BAHRAIN TELEGRAM NO. 123 DATED 12TH JUNE

RFI F.O. DUBAI ABUDHABI MUSCAT BAHRAIN AGENCY

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 405 TO F.O. OF 10TH JUNE PARAGRAPH 3

STOP I HAD A TALK WITH THOSE CONCERNED ON JUST THESE

POINTS YESTERDAY STOP AND CAN CONFIRM THAT

SIMILAR SITUATION EXISTS HERE

BOYLE

COL 00912 NO 123 12TH RFI F.O. NO 405 F.O.

10TH 3

1. EnR

2. ~~for Party from~~
3. PA. *BBP*

1091

~~DO NOT SPLIT TELEGRAM~~
~~NO PAPER SPLITTING PLEASE~~
~~DO NOT SPLIT TELEGRAM~~
MUSCAT SAVING TEL.40

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO.410 OF 11 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN, KUWAIT, JEDDA, MOSCOW, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV AND SAVING TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO, BAHRAIN AGENCY, DOHA, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, MUSCAT.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO.1085 TO AMMAN (NOT TO ALL): SOVIET POLICY IN MIDDLE EAST.

THERE HAS BEEN NO INDICATION HERE, NOR SO FAR AS I AM AWARE ELSEWHERE IN THE ARAB WORLD, THAT ARABS ARE OPENLY BLAMING SOVIET UNION FOR FAILURE TO COME TO THEIR HELP. IT IS PROBABLY IN ANY CASE TOO EARLY TO LOOK FOR THIS, SINCE ON LOCAL EVIDENCE, ARABS ARE STILL IN A STATE OF SHOCK AS RESULT OF THEIR DEFEAT AND NASSER'S GYRATIONS. I DOUBT HOWEVER WHETHER EVEN WITH PASSAGE OF TIME THEY WILL BLAME RUSSIANS, UNLESS GIVEN A POSITIVE LEAD BY ONE OF THE COUNTRIES WHICH PARTICIPATED IN FIGHTING. IF, FOR EXAMPLE, KING HUSSEIN COULD MAKE A STATEMENT BLAMING RUSSIANS, THIS WOULD FOCUS ARAB MINDS ON SOVIET FAILURE, AT LEAST IN THIS AREA, BUT I IMAGINE THAT THIS WOULD BE POLITICALLY TOO DANGEROUS FOR HIS POSITION. IN ABSENCE OF SUCH A LEAD, PUBLIC OPINION WILL BE GUIDED BY BROADCASTS FROM REVOLUTIONARY ARAB COUNTRIES WHICH CAN BE EXPECTED TO HIGHLIGHT PRO-ARAB GESTURES BY SOVIET GOVERNMENT. IN THIS EVENT, I FEAR THAT POINTS IN YOUR GUIDANCE NO.135 WILL NOT MAKE ANY EFFECT EXCEPT WITH RULERS AND OTHER CONVINCED OPPONENTS OF SOVIET RUSSIA.

2. ON PARA 2CB) OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, NO INFORMATION HERE. ON PARA 2CC) CURRENT SOVIET LINE SHOULD BE ADEQUATE TO PROTECT

UNLESS GIVEN A POSITIVE LEAD BY ONE OF THE COUNTRIES WHICH PARTICIPATED IN FIGHTING. IF, FOR EXAMPLE, KING HUSSEIN COULD MAKE A STATEMENT BLAMING RUSSIANS, THIS WOULD FOCUS ARAB MINDS ON SOVIET FAILURE, AT LEAST IN THIS AREA, BUT I IMAGINE THAT THIS WOULD BE POLITICALLY TOO DANGEROUS FOR HIS POSITION. IN ABSENCE OF SUCH A LEAD, PUBLIC OPINION WILL BE GUIDED BY BROADCASTS FROM REVOLUTIONARY ARAB COUNTRIES WHICH CAN BE EXPECTED TO HIGHLIGHT PRO-ARAB GESTURES BY SOVIET GOVERNMENT. IN THIS EVENT, I FEAR THAT POINTS IN YOUR GUIDANCE NO.135 WILL NOT MAKE ANY EFFECT EXCEPT WITH RULERS AND OTHER CONVINCED OPPONENTS OF SOVIET RUSSIA.

2. ON PARA 2(B) OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, NO INFORMATION HERE. ON PARA 2(C) CURRENT SOVIET LINE SHOULD BE ADEQUATE TO PROTECT THEIR POSITION WITH PUBLIC OPINION. THOUGH PEOPLE IN SOUTHERN GULF ARE NOT GREATLY CONCERNED WITH SOVIET RUSSIA, LATTER MUST HAVE ENHANCED ITS REPUTATION RELATIVELY, AS RESULT OF OUR OWN DIFFICULTIES.

F.O. PASS IMMEDIATE AMMAN 30 MOSCOW 1 BEIRUT 122 TEL AVIV 2 AND SAVING TO WASHINGTON 7 UKMIS NEW YORK 11 UKDC NATO 1

CRAWFORD

BAHRAIN AGENCY TO MUSCAT TEL NO 10.

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO 84 OF 11 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFNN
TO KUWAIT H.C. ADEN (PERSONAL) TEHRAN DOHA ABU DHABI DUBAI MUSCAT
AND SAVING TO BAHRAIN RESIDENCY.

NYTELNO 82: MIDDLE EAST CRISIS.

THERE HAVE BEEN NO DEMONSTRATIONS TODAY AND LIFE IS RETURNING TO
NORMAL EXCEPT THAT THE BAPCO WORKERS ARE STILL REFUSING TO LOAD
TANKERS AND THE DOCK WORKERS WILL NOT UNLOAD THE SERVICES SUPPLY
SHIP. THE CONSTRUCTION WORKERS ARE BACK AT RAF MUHARRAQ.

2. THE BAHRAIN GOVERNMENT IS GOING TO PLAY FOR TIME OVER TANKER
LOADING UNTIL TOMORROW OR TUESDAY IN THE HOPE THAT THE SITUATION
WILL IMPROVE WITHOUT THEIR HAVING TO MAKE ANY MORE OFFICIAL
STATEMENTS. THEY ARE PARTICULARLY ANXIOUS TO AVOID PUBLICLY
NAMING THE U.K. AND U.S. AS FORBIDDEN DESTINATIONS OR PROHIBITING
LOADING OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN FLAG TANKERS. WE ARE IN CLOSE TOUCH
AND THEY WILL DISCUSS ANY ANNOUNCEMENT WITH ME BEFORE IT IS MADE.
THEY HOPE THAT DOCKERS WILL UNLOAD THE SERVICES SUPPLY SHIP
TOMORROW.

FO PASS H.C. ADEN 13 PERSONAL AND TEHRAN 8.

PARSONS.

1. RnIn
2. Mr. ParIn 103m PBP
3. PRA

17 JUN 67
1091
MUSCAT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. R.W.H.
2. Mr. Parker to P.D.
3. P.D.

H.B.M. POLITICAL AGENCY,
TRUCIAL STATES,
DUBAI.

(1074/67C)

10 June, 1967.

THE ARAB/ISRAEL CONFLICT AND SECURITY IN THE NORTHERN TRUCIAL STATES

In correspondence resting with my telno. 325 of 9 June (not repeated to all the addressees of this letter) I have reported on this subject. Although it is much too early to regard it as a closed book the acceptance of the Security Council's Cease Fire Resolution by Egypt, Syria and Jordan and the establishment, at least temporarily, of law and order in Dubai and Sharjah afford a useful opportunity of summing up developments so far.

2. The material cause of the local manifestations and of bewilderment and indeed some disaffection in the Trucial Oman Scouts, was of course the rise in temperature and exacerbation Arab feelings caused by the tension and subsequent open war between Israel and the neighbouring Arab States.

3. The efficient cause, however, was the presence in Dubai of a large number of Palestinians, many of whom wished to leave Dubai for Kuwait, some perhaps genuinely to volunteer to fight, others ostensibly to do so. As far as I can gather, purely for logistic reasons the authorities were unable to provide transport by air or sea to enable them to leave. The volunteers therefore shuttled between the Kuwait State Office and the Municipality and when frustrated began to excite each other to frenzy in the classic Arab manner.

4. The first manifestation I observed occurred on 6 June as I left the Trucial States Development Office opposite the Kuwait State Office. An Emergency Meeting of the Rulers' Council had been convened by the Chairman, the Ruler of Ras al Khaimah, to discuss such unrealistic propositions as the despatch of the T.O.S. to the front. After the deliberations had been brought to a suitably negative end I left the Council Chamber. The crowd outside the Kuwait State Office immediately crossed the road and surrounded my car. They did nothing more than beat upon it with their fists and shriek abuse at me through the windows. As they were all shrieking at the same time I was unfortunately unable to discover exactly what they were saying, not that it would have been of much consequence. There were no police present. Indeed there are normally none on such occasions. The Director of the Municipality effectively intervened on the Rulers' instructions, but no punitive action was taken.

.../5.

Sir Stewart Crawford, K.C.M.G., C.V.O.,
H.M. Political Resident,
BAHRAIN.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

5. The following day, however, groups of Palestinians started whipping up the layabouts of Dubai, Iranians, Pakistanis, Baluchis, Adenis and Yemenis, who proceeded to smash windows and loot shops and some houses. Almost the first casualty was the Commercial Office of the Agency, where the windows were broken. The Trucial States Council and Kuwait State Office premises suffered similarly. Damage was by no means confined to British property but there was a definite concentration in that direction. Particular casualties were the B.B.M.E. branch in Deira (which suffered the worst damage) their branch in Dubai, and the stores and General Manager's flat of Gray Mackenzie and Co., and the offices of Sir William Halcrow and Partners. In the first few hours the situation was naturally disturbing, with approximately 400 rioters actively bent on destruction. I called in one troop of the T.O.S. at approximately 11.00 hours without being able to consult the Ruler, in order

- (a) to release policemen for other duties and generally stiffen the forces of law and order;
- (b) to guard the Agency and
- (c) to ensure safe conduct home for the children of the English-Speaking School.

All this was duly achieved. By approximately 13.45 hours Dubai Police had the rioters dispersed. The night of June 7 passed quietly and, although there was a further outbreak of rioting by scattered groups on 8 June it was soon quelled and all was quiet and has since remained so. At the time of writing Nasser's resignation and potential reinstatement have had no effect; nor do I expect them to have any in the immediate future.

6. On the whole the Dubai Authorities, especially the Police, coped extremely well with what could have developed into a dangerous situation. The only major mistake was that at the beginning the Director of the Municipality, a most efficient and conscientious Sudanese official, tended to treat the rioting as a mere expression of feelings and discounted the possibility of danger to life and property. He accordingly prevented the police from playing a conspicuous part or taking any direct action against the rioters. His attitude unfortunately influenced that of Shaikh Rashid in the very early stages. Rashid, however, realised much more quickly than the Director that the situation could get out of hand. The moment he had done so his reaction was energetic. He agreed instantly to my bringing in a second troop of the T.O.S. to hold the bridge over the Dubai creek and thus bisect the security problem. On 8 June he gave the police full discretion to fire on looters (it in fact proved unnecessary). He arranged for the departure of over 350

.../Palestinians

- 3 -

Palestinians by air to Kuwait and despatched 100 Yemenis and Adenis there by launch. He was even reliably reported to have sent a further consignment of Pathan and Baluchi out "mujahidin" in a launch whose crew on his orders deserted it outside the entrance to the creek and left the would-be volunteers to rock in the ocean swell for 24 hours, before bringing them back in an extremely chastened condition to Dubai. He was, in short, in a towering rage for approximately 36 hours. I called on him briefly on 7 and 8 June when he readily agreed to everything I asked, adding for good measure that if the situation became any worse he would ask for the T.O.S. to be used in force to clear the town. He also despatched parties of his extremely dangerous-looking personal retainers on 7 and 8 June to points of danger, including the English Speaking School and the Agency.

7. Apart from a fire in Sharjah and some feeble demonstrations in Ras al Khaimah, the Northern Trucial States have otherwise been quiet.

8. Meanwhile, there had for some days been disturbing signs of unease among the T.O.S. A few N.C.O.'s and men had threatened British officers with trouble if the United Kingdom helped Israel in any way. In the event the T.O.S. performed all the duties required of them admirably, and much credit is due to the Commanding Officer and Officers for their resolute and shrews leadership in difficult circumstances. (One can easily imagine the bewilderment of a beduin soldier listening on his transistor set to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Sawt al Arab and Sawt-as-Sahil and wondering why he was ordered suddenly into Dubai). This malaise culminated in the submission on 9 June of their resignations by the two senior Arab Officers in the force, Captain Abdul Aziz bin Mohamed and Captain Faisal bin Sultan. After a long discussion they agreed to take the paid leave to which they were entitled, and a further month's unpaid leave in order to consider the position. Their decision must have been made before they knew of the Egyptian and Syrian acceptance of the Security Council's cease-fire Resolution since they asked for an interview on 8 June at an hour which they could not plissibly have known of it. Their action must be attributed not to orders given to them at any stage in the crisis. (Abdul Aziz dealt admirably with the safe conduct of the children of the English Speaking School) but must have been due to the general unease which I have described above and to the shock which, as more technically accomplished soldiers, they must have felt when they began to perceive that Arab arms were not going to be victorious. They obviously felt that a gesture was called for on their part. Nine Palestinian Police Officers also resigned but one remained at his post.

9. There are all sorts of lessons to be drawn from these incidents which I shall be considering in concert with the Dubai Police and the T.O.S. in the near future. They mostly concern the mechanics of communication in an emergency. The system of wardens worked well as a means of conveying news to the community. The Army Helicopters were a priceless asset and enabled us to follow events and react to them far more quickly than any other device would have done. The stationing of a T.O.S. officer (again Captain Abdul Aziz bin Mohamed) in Police H.Q. with a wireless set was also a complete

.../success.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

success. It only remains to add that the staff of the Agency worked long hours extremely well and cheerfully.

10. Throughout the crisis, Sawt-as-Sahil, the attempted sabotage of which I have reported separately, performed admirable service, giving judicious publicity to denials of British and American intervention, and, as far as I can gather locally, enhancing its reputation.

11. This is not the moment to survey future prospects. The local authorities and the British community, some of whom believed that "it could never happen here" have been fortunate in that they have received a shock which has not been painful but which cannot but have been salutary. I propose very shortly to discuss with Shaikh Rashid, while he is in a suitable frame of mind, the question of Immigration Control or, failing that, a system of labour permits which would enable him to track down undesirable elements, and the whole question of security posed by the presence in Dubai of Palestinians and Egyptians, including professional agitators, plus a large and un-controlled under-world which could easily be suborned or merely led on by the hope of loot. The damage has not been serious and the situation was never grave, but the lessons must be learned.

12. I am sending a copy of this letter to Head of Arabian Department in the Foreign Office, to H.M. Ambassador in Kuwait, to the Political Agents in Bahrain, Doha, and Abu Dhabi and to H.M. Consul-General in Muscat.

(D. A. Roberts)

CONFIDENTIAL

1. RnRn
2. Mr. Parsons *BSF*
(1088/67) *SECRET* PA

Cypher

From: Bahrain To: Foreign Office

Telegram No: 82

Date: 10 June, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram number 82 of 10 June, repeated for information to Aden, Kuwait, Tehran, Doha, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Muscat (Bahrain Residency).

1088/67

1091
80A

My tel. No: 80: Middle East crisis.

There have been small demonstrations all morning and one or two minor incidents between Bahrainis and Iranians. Passing demonstrators threw stones at the R.A.F. Transit Rest House in Manama breaking a few windows. Wimpeys have stopped work at R.A.F. Muharraq as the Arab labour force was drifting away. Dock workers have refused to unload a services supply ship at Mina Sulman.

2. I have had a series of discussions with the Ruler and his brothers and with the Commandant of Police. The Ruler has decided to broadcast at 8.15 p.m. local time urging the people to resume normal life and expressly forbidding demonstrations or gatherings. The Police will be deployed on Sunday morning to enforce this prohibition.

3. During our discussions, the Ruler and the others said that, thanks mainly to the skill and restraint of the Police and to the judicious deflation of pressure by the various moves such as the collection of money, opening volunteer offices, etc, Bahrain had so far miraculously survived without serious incident. (The deterrent effect of the British military presence in the background has also been a major factor.) They said that it would be a tragedy if, with only perhaps two or three more days of danger and tension, a spark was put to the powder barrel. The Ruler therefore argued very strongly against any provocative action such as our unloading the supply ship with British troops. The Commandant backed him up and we have agreed to leave matters as they are for the next 48 hours or so. In the same context the Ruler drew attention to the fact that the Soviet bloc was coming out strongly on the Arab side over the armistice terms, e.g. insisting on Israeli withdrawal to her original positions. He said that he hoped very much that H.M.G. would neither say nor do anything which might indicate a pro-Israeli bias. If we did, this would undoubtedly prolong the danger of anti-British out-breaks in Bahrain as well as boycott action by the labour force. I agree with the Ruler's analysis.

PARSONS.

Distribution

Normal
Doha,
Abu Dhabi,
Dubai,
Muscat.

En Clair Code R
Code Cypher
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

[Signature]

[No. and prefix]

[Date]

[Priority]

INWARD TELEGRAM

1. To Pako Town Rd.
2. PA.

[Distribution
Heading]



FROM Salvador TO Yorosar
Agency

No. 8 D. M.

10 June R. M.

Repeated to

CONFIDENTIAL

Accordance to Fo Tede Po
2 June to Rds AC Adam
Korowai Tadean Obi Dibai
Dola Dibai Yorosar and
Nawang to Salvador Korowai.
14 Telegram 79: Model
Bata Cicis.

Observations continued
throughout Friday, on a
diminishing scale. By
evening only half the
bougats were left after
evening of prayer.

Agreement started between
groups of Yorosar and groups
Salvador. Fighting broke
out and some damage
was done to property. The
Police* Commander had a
riot spread; and to secure
and gave rioters a thorough
beating. This (continued)

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INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

[Distribution
Heading]

FROM TO

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. D M

[Date] R M

Repeated to

[Priority]

situation. (Riot was an expression of concern between ruling or middle class between Balwami and Iranian immigrants (about and of Anglo 1600 Iranian supporting the Israeli)

2. after HARRE's speech
riots but ugly looking
groups began assembling.
The Commandant said
riot speeches would
arresting all who refused
to disperse. The night was
quiet.

3. This morning schools
appeared to close and
demonstrations are
foregoing up to express
sympathy for HARRE.
Balwami workers have

ADVANCE
COPIES TO:-

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair Code R
Code Cypher
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

[Distribution Heading]

FROM..... **TO**.....

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. D M

[Date] **R** **M**

Repeated to

[Priority]

reporter for daily newspaper
stated regarding local
banks. Some of
construction workers at
RAF Metherall have
walked out presumably
as a result of Nasser's
agreements above
stated. Iranian-owned
shops are closed.

DISTRIBUTION

Parson

**ADVANCE
COPIES TO:—**

Bahrain Residency to MUSCAT SAVINGRAM

39.

1091

1. Env
2. Mr Park ^{BSB}
3. P.R.

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO 405 OF 10 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFMN
TO KUWAIT JEDDA H.C. ADEN (PERSONAL) AMMAN BEIRUT TRIPOLI TEL AVIV
AND SAVING TO BAHRAIN AGENCY DOHA DUBAI ABU DHABI MUSCAT AND
WASHINGTON.

MIDDLE EAST CRISIS.

POLITICAL AGENT BAHRAIN IS REPORTING ON LOCAL SITUATION HERE IN
LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS SINCE NASSER'S SPEECH AND OF DISCUSSIONS
HE HAS HAD WITH RULER. SITUATION IN BAHRAIN HAS BECOME MORE TENSE
THAN AT ANY TIME DURING THE CRISIS AND THIS MAY CONTINUE FOR SOME
DAYS. HAVING GOT THROUGH THE CRISIS BROUGHT ON BY OUTBREAK OF
FIGHTING, PUBLIC SENTIMENT IS LIKELY TO BE DETERMINED MAINLY BY
EVENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE AND PARTICULARLY BY ANY POSITIONS
TAKEN UP BY H.M.G. AND ANY STATEMENTS OF BRITISH POLICY.

2. UNFORTUNATELY, WE HAVE ARRIVED AT THIS POINT WITH NEARLY
EVERYONE HERE CONVINCED THAT OUR POSITION IS ESSENTIALLY PRO-ISRAEL.
DESPITE EXPLANATIONS GIVEN FOR OUR ATTITUDE ON THE STRAITS OF
TIRAN, WE WERE CONSIDERED TO BE ESPousing AN ISRAELI POLICY AIM.
THERE IS HARDLY ANYONE HERE WHO DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT OUR AIRCRAFT
HELPED ISRAELIS IN THE FIGHTING. SINCE ALL EARS ARE GLUED TO
RADIO SETS TUNED IN ~~TO~~ MOST OF THE TIME TO CAIRO, KUWAIT, DAMASCUS
ETC., PUBLIC OPINION WILL CONTINUE TO REFLECT LINE TAKEN BY THEM.
RULER HAS HANDLED SITUATION WITH GREAT SKILL AND HAS GIVEN AWAY
AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE, BUT WE MUST EXPECT HIM TO MOVE WITH THE
GENERAL TIDE THOUGH MORE SLOWLY, AND WE CANNOT EXPECT HIM TO TAKE
A STRONG LINE WITH ARAB LABOUR WHEN THEY REFUSE TO LOAD TANKERS,
UNLOAD BRITISH SHIPS, ETC.

3. IN THIS SITUATION OUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS RESTORATION OF TERRITORIAL
STATUS QUO AND TOWARDS POSSIBLE INGREDIENTS OF A SETTLEMENT,
WHETHER TEMPORARY OR PERMANENT, WILL BE UNDER CLOSEST WATCH. AS
SEEN FROM HERE, DANGER IS THAT ALTHOUGH ISRAEL WILL SEEK AT LEAST
RELIABLE GUARANTEES FOR THE FUTURE AND POSSIBLY A PERMANENT PEACE

3. IN THIS SITUATION OUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS RESTORATION OF TERRITORIAL STATUS QUO AND TOWARDS POSSIBLE INGREDIENTS OF A SETTLEMENT, WHETHER TEMPORARY OR PERMANENT, WILL BE UNDER CLOSEST WATCH. AS SEEN FROM HERE, DANGER IS THAT ALTHOUGH ISRAEL WILL SEEK AT LEAST RELIABLE GUARANTEES FOR THE FUTURE AND POSSIBLY A PERMANENT PEACE SETTLEMENT, THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS WILL PROVE MORE IRRECONCILABLE THAN EVER, AND OPPOSED TO ANY PERMANENT SETTLEMENT NOW. IF THIS PROVES CORRECT, OUR OPEN SUPPORT FOR WHAT MAY WELL BE ENTIRELY REASONABLE DEMANDS BY THE ISRAELIS WILL BE SEEN AS FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT WE ARE OPPOSED TO THE ARABS AND BALANCED STATEMENTS WILL BE SEEN AS PROVING OUR PARTISANSHIP FOR ISRAEL. UNLESS WE ARE VERY CAREFUL POSITION HERE WOULD BE LIABLE TO DETERIORATE FURTHER AND RULER WOULD FIND IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO HELP US.

4. I REALISE THAT THESE CONSIDERATIONS, WHICH ARE NO DOUBT REFLECTED IN THE OTHER MAIN ARAB COUNTRIES, CONFRONT H.M.G. WITH A VERY DIFFICULT PROBLEM, GIVEN OUR COMMITMENT TO A POLICY OF BALANCE AND NON-PARTISANSHIP. I CAN ONLY SUGGEST FOLLOWING FOR CONSIDERATION:

(A) PENDING CLARIFICATION OF THE INTERNAL POSITION IN THE U.A.R. AND OF INDICATIONS OF WHAT THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS SEE AS THEIR ARMISTICE AIMS WE SHOULD AVOID ANY BUT THE MOST GENERAL PRONOUNCEMENTS AS TO WHAT WE THINK A SETTLEMENT SHOULD CONTAIN, EVEN ON THE STRAITS ~~OF~~ OF TIRAN, SINCE ANYTHING SPECIFIC MAY WELL COINCIDE TO SOME EXTENT AT ANY RATE WITH ISRAELI AIMS.

(B) WE SHOULD THROUGHOUT KEEP OUR PUBLIC POSITION IN AS LOW A KEY AS POSSIBLE AND AVOID STATEMENTS SUGGESTING THAT WE ARE TAKING THE LEAD IN WORKING FOR A SETTLEMENT, HOWEVER ACTIVE WE MAY WISH TO BE THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

(C) WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE MAXIMUM USE OF U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR ANY MEDIATION THAT MAY BE NEEDED, AS WELL ^{AS} OF COURSE SUPPORTING PRACTICAL PROPOSALS FOR STRENGTHENING U.N. PRESENCE IN THE AREA C.E.G. BOTH REPEAT BOTH SIDES OF THE ISRAEL BORDER AS WELL AS AT SHARM AL-SHAIKH.

(D) WHERE A PUBLIC LEAD BY THE GREAT WESTERN POWERS HAS TO BE GIVEN, WE SHOULD LEAVE IT SO FAR AS WE CAN TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. THIS MAY APPEAR IRRESPONSIBLE BUT THE FACT IS THAT ISRAEL PRESSURES ON U.S. GOVERNMENT ARE UNIVERSALLY UNDERSTOOD AND WIDELY ACCEPTED, AND THEIR POSITION IS MUCH LESS EXPOSED IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD THAN OURS.

FO PASS IMMEDIATE H.C. ADEN (PERSONAL) 25 AMMAN 28 BEIRUT 121

TRIPOLI 5400972 2 TEL AVIV 1 AND SAVING WASHINGTON 6. CRAWFORD

Cypher Cat A

From: Jeddah To: Bahrain
Tel. No: 89

Date: 8 June, 1967

(1073/154/67)

1. *Ans*

2. *Very interesting*

3. *Mr. Park*

3. *PA.*

12 JUN 67

1091

180

13/1

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTINE

Addressed to Foreign Office tel. No. 363 of 8 June, repeated for information Washington, Bahrain, Kuwait.

Your tel. 820: Oil.

For several days the trans-Arabian tap line has been closed at the request of the Lebanese and other transiting governments owing to cessation of handling facilities. This was not part of an oil ban directed against Britain, America or other specified countries.

2. On 6 June the Ras Tanura refinery was closed because of labour trouble and risk of sabotage.

3. Meanwhile normal field production continued and piping to Bahrain. Ships loaded whatever oil was ready in the tanks.

4. On 7 June owing to demonstrations and labour trouble in Dhahran-Damman area the Bahrain pipe line was closed and this compelled closure of field production. This was not done by order of the Saudi Arabian Government and was not a government ban on oil production or exports directed against Britain or America.

5. The situation today is that Aramco are hoping to reopen the Ras Tanura refinery and restart field production. They also hope Bahrain pipe-line may open but this depends partly on the Bahrain Government. The Aramco representative in Jeddah has no information yet if field production has actually restarted but is enquiring.

6. There has been no move against shipping but shipping is restricted in practice by the quantity of field production. Normally relatively few U.S. and U.K. flag tankers use Ras Tanura the bulk are of Liberian type.

7. On 6 and 7 June there were serious demonstrations in Damman and Dhahran. The Governor allowed an anti-American procession to proceed towards the American Consulate-General escorted by Saudi security forces and on the understanding that it would be peaceful. On arrival at the Consulate-General the crowd broke loose, entered the building and caused some damage and roughly handled some staff but without causing injury. The security forces were unable to maintain control and made little attempt to intervene.

8. Other demonstrators approached the American oil company camp at Dhahran, entered and damaged several houses on the outskirts and threatened to return for more serious and more damaging demonstrations. Some American houses in Damman are also said to have been damaged. Rumours that three Americans had been killed have been denied but a few may have been slightly injured. Some American cars were burned.

9. At the College of Petroleum demonstrators are said to have ejected British and American teachers with rough handling.

10. After strong representations to the Minister of Foreign Affairs by the American Ambassador Prince Fahd has sent a unit of the National Guard to Dhahran area to maintain order and has promised full protection for Americans and full support to the oil company for them to continue normal operations.

11. The British shipping company representative in Dammam has reported this morning that the situation there is at present quiet but there were demonstrations in the town yesterday. He has sent his family to Bahrain but intends to stay on himself unless the situation deteriorates. He had not been caused any personal difficulty and did not report any demonstration against British subjects. The port is quiet at present and no evidence of discrimination against British shipping. I expect a further report from him later in the day.

12. The foregoing demonstrations are the work of oil company employees who for long have been an organised potential source of trouble but were kept under firm control by the Governor bin Jiluwi. His brother who succeeded as Governor is relatively weak and control has correspondingly weakened. Trouble in the fields affecting production is therefore a continuing possibility.

Distribution

Advance
File

1 Encls
2 yr Parl to me
AFB

1091

CYPHER/CAT A
FROM FOREIGN OFFICE

TELNO 635.

DATED 7 JUNE

ROUTINE

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NUMBER 1119 OF 7 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO KUWAIT JEDDA BEIRUT WASHINGTON BAHRAIN AND SAVING TO UKMIS NEW YORK PARIS UKDEL NATO BONN.

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 712.

BREACH OF RELATIONS.

IF YOU SEE NO INSUPERABLE PRACTICAL OR POLITICAL OBJECTION, YOU SHOULD ATTEMPT THROUGH WHATEVER CHANNELS ARE AVAILABLE TO YOU TO GET THE FOLLOWING THOUGHTS TO PRESIDENT AREF OR OTHER ^RIRAQI LEADERS WHO MIGHT BE A MODERATING INFLUENCE ON THE SITUATION.

2. IN BREAKING RELATIONS AND INTERFERING WITH OIL SUPPLIES, THEY ARE ACTING ON THE BASIS OF INFORMATION WHICH IS KNOWN TO THE WORLD TO BE FALSE, AND WHICH EVEN THE RUSSIANS HAVE NOT THOUGHT IT EXPEDIENT TO ENDORSE, ABOUT BRITISH AND AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN THE FIGHTING. THEY SHOULD NOW BE ABLE TO UNDERSTAND BETTER THAT THE DESPERATE EFFORTS THAT WERE BEING MADE LAST WEEK BY BRITAIN AND AMERICA WOULD HAVE SAVED THEM FROM THE CATASTROPHE TO WHICH NASSER'S MEGLOMANIA AND RUSSIAN OPPORTUNISM HAS LED THEM.

3. INSTEAD OF ALLOWING THEMSELVES TO BE LED FURTHER ALONG THIS
SELF-DESTRUCTIVE COURSE THEY SHOULD NOW BE CONSIDERING WHAT THEY
~~CAN DO TO REVERSE COURSE~~

~~EX~~
CAN DO TO GET SANITY RESTORED AND SALVAGE WHAT CAN BE RECOVERED
FROM THE WRECKAGE.

4. AS REGARDS OIL, IRAQ HAS ALREADY SUFFERED ENOUGH IN RECENT
YEARS FROM THE REFUSAL TO FACE ECONOMIC REALITIES. OTHER PRODUCERS
ARE BOUND TO WANT TO RESUME NORMAL SUPPLY ARRANGEMENTS AS SOON AS
THEY DECENTLY CAN, AND ONCE AGAIN IT SEEMS ALL TOO LIKELY THAT
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS WILL CAUSE THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT TO
SACRIFICE IRAQ'S ECONOMIC INTERESTS. VERY RECENT EXPERIENCE HAS
ILLUSTRATED FOR IRAQ THE FACT THAT ONCE THE PATTERN OF OIL SUPPLY
IS ALTERED IT IS NOT EASY TO GET IT RESTORED.

To Prof. Ian APP

Mr.

(1073/126/67)

12 JUN 67
1091
MUSCAT

Cypher/CAT A

From: Foreign Office To: Bahrain

Tel. No: Guidance 130

Date: 7 June, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL
IMMEDIATE

Addressed to Bahrain Guidance Telegram No: 130 of 7 June,
repeated saving to Abu Dhabi, Doha, Dubai and Muscat.

Arab/Israel.

Our objective is to secure as reasonable lasting and broad a settlement as possible. Some of the elements are bound to be anathema to the Arabs. We must try to persuade them that we are well alive to their real grievances, and we shall be looking for comments in the package designed to give them satisfaction.

2. Our immediate aim is to nail Nasser's "big lie" and "phony alibi" about U.S./U.K. air cover. This will anyway become an Arab myth: we must see that it is as flimsy as possible.

3. We believe that an essential element for a greater stability in the Middle East is a sharp decline in Nasser's authority. In spite of all his alibis his defeat by the Israelis should produce this. He will however try hard to recover in later diplomatic negotiations in the U.N. etc. and be supported by the Soviet Union.

4. The Arab States will soon themselves start to count the cost of Nasser's leadership, and any blatant campaign by us or the Americans to denigrate him or divide the Arabs would run the danger of reversing this trend. Nevertheless we wish to help the process by discreet use of such arguments as:

(a) Nasser made a major blunder in blocking Aqaba, known to be an Israeli *casus belli*.

(b) We did everything possible to save the Arabs from the consequences and the peace held for two weeks.

(c) In spite of assurances in his press conference of 28 May that any conflict would be confined if there was no intervention, Nasser has on the basis of fabricated reports rushed Arab States into:

(i) breaking off relations with U.S. and U.K.
(ii) blocking oil supplies,
(iii) accepting closure of the canal.

(d) He has gravely damaged the Arab reputation for responsible international behaviour which his effective administration of the canal had enhanced. There is danger that Western purchasers will look preferably to other oil sources even if more expensive. How does all this help the Arabs against Israel?

(e) In spite of all their large forces and first class Russian equipment the extraordinary military ineptitude of the Egyptians, who arrogated to themselves supreme command of the Arab Forces, has led to tragic losses among the courageous forces of the other Arab countries.

Distribution
Normal
Savings.

FM ASOLHY

TO: OO ASOLDO (PASS SAYING DOHA ABU DHABI BUSCAT DUBAI)

1. Encl 12 JUN 67
2. Mr Avin 6 m. 1091

This is much too complex to be listened to by people who are based against us. Both British facts that Hermes & Victorious won in

GUIDANCE 13308.

OUR GUIDANCE NO 128.

MIDDLE EAST.

THE ALLEGATIONS OF BRITISH INVOLVEMENT APPEAR TO BE BASED ON QUOTE

EVIDENCE UNQUOTE FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCES COLON

Aden &
Arab.

(1) A CLAIM BY KING HUSSEIN THAT ON 5 JUNE JORDAN RADAR DETECTED THE PRESENCE OF TWO AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, ONE 20 MILES AND THE OTHER 30 MILES, WEST OF TEL AVIV. EIGHT AIRCRAFT WERE SUPPOSED TO HAVE BEEN SEEN LEAVING EACH OF THESE SHIPS AND TO LAND IN ISRAEL.

DAMASCUS RADIO SUBSEQUENTLY CLAIMED THAT THEY HAD INTERCEPTED AN ISRAELI RADIO MESSAGE REQUESTING AIR SUPPORT FROM FOREIGN CARRIERS WHILE CAIRO RADIO CLAIMED THAT THE JORDAN RADAR EVIDENCE CONFIRMED QUOTE INFORMATION UNQUOTE AVAILABLE FROM THE EGYPTIAN FRONT THAT BRITISH AND U S PLANES WERE PROVIDING AIR COVER FOR ISRAEL.

(2) DAMASCUS RADIO REPORTS OF INTERVIEWS WITH CAPTURED ISRAELI PILOTS IN WHICH IT WAS SAID THAT IN ISRAELI AIR FORCE CIRCLES RUMOUR HAD IT THAT THE BRITISH HAD TAKEN PART IN THE ISRAELI ATTACK AND THAT 17 VULCAN AIRCRAFT HAD ARRIVED IN ISRAEL FROM AKROTIRI BASE IN CYPRUS ABOUT TEN DAYS BEFORE .

2. THE BRITISH - BUILT RADAR AT AJLUN (40 MILES NORTH OF AMMAN) HAS , UP TO 5000 FEET , AN EFFECTIVE RADIUS OF 50 TO 70 MILES. AT 40,000 TO 45,000 FEET THE RANGE WOULD BE 200 MILES . THE CARRIER VICTORIOUS WAS IN MALTA, 1,250 MILES AWAY. THE CARRIER HERMES WAS OFF ADEN, 1540 MILES AWAY.

BUT WHATEVER THE CAPABILITY OF THIS RADAR EQUIPMENT THE LINE OF SIGHT OF THE BEAM TO THE AREAS IN WHICH THE CARRIERS WERE ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN DETECTED WOULD HAVE BEEN BLOCKED BY THE MOUNTAIN RANGE AT NABLUS.

SOVIET - BUILT RADARS AT MAFRAG WOULD HAVE BEEN ON THE SAME LINE OF SIGHT AND THUS SUBJECT TO SIMILAR LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY THE TERRAIN.

AKROTIRI AIRFIELD IS NOT WITHIN RANGE OF ANY OF THE SE RADARS AND NO AIRCRAFT COULD HAVE BEEN SEEN TAKING OFF FROM THERE.

3. SEE ALSO VERBATIM NO 249 AND GUIDANCE NO 132 (NOT TO ALL).

SOSFA

140/6/6

1 Bn Pn.
2 to Pn Pn bren
1881

17 JUN 67
1091

CYPHER/CAT A

FROM KUWAIT

TELNO 192.

DATED 9 JUNE

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDSD FOREIGN OFFICE TEL NO 260 OF 9 JUNE REPTD FOR INFMN
BAHRAIN AND WASHINGTON.

HYTEL 258.

PLEASE INSERT FOLLG PARA 4 WHICH WAS OMITTED IN TRANSMISSION.

S
BEGIN

4. SHAIKH SABAH SAID WITH A SIGH THAT KUWAIT WAS AN ARAB COUNTRY. SHE WAS NOT AND WOULD NOT BE A SATELLITE OF EGYPT. SHE STUCK TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ARABISM, THAT WAS ALL. HER ANCIENT RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN WOULD SURELY SURVIVE MISUNDERSTANDINGS OVER PROPAGANDA AND SO ON: HE WOULD LIKE ME TO ASSURE YOU SOLEMNLY THAT NEITHER HE PERSONALLY NOR THE KUWAIT GOVT BELIEVED ONE WORD OF CAIRO'S ALLEGATION OF WESTERN INTERVENTION. WHAT A CHANGE OF TUNE FROM TWO DAYS AGO: BUT THEY COULD NOT SAY THIS IN PUBLIC.

ENDS

F O PASS IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON 23

1. RnR
2. Mr. Parkinson
BSP

1091

CYPHER/CAT A

FROM KUWAIT

TELNO 190.

DATED 9 JUNE

IMMEDIATE

~~OBYQCL LBDQDABORECN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ADDRESSED TO FO TEL ~~NO.~~ 258 OF 9 JUNE RPTD FOR INFMN

TO

WASHINGTON AND BAHRAIN.

MY TEL NO. 252 PALESTINE

I REPEATED THE PERFORMANCE THIS MORNING WITH THE FOREIGN
MINISTER, WHO IS LESS WELL- DISPOSED TO THE BRITISH
CONNEXION. THE ARGUMENT WAS FRANK, NOT TO SAY SHARP AT TIMES.

2. SHAikh SABAH REPEATED THAT THE OIL STOPPAGE WOULD BE TEMPORARY.
I SAID YOU HOPED IT WOULD BE SHORT, AND THAT THE DECREE COULD
SOON BE RESCINDED. I ADDED THAT IF THE BREAK WAS LENGTHY,
KUWAIT MIGHT LOSE SOME OF HER MARKETS. SHAikh SABAH OBSERVED
THAT THIS POINT HAD BEEN MADE BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN PARLI-
MENT AND BY YOU TO THE KUWAIT AMBASSADOR. HE DID NOT REGARD
IT AS A THREAT; KUWAIT COULD LIVE ON A MUCH LOWER INCOME.

3. SHAikh SABAH MAINTAINED THAT THE KUWAIT RADIO HAD BEEN LEFT
FREE TO BROADCAST ANY ARAB NEWS BULLETINS THAT WERE AVAILABLE,
SO THAT THE FEELINGS OF THE DIFFERENT COMMUNITIES IN KUWAIT
SHOULD NOT BE STIRRED UP. I SAID THAT HE COULD SURELY NOT
EXPECT ME TO ACCEPT THAT EXCUSE; THE INFLAMMATORy NATURE OF
THE BROADCASTS WAS PRECISELY WHAT WE WERE COMPLAINING ABOUT,

AND WE COULD PROVE OUR POINT. AFTER SOME FURTHER ARGUMENT
SHAikh SABAH SAID THAT KUWAIT HAD LIVED THROUGH THREE DAYS
OF HADNESS, AND IF YOU HAD BEEN HERE, YOU WOULD CONGRATULATE
THE KUWAIT GOVERNMENT ON KEEPING THINGS CALM INSTEAD OF
REPROACHING THEM FOR THEIR BROADCASTS. THE KUWAITI YOUNGER
GENERATION WERE HOPELESS (EVEN HIS OWN SONS);
EVERYBODY HERE LIVED ON THEIR NERVES, FOR THE KUWAITIS WERE
A MINORITY IN THEIR OWN COUNTRY. ANYHOW IT WAS ALL OVER NOW
AND THERE COULD BE NO MORE STORIES OF WESTERN INVOLVEMENT.
I ADMITTED THAT THERE WAS SOME FORCE IN WHAT SHAikh SABAH
HAD SAID, BUT ASKED WHETHER KUWAIT WOULD GO ON RELAYING
STORIES FROM CAIRO, WHICH HAD ALWAYS LIED AND WOULD NO DOUBT
GO ON LYING.

5. AT ONE POINT I REMARKED THAT BRITAIN WAS NOT ONLY KUWAIT'S
OLDEST FRIEND, BUT THE ONLY FRIEND FROM WHOM SHE COULD EXPECT
REAL HELP AS OPPOSED TO FINE WORDS. THE MINISTER REPLIED THAT
EVERY KUWAITI KNEW THAT.

6. SHAikh SABAH SAID HE HOPED THAT WE WOULD HELP OUR FRIENDS
THE ARABS IN THE DIFFICULT DAYS AHEAD. I COMMENTED THAT THE
ARABS OFTEN MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR THEIR FRIENDS TO HELP THEM,
AND THAT IN ANY CASE WE DID NOT REGARD EGYPT AS A FRIEND.
HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THIS: WHAT HE HAD IMMEDIATELY IN MIND
WAS HELP FOR JORDAN- KUWAIT WAS GIVING £5 MILLION AND HOPED
HE WOULD DO SOMETHING TOO. HE WOULD ALSO LIKE YOU TO KNOW
THAT KUWAIT HAD ADVISED LEBANON AND JORDAN NOT TO Rush INTO
A BREAK WITH THE U.K.

7. SHAikh SABAH ASKED THAT ARMS SUPPLIES TO KUWAIT SHOULD BE
RESUMED. I SAID I WOULD ENQUIRE ABOUT THIS, BUT THAT IT WOULD
HELP IF KUWAIT ACCEPTED THE CEASE FIRE DEMANDED BY THE U.N.
AT THIS POINT SHAikh SABAH'S REASON LEFT HIM AGAIN: HE WOULD NOT ~~ACCEPT~~
ACCEPT THE CEASE

FIRE, KUWAIT HAD NO COMMON BOUNDARY WITH ISRAEL, IRAQ AND
SAUDI ARABIA HAD RECEIVED ARMS FROM BRITAIN WITHOUT ACCEPTING
THE PREVIOUS CEASE FIRE, AND KUWAIT COULD GET ARMS FROM BELGIUM

ANYHOW. WHEN HE CALMED DOWN, I REPEATED THAT WE WOULD LET
HIM KNOW HOW THINGS STOOD. I HOPE WE CAN CONTINUE TO SUPPLY
IF ONLY FOR COMMERCIAL REASONS.

8. SHAIKH SABAH FINALLY SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD YOU SAY THAT
THE ARABS WERE LIKE THE IRISH- THEY LET THEIR EMOTIONS RUN
AWAY WITH THEM. HE THOUGHT THIS WAS VERY TRUE AND HE WAS
GOING TO WRITE YOU A LETTER TO THANK YOU FOR THIS FRIENDLY
COMPARISON.

FO PASS IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON 21

XZCZC VM317 21643 P947

MBMU BU GJBA 063

BAHRAIN 63/62 8 1705

H. SHAHDAD

-8 JUN 67

188

506



ETAT PRIORITE

IMMEDIATE POLITICAL MUSCAT

60 8 1622

GUIDANCE 13203

MIDDLE EAST GUIDANCE NO. 123 FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM

H. M. AMBASSADOR AMMAN .

AT OFFICIAL BRIEFING AT JORDAN GENERAL HQ THIS AFTERNOON
FOREIGN MILITARY ATTACHES WERE TOLD THAT THE JORDANIANS
HAD QUOTE NO KNOWLEDGE OF ANY BRITISH OR AMERICAN AIRCRAFT
OPERATING OVER JORDAN UNQUOTE .

2. YOU SHOULD GIVE THIS THE WIDEST PUBLICITY

SOSFA

COLL CKE

1. *Parfin* *PP*
2. *To Parlbase*
3. *PA* *10/6*

From Bahrain Agency saving
telegram no. 7.

16 JUN 67
*1091
MUSCAT

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO.78 OF 8 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO KUWAIT, H.C. ADEN AND SAVING TO BAHRAIN RESIDENCY, DOHA, DUBAI, ABU DHABI, MUSCAT.

MY TELEGRAM NO.77: ~~MIDDLE EAST CRISIS.~~

PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE CONTINUED ALL MORNING. IN SPITE OF REPORTS THAT THERE WOULD BE TROUBLE THERE HAVE BEEN NO INCIDENTS AND THE CROWDS SEEMED LESS EXCITED THAN THEY WERE YESTERDAY. AT 1300 HOURS THE RULER BROADCAST AN APPEAL TO STOP DEMONSTRATING AND ANNOUNCED THAT AN OFFICE FOR VOLUNTEERS WOULD BE OPENED ON 10 JUNE (HE HAD KEPT THIS CARD TO THE LAST). ALL IS QUIET AT PRESENT. THE BRITISH COMMUNITY ARE CALM.

2. BAPCO HAVE RESUMED LOADING TANKERS FOR ALL DESTINATIONS EXCEPT UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM BUT INCLUDING E.G. VIETNAM FOR UNITED STATES FORCES. THERE HAS BEEN VIRTUALLY NO ATTEMPT BY DEMONSTRATORS ETC. TO INTERFERE WITH BAPCO'S OPERATIONS.

3. THE SITUATION IS NOW EVENLY BALANCED. BY MID-MORNING THE RULER WAS GETTING SERIOUSLY WORRIED PARTICULARLY BECAUSE THE VILLAGES WERE STARTING TO JOIN IN AND HE ENVISAGED THE DEMONSTRATIONS GETTING OUT OF HAND. I HOPE THAT HIS ANNOUNCEMENT WILL HAVE THE DESIRED EFFECT. BUT THE NEXT FEW DAYS (PARTICULARLY FRIDAY) WILL BE TRICKY.

F.O. PASS H.C. ADEN AS NYTEL.10

PARSONS

CONFIDENTIAL

(1078/67)

TELEGRAM

1. Bush
2. Mr. Portlock
3. PA

10/6

Cypher ~~code.....codebook~~

From: — Agency, Bahrain

To: — Foreign Office,
London.

Despatched

Received

No. 77

of 7 June, 1967

IMMEDIATE

Addressed to Foreign Office, London No.77,
and repeated for information PRIORITY to Kuwait No.16/
High Commission, Aden No.9 and (Saving) to British
Political Residency, Bahrain No.8/(S), Agencies
Doha No.12/(S), Dubai No.13/(S), Abu Dhabi No.9/(S
Consulate-General Muscat No.6/(S).

My tel No. 75: Middle East crisis.

By late morning the pressure by the demonstrators
for a public announcement about cutting oil had become
very strong. The Ruler has therefore made an announcement
that oil is cut off from any country participating
in the aggression against the Arabs. He accompanied it
with a call for restraint and cooperation with the
authorities.

2. The Ruler's brother showed me the text of the
announcement before it was issued. He said that he and
his brother were convinced that, if they did not take
this action, the demonstrators would turn against the
regime. (I agree with them). They had deliberately not
named Britain and America and would do as little as they
could to implement the cutting off of oil. Shaikh
Khalifah assured me that, if the Royal Navy or U.S.
Navy needed to refuel their ships normally stationed
in Bahrain, they would arrange for this to be done
unobtrusively by barges at Mina Sulman.

PARSONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

W.49512 Dd.186D 45M (in 2 sorts) 12/60 LP2849

26 ALL DRAWS


Muscat

En Clair and By Bag

FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO BAHRAIN AGENCY

Telno 108 6 June, 1967 (Arabian)

UNCLASSIFIED



Addressed to Bahrain Agency telegram No. 108 of 6 June.

Repeated for information to: Bahrain Residency Kuwait
Aden Abu Dhabi
Doha

And Saving to: Muscat.

K/1 Your telegram No. 74 [Arabic service denial].

Paragraph 2. Yes they will, at first opportunity after they open at 1300 hours G.M.T.

SOSFA Sent 1135Z 6 June

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

J.I.P.G.D.

Arabian Dept.

Eastern Dept.

N.E.A.D.

uuuuu

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

[Distribution
Heading]

FROM _____ TO _____

[Signature] _____

[No. and prefix] No. _____ D _____ M _____

[Date] _____ R _____ M _____

Repeated to _____

[Priority] _____

by unanimous power, have
been due to & partially,
for either side been to
judgement that the
& peace was very grave
and that only conclusive
action could hope to
preserve it. unfortunately,
the faisee. are agreed
now being made to bring
fighting to an end. you
should be careful not
to apportion blame for
outbreak.

Conway

ADVANCE
COPIES TO:-



X

ZCZC VM096 P533 21614

MBMU BU GJBA 261

BAHRAIN 261/260 6 1120 P1/55

276

ETATPRIORITY BRITAIN MUSCAT 17306

ADDRESSED TO DUBAI TELEGRAM NO.279 OF 6 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO ABU DHABI , DOHA , MUSCAT AND SAVING TO BAHRAIN AGENCY . FOLLOWING ARE EXTRACTS FROM STATEMENT BY FOREIGN SECRETARY IN COMMONS ON 5 JUNE . QUOTE .

I CANNOT EMPHASISE TOO STRONGLY HOW MUCH H.M. GOVERNMENT REGRET

P2/50

THIS TRAGIC DEVELOPMENT . IT WAS PRECISELY IN THE ATTEMPT TO AVERT THE RISK OF SUCH A DEVELOPMENT THAT THE GOVERNMENT TOOK THE STEP I PUT BEFORE THE HOUSE ON 31 MAY . AS THE HOUSE KNOWS , WE HAVE REPEATEDLY URGED BY ALL MEANS OPEN TO US , BOTH

ON ISREAL AND THE ARAB STATES , THE NEED TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT
AND SEEK A SOLUTION TO THEIR PROBLEMS THROUGH
PEACEFUL NEGOTIATIONS . UNQUOTE . QUOTE . OUR IMMEDIATE
AIM MUST CLEARLY BE TO BRING ABOUT AN EARLY AND GENERAL
CEASE-FIRE . THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS BEEN CONVENED
AND IS

ABOUT TO BEGIN ITS EMERGENCY MEETING . I HOPE THAT IT WILL PROCEED
IMMEDIATELY TO THE ADOPTION OF A RESOLUTION CALLING FOR THIS
CEASE-FIRE . THE GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE IS THAT THE
BRITISH CONCERN IS NOT TO TAKE SIDES BUT TO ENSURE A PEACEFUL
SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE AREA ,

AND THAT IN THIS SITUATION WE HAVE THE SAME INTEREST AS
THAT OF OTHERS IN THE AREA AS WELL AS THE REST OF THE WORLD .
THE HOUSE WILL WISH TO KNOW THAT INSTRUCTIONS ARE BEING GIVEN
TO ALL OUR FORCES IN THE AREA TO AVOID ANY INVOLVEMENT IN THE
CONFLICT . UNQUOTE .

CRAWFORD

F, PH
✓
Muscat



EN CLAIR AND BY BAG

FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO CERTAIN MISSIONS

GUIDANCE 128 ADDENDUM. 6 JUNE, 1967 (JIPGD)

UNCLASSIFIED

MIDDLE EAST.

FOREIGN OFFICE SPOKESMAN ADDED ON THE RECORD:

THROUGHOUT YESTERDAY AIRCRAFT CARRIER VICTORIOUS WAS STATIONARY
IN MALTA AND HERMES IN ADEN. IT WAS NOT (REPEAT NOT) THEREFOR
PHYSICALLY POSSIBLE FOR THERE TO HAVE BEEN ANY AIRCRAFT ACTIVITY
FROM THESE CARRIERS.

SOSFA/CROSEC

SENT 1246Z 6 JUNE

BY TELEGRAPH:

UKMIS NEW YORK	ALGIERS
BIS NEW YORK	CAIRO
WASHINGTON	KHARTOUM
AMMAN	RABAT
BAGHDAD	TRIPOLI
BAHRAIN	BENGHAZI
BEIRUT	OTTAWA
DAMASCUS	CANBERRA
JEDDA	WELLINGTON
JERUSALEM	NEW DELHI
KUWAIT	RAWALPINDI
TEHRAN	DACCA
TEL AVIV	

[ALL FLASH]

ANKARA	ADDIS ABABA
ATHENS	VALLETTA
ADEN	NICOSIA

[ALL IMMEDIATE].

F.O./C.O./WH DISTRIBUTION

J.I.P.G.D.

EN AIR AND BY BAG

PA 12 JUN 1967
Minuscule

F L A S H FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO CERTAIN MISSIONS.

GUIDANCE NO. 128

6 JUNE 1967 (JIPGD)

12 JUN 1967
1091
M 12 JUN 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

FOLLOWING IS PRESS RELEASE ISSUED BY FOREIGN OFFICE ON 6 JUNE.

MIDDLE EAST

QUOTE HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT ARE SHOCKED BY REPORTS EMANATING FROM THE MIDDLE EAST AND CARRIED BY OFFICIAL NEWS MEDIA THAT PLANES FROM A BRITISH AIRCRAFT CARRIER HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN THE FIGHTING. THIS A MALICIOUS FABRICATION. THERE IS NOT A GRAIN OF TRUTH IN IT. IT IS THE POLICY OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT TO AVOID TAKING SIDES IN THIS CONFLICT AND TO DO EVERYTHING THEY CAN TO BRING ABOUT A CEASE FIRE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. AS STATED BY THE FOREIGN SECRETARY YESTERDAY IN THE HOUSE, ALL BRITISH FORCES IN THE AREA HAVE THE STRICTEST INSTRUCTIONS NOT TO BECOME INVOLVED IN ANY WAY.

2. MEASURES TO INTERRUPT THE NORMAL FLOW OF OIL SUPPLIES OR TO CLOSE THE SUEZ CANAL TO SHIPPING ARE THEREFORE TOTALLY UNJUSTIFIED.

3. URGENT STEPS ARE BEING TAKEN IN LONDON AND IN THE CAPITALS OF ARAB STATES TO CORRECT THESE MIS-REPRESENTATIONS UNQUOTE.

SOSFA/CROSEC

SENT 1142Z/6 JUNE 1967

BY TELEGRAPH:

ANKARA
ATHENS

H.C. ADEN
ADDIS ABABA

VALLETTA
NICOSIA

[ALL IMMEDIATE]

UKMIS NEW YORK
BIS NEW YORK
WASHINGTON
AMMAN
BAGHDAD
BAHRAIN
BEIRUT
DAMASCUS
JEDDA

JERUSALEM
KUWAIT
TEHRAN
TEL AVIV
ALGIERS
CAIRO
KHARTOUM
RABAT

TRIPOLI
BENGHAZI
TUNIS
OTTAWA
CANBERRA
WELLINGTON
NEW DELHI
RAWALPINDI

[ALL FLASH]

FC/CO/MI DISTRIBUTION
S.10.60

SSSSS

CYPHER/CAT A

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO.618

5 JUNE, 1967

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL.

1091
1 Enq
2 Xr Pdn to m
1881
ADDRESSED TO AMMAN TELEGRAM NO. 944 OF 5 JUNE REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION TO BEIRUT DAMASCUS BAGHDAD KUWAIT JEDDA CAIRO KHARTOUM
TRIPOLI BENGHAZI TUNIS ALGIERS RABAT JERUSALEM WASHINGTON UKHIS
NEW YORK TEL AVIV BAHRAIN H.C. ADEN AND PARIS.

THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION.

THE HEADS OF ARAB MISSIONS IN LONDON CAME TOGETHER TO SEE ME TODAY
AT THEIR OWN REQUEST. THEY HAD ASKED FOR THIS MEETING BEFORE THE
NEWS OF THE OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING TO MAKE REPRESENTATIONS ON H.M.G.'S
POSITION AS SET OUT IN MINISTERIAL SPEECHES DURING THE HOUSE OF
COMMONS DEBATE LAST WEEK. THEY BROUGHT WITH THEM AN AIDE MEMOIRE
WHICH SET OUT ARGUMENTS WHY H.M.G.'S POSITION, PARTICULARLY
OVER THE STRAITS OF TIRAN, WAS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH THEIR DECLARED
INTENTION OF NOT TAKING SIDES BETWEEN THE ARABS AND ISRAEL.

2. THE LEBANESE AND SUDANESE AMBASSADORS, AS SPOKESMEN FOR THEIR
COLLEAGUES, ADDED TO THIS AN APPEAL THAT H.M.G. SHOULD MAINTAIN
NEUTRALITY IN THE LIGHT OF ISRAEL'S QUOTE AGGRESSION UNQUOTE
AGAINST THEM IN THE FIGHTING WHICH HAD STARTED TODAY. THEY SAID
THEY HAD NOTICED FROM MY STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE THIS AFTERNOON THAT
H.M.G. HAD ADOPTED A NEUTRAL POSITION, BUT WISHED ME TO BE AWARE
OF THE REASONS WHY THEY FOUND OUR POSITION BEFORE THE FIGHTING BROKE
OUT UNSATISFACTORY.

3. I REAFFIRMED H.M.G.'S NEUTRALITY AS BETWEEN THE ARABS AND ISRAEL.
I HAD BEEN AT PAINS THAT AFTERNOON TO MAKE A BALANCED STATEMENT
WHICH WOULD KEEP THE POSITION OPEN FROM WHICH I COULD BRING THE
MAXIMUM INFLUENCE TO BEAR IN THE CAUSE OF PEACE AND OF NEGOTIATED
SETTLEMENT OF THE MAIN ISSUES. ALTHOUGH I HAD NOT HESITATED TO
CRITICISE ISRAEL IN THE PAST (E.G. OVER THE SAMU INCIDENT) IT WOULD
DO NO GOOD IF I SET MYSELF UP AS AN ADJUDICATOR ON THE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CURRENT FIGHTING. OUR AIM MUST BE FIRST TO
BRING ABOUT - - - - - MAKE OUR SERVICES AVAILABLE

TELEGRAM

4. AS REGARDS THE STRAITS OF TIRAN, THERE WAS A SPECIFIC BRITISH
INTEREST HERE WHICH IT WAS MY DUTY TO UPHOLD. WHILE I COULD SEE
THE ARAB ARGUMENTS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS WAS AN ISSUE OF VITAL
IMPORTANCE TO BRITAIN SINCE THERE WERE OTHER NAVIGABLE STRAITS IN
THE WORLD WHICH WERE ALSO OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE.

5. LAST WEEK THE FLASHPOINT APPEARED TO BE THE GULF OF AQABA AND
IF WE HAD SEEMED TO CONCENTRATE ON THAT PROBLEM IT WAS BECAUSE WE
WERE DOING OUR BEST TO HEAD OFF ONE SIDE FROM A PRE-EMPTIVE MOVE.

EVEN IF THE ARAB COUNTRIES WANTED TO FIGHT TO THE END, IN THE
CONFIDENT BELIEF THAT THEY WOULD WIN, FOR US A WAR IN THE MIDDLE
EAST WAS VERY DANGEROUS AND BROUGHT ENORMOUS RISKS BECAUSE OF THE
INTERESTS INVOLVED OUTSIDE THE REGION.

6. I THEN WENT ON TO MAKE TWO POINTS VERY STRONGLY. FIRSTLY, I SAID
THAT I, AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, REACTED BADLY TO BEING
THREATENED, AND I WAS

DISTURBED BY THE TONE OF MESSAGES WHICH WE
HAD BEEN RECEIVING ABOUT WHAT THE ARAB STATES WOULD DO TO OUR
INTERESTS IF WE DID NOT FOLLOW THE COURSE THEY WANTED. WE AND THE
ARAB COUNTRIES HAD MANY INTERESTS IN COMMON AND WE HAD GONE OUT
OF OUR WAY TO HELP SOME OF THEM (E.G. OVER EXPENSIVE DEFENCE
COMMITMENTS). THE OIL INDUSTRY AND THEIR STERLING INVESTMENTS WERE
BENEFICIAL TO THEM AS WELL AS TO THE UNITED KINGDOM.

BRITISH

7. SOONLY, I WAS MUCH PUT OUT BY THE ~~NEWS~~ OF ATTACKS ON ~~THE~~
DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR PREMISES WHICH WAS COMING IN. I WAS
CONCERNED TO UPHOLD GOOD RELATIONS WITH ALL THE ARAB COUNTRIES AND
I CALLED UPON ALL THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS TO TAKE
BRITISH EMBASSIES AND CONSULATES TO PREVENT ~~THE~~ PROPER CARE OF
THEM FROM BEING THE
SUBJECTS OF ATTACK, JUST AS WE WOULD DO ~~IN~~ THIS COUNTRY. WE WOULD
IN THE FUTURE

WE STILL HAVE MANY JOINT INTERESTS WHICH WOULD HAVE TO
BE LOOKED AFTER AND IT WAS VITAL THAT ~~THEIR~~ FUTURE SHOULD NOT BE
PREJUDICED BY ATTACKS ON OUR MISSIONS. I HAD TO HOLD THE SITUATION
HERE AND PREVENT EMOTIONS FROM SPILLING OVER HERE TOO. THE
~~DEEP REGRET FOR ANY SUCH~~
~~INCIDENTS IN THEIR COUNTRIES, AND THE HEADS OF MISSIONS PROMISED~~
~~TO REPORT TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS~~
TUNISIAN AND LIBYAN AMBASSADORS EXPRESSED DEEP REGRET FOR ANY SUCH
INCIDENTS IN THEIR COUNTRIES, AND THE HEADS OF MISSIONS PROMISED
TO REPORT TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS WHAT I HAD SAID.

CYPHER AT A AND BY BAG

CONFIDENTIAL

PA
M 16 Muscat

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO CERTAIN MISSIONS

GUIDANCE NO.127 5 JUNE, 1967 (IPC)

CONFIDENTIAL.

12 JUN 1967
1091

MIDDLE EAST.

OUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE ARAB ISRAEL HOSTILITIES WILL BE STATED BY MINISTERS IN PARLIAMENT AND AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

2. YOU SHOULD BE CAREFUL TO SAY NOTHING APPORTIONING BLAME FOR THE OUTBREAK, AND IN DISCUSSION MAY MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS.

(A) WE ARE GRAVELY CONCERNED AT THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES. ALL OUR RECENT EFFORTS, E.G. CANVASSING FOR A DECLARATION BY THE MARITIME POWERS, HAVE BEEN DUE NOT TO ANY PARTIALITY FOR EITHER SIDE, BUT TO OUR JUDGMENT THAT THE THREAT TO PEACE WAS VERY GRAVE, AND THAT ONLY THE MOST CONSTRUCTIVE ACTION BY ALL CONCERNED COULD HOPE TO PRESERVE IT. UNFORTUNATELY WE HAVE FAILED.

(B) EVENTS HAVE PROVED THE DANGERS OF EXCLUDING U.N. ACTION FROM THE SITUATION.

SOSFA/CROSEC SENT 2300Z/5 JUNE

BY TELEGRAPH:

ANKARA	MOSCOW	SANTO DOMINGO	KINSHASA	NEW DELHI
ATHENS	PRAGUE	TEGUCIGALPA	LOME	KARACHI
BONN	SOFIA	H.C. ADEN	MONROVIA	RAWALPINDI
BRUSSELS	WARSAW	AMMAN	YAOUNDE	COLOMBO
COPENHAGEN	UKMIS NEW YORK	BAGHDAD	CAPE TOWN	K.LUMPUR
THE HAGUE	BIS NEW YORK	BAHRAIN	PRETORIA	SINGAPORE
LISBON	WASHINGTON	BEIRUT	TANANARIVE	ACCRA
LUXEMBOURG	BUENOS AIRES	DAMASCUS	BANGKOK	BATHURST
OSLO	CARACAS	JEDDA	DJAKARTA	FREETOWN
PARIS	MEXICO CITY	JERUSALEM	POL HONG KONG	LAGOS
UKDEL NATO	RIO DE JANEIRO	KUWAIT	KABUL	KAMPALA
UKDEL STRASBOURG	BOGOTA	TEHRAN	KATMANDU	NAIROBI
REYKJAVIK	HAVANA	TEL AVIV	MANILA	LUSAKA
ROME	LIMA	ALGIERS	PEKING	ZOMBA
BELGRADE	MONTEVIDEO	CAIRO	PHNOM PENH	VALLETTA
BERNE	SANTIAGO	KHARTOUM	RANGOON	NICOSIA
DUBLIN	ASUNCION	RABAT	SAIGON	KINGSTON
HELSINKI	GUATEMALA CITY	TRIPOLI	SEOUL	PORT OF SPAIN
HOLY SEE	LA PAZ	BENGHAZI	POL SINGAPORE	GEORGETOWN
MADRID	MANAGUA	TUNIS	TOKYO	GABERONES
STOCKHOLM	PANAMA CITY	ABIDJAN	ULAN BATOR	MASERU
VIENNA	QUITO	ADDIS ABABA	VIENTIANE	BRIDGETOWN
BUCHAREST	SAN JOSE	BUJUMBURA	TAMSUI	GIBRALTAR
BUDAPEST	SAN SALVADOR	DAKAR	OTTAWA	MAURITIUS
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J.I.P.G.D.

CONFIDENTIAL

1. *British Amb. AB*
2. *To London from*
3. *PA* 10/6



(1078/67)

CONFIDENTIAL
TELEGRAM

Cypher XXXXX XXXXX

From:— Agency, Bahrain To:— Foreign Office,
London.

Despatched Received

No. 75 of 7 June, 1967

IMMEDIATE

Addressed to Foreign Office, London No.75/ and repeated for information PRIORITY to British Embassy, Kuwait No.15/, High Commission, Aden No.8/ and (Savng) to British Political Residency, Bahrain No.80/(S), Political Agencies, Doha No.11/(S), Abu Dhabi No.8/(S), Dubai No.12/(S) and British Consulate-General, Muscat No.5/(S).

My tel No. 74: Middle East crisis.

Oil BAPCO heard this morning that ARAMCO's operation had closed down due to strike action. BAPCO who had already filled their tanks to capacity with Saudi oil, made a parade of closing the empty pipeline from Saudi Arabia and of temporarily suspending refining and loading operations (there was only one tanker at the wharf at the time). They have not stopped production from the Bahrain field. BAPCO hope by these methods to satisfy their Bahraini employees and the public in general and that their action will enable the Ruler to get away without having to make a public declaration that oil supplies to Britain and America are cut. The Ruler, whom I have seen this morning, agrees with this policy.

2. Internal situation: Peaceful demonstrations started yesterday afternoon and have continued this morning on a rapidly increasing scale. Most of the schools have closed and the streets of Manama and Muharraq are full of demonstrators. So far their slogans are more pro-Palestine and Masser than anti-British and there have been no incidents except that Gray Mackenzie's flag has been hauled down and trampled on. BAPCO's action has had a good effect. Tension is high but the temper of the crowd has not yet turned ugly. The Police are sensibly shadowing the demonstrators but doing nothing

CONFIDENTIAL Do not forward to...

CONFIDENTIAL

TELEGRAM

-Cypher code en clair

From : — *To* : —

Despatched

Received

No. of

- 2 -

to provoke them.

3. British community: I am in close touch with the British Community whose leaders agree with me that all we need do for the time being is to exchange information: they agree that it would be premature to advise people to leave etc.

4. Propaganda: We achieved widespread publicity for H.M.G.'s and the U.S. Government's denials of the Arab allegation about British and American aircraft operating with the Ismaelis. Bahrain Radio broadcast our denials on a number of occasions and the Ruler spread the word through the majlis. But it would still be difficult to find any Bahraini who does not believe the Arab fabrication. The fulminations of Kuwait Radio and its continued reiterations of this allegation are perhaps doing more than anything else to stir up passions.

PARSONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

O



CONFIDENTIAL

(1078/67)

TELEGRAM

Cypher ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~

From:— Agency, Bahrain

To:— Foreign Office,
London.

Despatched

Received

No. 74

of 6 June, 1967

FLASH

Addressed to Foreign Office, London No.74 and repeated for information IMMEDIATE to British Embassy, Kuwait No.14, High Commission, Aden No.7 and (Saving) to British Political Residency, Bahrain No.79 (S), Political Agency, Doha No.10 (S), Dubai No.11 (S), Abu Dhabi No.7 (S) and Consulate-General, Muscat No.4 (S).

My tel No. 73: Middle East crisis.

Your statement to the House of Commons, particularly the passage about British Forces in the area, had an immediate calming effect here. The Ruler is delighted and considers that this was the assurance for which he had asked.

2. However, Cairo Radio has started to broadcast a report that British and American aircraft are providing air cover for Israel. This is sending the temperature up here rapidly. Could B.B.C. Arabic Service broadcast an immediate denial?

PARSONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

1. Ruler
2. Mr. Parsons to [unclear]
3. PA

10/6

CONFIDENTIAL

(1078/67)

TELEGRAM



Cypher ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

From:— Agency, Bahrain To:— Foreign Office,
London.

Despatched

Received

No. 73 of 5 June, 1967

IMMEDIATE

Addressed to Foreign Office, London No.73 and repeated for information PRIORITY to British Embassy Kuwait No.13, High Commission, Aden (personal) Un-numbered, and (Saving) to British Political Residency, Bahrain No.78 (S), British Political Agency, Doha No.9 (S), Dubai No.10 (S), Abu Dhabi No.6 (S) and British Consulate-General, Muscat No.3 (S).

My tel No. 72: Middle East crisis.

The Ruler sent for me this afternoon. He reaffirmed the views expressed in my telegram under reference and said that he was desperately anxious for the assurance mentioned in Residency tel No.363. Now that hostilities had started he could not say for how long he could hold the line without such an assurance. He argued strongly that this assurance was as much in H.M.G.'s interest in Bahrain as in his. Meanwhile he had broadcast on Bahrain Radio expressing full support for the Arab cause and urging restraint on the people (I saw the text). He had also sent a second message to Nasser.

2. I hope very much that the Ruler's request can be met without delay. Excitement is mounting and a positive response from us would do much to diminish the probability of anti-British outbreaks.

PARSONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1073/63/67

✓
PA.

✓
10/1



Cypher/CAT A

From: Foreign Office To: Bahrain
Telegram No: Guidance 127
Date: 5 June, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~IMMEDIATE~~

Addressed to Bahrain telegram number Guidance 127 of 5 June, 1967, repeated Saving to Abu Dhabi, Doha, Dubai and Muscat (all unnumbered).

Middle East.

Our attitude towards the Arab Israel hostilities will be stated by Ministers in Parliament and at the Security Council.

2. You should be careful to say nothing apportioning blame for the outbreak, and in discussion may make the following points.

(a) We are gravely concerned at the outbreak of hostilities. All our recent efforts, e.g. canvassing for a declaration by the maritime powers, have been due not to any partiality for either side, but to our judgment that the threat to peace was very grave, and that only the most constructive action by all concerned could hope to preserve it. Unfortunately we have failed.

(b) Events have proved the dangers of excluding U.N. action from the situation.

Distribution

Normal
Savings
C.C.P.G.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

British Political
Agency,
Abu Dhabi.

(1074/67)

3 June, 1967.

Basidie Oil Conference

Abu Dhabi telegram No. 234 to
Bahrain, paragraph 1.

— 2. I enclose a copy in translation
of the invitation to attend the conference
received by Shaikh Zaid from the Iraqi
Ambassador in Kuwait.

3. I am sending copies of this letter
with enclosure to the Political Agencies,
the Consulate-General, Muscat and the
Arabian Department of the Foreign Office.

(S.J. Nuttall)

H.G. Balfour-Paul, Esq.,
BAHRAIN.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Translation

His Highness Shaikh Zaid bin Sultan,
Ruler of Abu Dhabi.

We are happy to inform you of the decision of the Iraqi Cabinet, sitting on Sunday 28 May 1967, under the Chairmanship of the President of the Iraqi Government, General Abdurrahman Mohammed Aref, which considered the firm friendship among the Arabs and the Israeli ^{sic} gangs and noticed with complete satisfaction the agreement of the Arabs from the Ocean to the Gulf to stand firm against Israeli gangs which are a threat still gaining the support of some imperialist nations. It decided to take all measures against scheming aggression including the forbidding of pumping oil and delivering it to any nation which shares in any aggression. It also decided to address an invitation to all Arab oil-producing countries to a meeting in Baghdad on Sunday 4 June 1967 at 7 p.m. to take a decision which would confirm the solidarity of the Arab oil-producing nations in preventing the sale or supply of oil to any nation which shares in aggression or supports aggression on either the United Arab Republic, Syria, the Jordanian Hashemite Kingdom, Lebanon or any other Arab country or on Arab rights of sovereignty over any Arab territory or on Arab territorial waters, especially the waters of the Gulf of Aqaba; the Arab oil-producing nations should inform all the foreign companies operating in them of the necessity of refraining from selling or supplying Arab oil directly or indirectly to states which take up a hostile position against the Arabs and if any operating company should disobey the decree steps should be taken to cancel their concession agreements. It called on all friendly Islamic oil producing countries to adopt a united attitude with the Arabs. The Embassy is pleased to address an invitation to Your Highness' Government in the name of the Government of the Iraqi Republic for a representative of your Government to attend and take part in this conference and attend at the appointed time. It would also be pleased to receive from Your Highness' Government notice of the name of your representative attending this conference by telegram.

Thank you.

The Ambassador
Al-Haj Abdal Hamid Mu'man
Ambassador of the Iraqi
Government in Kuwait.

1. Encls
2. ~~for~~ ^{to} Paris by
3. ^{ABP}

CYPHER/CAT A

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE

TELNO 603.

DATED 2 JUNE

ROUTINE

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO AMMAN TELEGRAM NO 900 OF 2 JUNE.

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, UKHIS NEW YORK, TEL AVIV,
DAMASCUS, CAIRO, BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, RABAT, ALGIERS, ADDIS ABABA, TUNIS,
KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, TRIPOLI, BENGHAZI, KHARTOUM, AND SAVING TO TEHRAN,
ANKARA, JERUSALEM.

YOUR TELEGRAMS NO.S 509 AND 510: GULF OF AQABA.

I CAN WELL UNDERSTAND THE DIFFICULTY OF EXPLAINING H.M.G.'S POINT OF
VIEW IN THE PRESENT STATE OF ARAB FEELING, BUT I HOPE THAT MY CARE-
FULLY WORDED STATEMENT IN PARLIAMENT WILL HELP YOU TO COUNTER THE
BELIEF THAT H.M.G.'S STAND IS ONE OF SUPPORTING ISRAEL.

2. AS REGARDS THE POINTS IN YOUR PARAGRAPH 2:-

(1) THE ARAB ARGUMENT THAT ELATH WAS OCCUPIED BY THE ISRAELIS AFTER
THE SIGNATURE OF THE EGYPTIAN / ISRAEL ARMISTICE AGREEMENT IS
IRRELEVANT SINCE IT WAS NEVER PART OF EGYPT NOR IN THE POSSESSION OF
EGYPTIAN FORCES. THE ARABS HAVE A POINT IN THAT THE ISRAELIS EXPelled
TRANSJORDANIAN FORCES AND OCCUPIED ELATH IN BREACH OF THE TRUCE THEN
EXISTING BETWEEN ISRAEL AND TRANSJORDAN IN MARCH 1949. BUT UNDER THE
1947 UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY PARTITION PROPOSAL ELATH AND
THE NEGEV WENT TO THE JEWISH STATE, AND THE ISRAEL/JORDAN ARMISTICE
AGREEMENT OF APRIL 1949 CONFIRMED ISRAEL IN POSSESSION OF IT. THE

AGREEMENT IS CLEAR THAT THE ARMISTICE LINES SHALL NOT PREJUDICE A FINAL SETTLEMENT: PENDING A FINAL SETTLEMENT, HOWEVER, THE AGREEMENT AND THE MAPS ANNEXED TO IT GIVE ISRAEL A SOUND LEGAL BASIS FOR POSSESSION OF THE PORT. UNLIKE E.G. JERUSALEM, ISRAEL'S CLAIM TO POSSESSION OF ELATH HAS NOT BEEN DISPUTED BY ANYONE BUT THE ARAB STATES SINCE THEN.

(II) AS YOU WILL HAVE SEEN FROM OUR GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NO.115, THERE IS ANY IMPORTANT PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT STAKE IN THE QUESTION OF THE FREEDOM OF PASSAGE THROUGH THE STRAITS OF TIRAN. MOREOVER, WHATEVER THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF QUOTE THE SUEZ AGGRESSION UNQUOTE, IT WAS PART OF THE ARRANGEMENTS MADE UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FORCES FROM SINAI THAT ISRAEL SHOULD ENJOY FREEDOM OF PASSAGE THROUGH THE STRAITS, AND MANY GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING OUR OWN, CONTRIBUTED TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT BY AFFIRMING THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE RIGHT OF PASSAGE. THE PRESENT CRITICAL SITUATION RESULTS FROM THE UNILATERAL ACTION OF THE U.A.R. GOVERNMENT IN UPSETTING ARRANGEMENTS WHICH HAVE STOOD FOR 10 YEARS AND ASSURED PEACE IN THE GULF AREA.

(III) I WAS CAREFUL TO SAY IN MY STATEMENT IN PARLIAMENT THAT H.M.G. CONDEMN ATTACKS ACROSS THE FRONTIER IN BOTH DIRECTIONS, AND SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED THE ATTACK ON SAMMUS.

3. OVER AND ABOVE ALL THIS, HOWEVER, THE ACTIONS OF THE U.A.R. GOVERNMENT, WHATEVER THEIR MOTIVATION (SEE GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NO.116) HAVE BROUGHT THE MIDDLE EAST TO THE BRINK OF A WAR WHICH WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE TERRIBLE CONSEQUENCES FOR JORDAN AND THE LIMITS OF WHICH COULD NOT BE FORESEEN. IN SUCH A SITUATION IT IS THE DUTY OF

• ALL GOVERNMENTS TO SEEK MEANS OF PREVENTING A CATASTROPHE. WE ARE
• WELL AWARE THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE PURSUING A CYNICAL POLICY IN
EXPLOITING THE SITUATION TO WIN ARAB SUPPORT FOR THEMSELVES AND THAT
THEY ARE HAVING CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS IN IDENTIFYING WESTERN EFFORTS
TO PRESERVE THE PEACE WITH SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL. WITH THE THREAT OF WAR
THAT EXISTS WE CANNOT BE SIMILARLY IRRESPONSIBLE. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
OURSELVES AND OTHERS ARE USING OUR INFLUENCE TO RESTRAIN THE ISRAELIS
BUT THE DANGER IS VERY SERIOUS AND THE MEASURES WE ARE TAKING IN THE
UNITED NATIONS AND IN CONSULTATION WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO FIND
SOME WAY OF AVERTING A CATASTROPHE ARE NO MORE PRO-ISRAEL THAN THEY
ARE PRO-ARAB AND PRO-HUMANITY. OBVIOUSLY IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ANYONE
TO SAY WHETHER THE ISRAELIS WILL CONTINUE TO BE RESTRAINED: BUT THE
INFLUENCE OF THOSE WHO ARE TRYING TO RESTRAIN THEM MUST DEPEND TO
A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT ON THEIR WILLINGNESS TO WORK FOR AN EQUITABLE
SETTLEMENT OF PRESENT DIFFICULTIES OVER THE GULF OF AQABA.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

((2016/67)

TELEGRAM

1 *Par*
2 *to Paris then*
3 *PA*

10/6

Cypher

code ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ en clair

16 JUN 67

1091



From : — Agency, Bahrain

To : — Foreign Office,
London.

Despatched

Received

No. 70 of 1 June, 1967

ROUTINE

Addressed to Foreign Office, London /No. 70/ and repeated for information to British Embassy, Kuwait /No.11/, High Commission, Aden (personal) /No.5/ and (Savv) to British Embassy, Tehran /No.1/(S), British Political Agencies, Doha /No.8/(S), Dubai /No.9/(S), Abu Dhabi /No.5/(S), British Consulate General, Kuwait /No.2/(S) and British Political Residency, Bahrain /No.73/(S).

By telegram No. 68: Bahrain internal situation.

The atmosphere has eased a little during the past 24 hours. A second Jewish owned car was burned on the night of 30 May but there have been no further incidents. The weekly newspaper has published telegrams from the Federation of Clubs to the Ruler (thanking him for his telegram to the Arab League) and to Nasser and other Arab leaders. Editorial and commentary were moderately worded and advocated practical steps such as sending cash and blood rather than demonstrations and attacks on property. The Ruler has authorised a public collection of money.

PARSONS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WI 49612 Dd185D 45m (in 2 sorts) 19/60 LP2049

CONFIDENTIAL

BRITISH RESIDENCY,

(1073/162/67)

BAHRAIN.

9 June, 1967.

Middle East Crisis

We are still in the thick of the crisis and it will, even under favourable circumstances, be a little time before the dust settled and we can see the crisis in perspective. It is only because there are so few opportunities for getting bags down the Gulf that I am writing now to say to you and to the other Political Agents and the Consul-General, Muscat that I should in due course like to have a synoptic view of the main events of the emergency and the principal conclusions you draw from it in regard to the conduct of your respective Rulers and other agencies in your States and any lessons for the future. I must leave it to you and the others to judge the right time to make a report, but I think it would be as well to take a short term look within a week or so, rather than wait for the whole Arab-Israel situation to set in a new fashion, which may well not happen before some months of international negotiation.

2. I am sending a copy of this letter to Ranald Boyle, Archie Lamb, David Roberts and Bill Carden.

(R. S. Crawford)

A. D. Parsons, Esq., M.V.O., M.C.,
British Political Agency,
BAHRAIN.

CONFIDENTIAL

(1091)
PERSONAL

BRITISH CONSULATE GENERAL,

MUSCAT.

7 June, 1967.

During the current Middle East crisis I am likely to receive telegrams from the Foreign Office defining Her Majesty's Government's position on any issues which become controversial. I will arrange to have copies of these telegrams sent to you and to other British subjects here. I should be grateful if you would use the information contained in them to nail lies - as suitable occasion offers.

(D.C. Garden)

1. Major Chauncy.
Personal Adviser to the Sultan
2. D. Payne Esq.,
Cable & Wireless Ltd.,
MUSCAT.
3. Capt. Lyon.
Gray Mackenzie & Co. Ltd.
4. Alan Ashmole.
B.B.M.E.
5. Brigadier Waterfield,
Military Sec.
6. Lt. Col. Colin Maxwell,
S.A.F.
7. I. Skeet, Esq.,
P.D.(O.) Ltd.

QUOTE HER MAJESTY'S GOVT ARE SHOCKED BY REPORTS EMANATING FROM THE MIDDLE EAST AND CARRIED BY OFFICIAL NEWS MEDIA THAT PLANES FROM A BRITISH AIRCRAFT CARRIER HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN THE FIGHTING. THIS IS A MALICIOUS FABRICATION. THERE IS NOT REPEAT NOT A GRAIN OF TRUTH IN IT. IT IS THE POLICY OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVT. TO AVOID TAKING SIDES IN THIS CONFLICT AND TO DO EVERYTHING THEY CAN TO BRING ABOUT A CEASE FIRE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. AS STATED BY THE FOREIGN SECRETARY YESTERDAY IN THE HOUSE, ALL BRITISH FORCES IN THE AREA HAVE THE STRICTEST INSTRUCTIONS NOT REPEAT NOT TO BECOME INVOLVED IN ANY WAY.

2. MEASURES TO INTERRUPT THE NORMAL FLOW OF OIL SUPPLIES OR TO CLOSE THE SUEZ CANAL TO SHIPPING ARE THEREFORE TOTALLY UNJUSTIFIED.

3. URGENT STEPS ARE BEING TAKEN IN LONDON AND IN THE CAPITALS OF ARAB STATES TO CORRECT THESE MISREPRESENTATIONS UNQUOTE.

FOREIGN OFFICE SPOKESMAN ADDED ON THE RECORD.

THROUGH OUT YESTERDAY AIRCRAFT CARRIER VICTORIOUS WAS STATIONARY IN MALTA AND HERMES IN ADEN. IT WAS NOT REPEAT NOT THEREFORE PHYSICALLY POSSIBLE FOR THERE TO HAVE BEEN ANY AIRCRAFT ACTIVITY FROM THESE CARRIERS.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Registry 1091
No.

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Open

EMERGENCY
IMMEDIATE
ROUTINE
with
without
DEFERRED

*Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should
reach addressee(s) _____

(Date) _____

Despatched _____

Draft.

Telegram to:—

No. _____

(Date) _____

And to:—

Repeat to:—

En-Clair
Code
Cypher Cyphn.

Distribution:—

Copies to:—

[Security classification]
—if any _____

[Codeword—if any] _____

Address to Bahrain.

telegram No. 237 / (date) 9/6

repeated for information to Foreign office, (95)

Yoko (7) Am Shah (7) Yorbai. Sanj (5
Bahran Agency) (115).

Conditions normal.

ZCZC VM135 DDD DDD DDD ERE FLASH

9/2012

21623

MBMU BU QJBA 234

BAHRAIN 234 6 1355 P1/50



FLASH

BRITAIN MUSCAT U/N

GUIDANCE

-6 JUN 67
1091

IDANCE 12306.

FOLLOWING IS PRESS RELEASE ISSUED BY FOREIGN OFFICE
ON 6 JUNE. MIDDLE EAST.

A.

QUOTE HER MAJESTY'S GOVT ARE SHOCKED BY REPORTS EMANATING FROM THE
MIDDLE EAST AND CARRIED BY OFFICIAL NEWS MEDIA THAT PLANES FROM
A BRITISH AIRCRAFT CARRIER HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN THE FIGHTING.
THIS IS A MALICIOUS FABRICATION. THERE IS NOT (RPT NOT) A GRAIN
OF TRUTH IN IT. IT IS THE POLICY OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVT TO AVOID
TAKING SIDES IN THIS CONFLICT AND TO DO EVERYTHING THEY CAN TO
BRING ABOUT A CEASE FIR AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. AS STATED BY THE

ON 6 JUNE. MIDDLE EAST.

A.

QUOTE HER MAJESTY'S GOVT ARE SHOCKED BY REPORTS EMANATING FROM THE MIDDLE EAST AND CARRIED BY OFFICIAL NEWS MEDIA THAT PLANES FROM A BRITISH AIRCRAFT CARRIER HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN THE FIGHTING. THIS IS A MALICIOUS FABRICATION. THERE IS NOT CRPT NOTD A GRAIN OF TRUTH IN IT. IT IS THE POLICY OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVT TO AVOID TAKING SIDES IN THIS CONFLICT AND TO DO EVERYTHING THEY CAN TO BRING ABOUT A CEASE FIR AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. AS STATED BY THE FOREIGN SECRETARY YESTERDAY IN THE HOUSE, ALL BRITISH FORCES IN THE AREA HAVE THE STRICTEST INSTRUCTIONS NOT CRPT NOTD TO BECOME INVOLVED IN ANY WAY.

2. MEASURES TO INTERRUPT THE NORMAL FLOW OF OIL SUPPLIES OR TO CLOSE THE SUEZ CANAL TO SHIPPING ARE THEREFORE TOTALLY UNJUSTIFIED.

3. URGENT STEPS ARE BEING TAKEN IN LONDON AND IN THE CAPITALS OF ARAB STATES TO CORRECT THESE MISREPRESENTATIONS UNQUOTE. B

GUIDANCE 123 ADDENDUM

MIDDLE EAST

FOREIGN OFFICE SPOKESMAN ADDED ON THE RECORD.

THROUGHOUT YESTERDAY AIRCRAFT CARRIER VICTORIOUS WAS STATIONARY IN MALTA AND HERMES IN ADEN. IT WAS NOT CRPT NOTD THEREFORE PHYSICALLY POSSIBLE FOR THERE TO HAVE BEEN ANY AIRCRAFT ACTIVITY FROM THESE CARRIERS. SOSFA

CRAWFORD. X.

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair Code R
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

[Distribution Heading]

1. *Re: India*
2. *Mr. Parton's Information*
to me
3. *Re: PA*
5 JUN 1967
1091
MUSCAT

FROM Bahrain TO Yemen
Agency

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 7

D M

[Date] 5 June

R M

Repeated to: _____

[Priority]

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed a F.O. Tel No. 72
to 5 June 1967, Omani Delta
Oman Delta Forces, Keewant
and Nizwa to Bahrain Roads,
Mazraat Liwa, Crisico.

Reuter has advised me
through his bracket & report
that he is confirming that
there will be no American
troops here of HMG either
condemns Israel attack
on Egypt or remains
neutral. However, if HMG
appears to be supporting
Israel, he believes that
there will be a violent
anti-British reaction in
Bahrain with attack on
British property and probably
on one installation.

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INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

[Distribution
Heading]

FROM _____ TO _____

[Signature] _____

[No. and prefix] No. _____

D _____ M _____

[Date] _____

R _____ M _____

Repeated to _____

[Priority] _____

2

I agree with this
assessment. So is it correct
that the judge from
here who made the
final decision, if it was
that, I sincerely hope
that a CONDEMNATION
statement can be made

DISTRIBUTION

Parole

ADVANCE
COPIES TO:-

1. Enth
2. P.A.

3/6.

TM
-4 JUN 67
107

MUSCAT TEL. 6

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO RESIDENCY TELEGRAM NO.76 SAVING OF 1 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO FOREIGN OFFICE, DUBAI, DOHA, ABU DHABI, MUSCAT AND BAGHDAD.

ABU DHABI TELEGRAM NO.234: BAGHDAD OIL CONFERENCE.

BAHRAM GOVERNMENT HAVE RECEIVED SIMILAR INVITATION. THEY ARE SENDING YUSUF SHIRAWI, DIRECTOR OF OIL AFFAIRS AND SAYED MAHMOUD, HEAD OF FINANCE DEPARTMENT. THE RULER IS AWARE OF THE DANGERS BUT FEELS THAT HE HAS NO CHOICE; IF HE FAILED TO SEND A REPRESENTATIVE HE WOULD COME UNDER FIRE FROM ARAB PROPAGANDISTS AND, BY EXTENSION, FROM HIS OWN PEOPLE. HE CAN TRUST SHIRAWI AND MAHMOUD TO ACT SENSIBLY.

~~BUQUAYA~~ PARSONS.

1073/30/67

RuFu + PA

TELEGRAM

TM

3/1

Cypher code en clair

From :—

To :—

Bahrain

Abu Dhabi

Despatched

Received

No. of

199

1 June 1967

- 4 JUN 67

1091

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~PRIORITY~~

Addressed to Abu Dhabi telegram number 199 of 1 June, repeated for information Saving to Museat (34) and Bahrain Agency (83). (Repeated to P.O. (Priority, Dubai and Doha (Imm.)).

Your telegram No. 234.

I recommend Rulers reply should express general support for Arab cause and say that he is relying on his Petroleum Adviser to keep him informed of outcome of meeting.

CRANFORD

Distribution
Normal
Saving

E-X *in 3/6.*

BAHRAIN RESIDENCY TO MUSCAT SAVINGGRAM 34



CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO ABU DHABI TELNO 199 OF 1 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION
TO FOREIGN OFFICE DUBAI DOHA AND SAYING TO MUSCAT AND BAHRAIN
AGENCY.

YOUR TEL NO 234.

I RECOMMEND RULER'S REPLY SHOULD EXPRESS GENERAL SUPPORT FOR ARAB
CAUSE AND SAY THAT HE IS RELYING ON HIS PETROLEUM ADVISER TO
KEEP HIM INFORMED OF OUTCOME OF MEETING.

CRAWFORD.

NNNN

ZCZC VM325 ASV971 DFF401 LHC522 FCW37

MBMU BU GBLH 033

S LONDONLH 33 2 2330 BG

128

20909

- 4 JUN 67
2091

ETATPRIORITE

, BRITAIN MUSCAT 10402

ADDRESSED BAHRAIN TELEGRAM NUMBER 604 2/6 REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION PRIORITY TO ABU DHABI BAGHDAD DUBAI DOHA MUSCAT
AND SAVING TO BAHRAIN AGENCY YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 373 I AGREE

SOSFA

COL 10402 604 2/6 373

INWARD TELEGRAM



En Clair Code R
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

[Distribution
Heading]

FROM Balwan TO Turcet

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 173

D M

[Date] 2 June

R M

Repeated to _____

[Priority]

Normal

CONFIDENTIAL

Answering to Fo Tso No
173 of June 2nd Re. 1997
Balwan Kewari jwala
Trophie Ben Dabi Darbar
Dola Muscat and
Balwan to Balwan Agency
See telegram 600.

Bagdad Dec Conference.

These objective Nitto
in fact para 2 is
desirable, I should have
thought that any effort
to make a ruler or
anyone else take this
line as meeting every
as you suggested would
be better.

to force conference to take

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COPIES TO:-

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair Code R
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

[Distribution
Heading]

FROM _____ TO _____

[Signature] _____

[No. and prefix] No. _____ D _____ M _____

[Date] _____ R _____ M _____

Repeated to _____

[Priority] _____

a decision in opposite
recoce. . . I hope policies
agents may have
decision how to pro-
cess force

Changra

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—

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1. Encls
2. To Party to which
3. P.A.



INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair Code R
Code
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

[Distribution Heading]

FROM 10 TO Moscat

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 101

D M

[Date] 1 June

R M

Repeated to _____

[Priority]

CONFIDENTIAL.

Addressed to Bahrain Trade
600 3 June 1st RT. Abu Dhabi
Doha Bahrain Agency Doha
Moscat Bagdad Kuwait
Federal Trade.

Abu Dhabi Tel No 234
to you: Bahrain Doh
Conference.

Our view is that
which is more closely
be preferable of conference
were a failure or, at least,
any resolution passed
were not unanimous, all
those involved were
probably feel compelled
to attend and to go along
with widely divergent
resolutions [on] lesser
proposals by major. It would
be better for us if we

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En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

[Distribution
Heading]—

FROM _____ TO _____

[Signature] _____

[No. and prefix] No. _____ D _____ M _____

[Date] _____ R _____ M _____

Repeated to _____ 2

[Priority] _____

appeared to be attempting
to force all the members
and we should never,
therefore accept to
decourage the people
from * seeking a
representative.

2 However if the Reeler
decides to send a
representative in whose
hops if he comes to
encourage to take him
that any decisions on
that place policy

"Locales & Arbo" Morelos
be ~~lago~~ & ~~minerales~~ ~~producen~~,
dolos sea ~~no~~ be
mase ~~Centrales~~ ~~en~~,
paz, Cava o* ~~bagre~~.

3 The same considerations apply to the other Green Glass, Corcoran.

**ADVANCE
COPIES TO:—**

Sofia

NNNN

ZCZC VM261 ASV412 CFF428 LHC023 FCW6

MBMU BU GBLH 046

S LONONLH 46 2 0235 BG

075



200 1000
200 1000



ETATPRIORITE

BRITAIN MUSCAT

10201

ADDRESSED TO BAHRAIN TEL NO 601 OF 1 JUNE 67 REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION TO DUBAI DOHA MUSCAT BAHRAIN AGENCY BAGHDAD TEHRAN
JEDDA YOUR TELEGRAM NO 199 TO ABU DHABI WE AGREE WITH YOUR
RECOMMENDATION WHICH WOULD ACCORD WITH OUR GENERAL PURPOSE

SOSFA

COL 10201 601 1 67 ALSO 199

1. *Print*.
2. *For Print for ~~all~~ + New P.A.*



Yabuwa 1/6

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

[Distribution Heading]

FROM Abu Dhabi TO Moscow

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 9

D M

[Date] 11 May

R M

Repeated to: _____

[Priority]

CONFIDENTIAL.

Addressed to Bahraini Leader
and to May 11th R.F. To Leader
Bahrain Agency* 1st
(Responsible person) Doha
Moscow.

From KUFTALL.

See PA's address in
Bahraini Ministry. Leader has
requested to see for advice
a telegram received from
Iraqi Ambassador in
Kuwait (text by 600)
concerning ruler of Iraq.
Leader's decree dated
May 28th concerns for
Iraqi solicitude to deny
one to any Power supplying
force and resources
a conference of all Arab
oil-producing countries

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INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair Code R
Code Code R
Cypher (Paraphrase Heading)
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

[Distribution
Heading]

FROM _____ TO _____

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. _____ D _____ M _____

[Date] _____ R _____ M _____

Repeated to _____

[Priority]

DISTRIBUTION

2
en Baghdad on June 4th
which would take a
decision to refer to me
or suffice, are to any
concerning supporting
Mall in an attack
on an area containing or
that contained water
including Gulf of
AQABA. The Iraqi
Government extended
an invitation to Govt of
Abu Dhabi to attend
meeting and obtain for
a telegraphic reply
mention their preference
3. This is being sent
to you in Persian
this afternoon with a
message that I have referred
matter to you for advice.

ADVANCE
COPIES TO:-

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair Code R
Code Code R
Cypher (Paraphrase Heading)
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

[Distribution
Heading]

FROM _____ TO _____

[Signature] _____

[No. and prefix] No. _____

D _____ M _____

[Date] _____

R _____ M _____

Repeated to: _____

[Priority] _____

1. I must see Gedenig
earlier at 11.00 a.m. tomorrow
and should be given time
for corrections as to how
to speak to him then.

Lancs.

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ADVANCE
COPIES TO:—

CONFIDENTIAL

BRITISH POLITICAL AGENCY

(1041)

DOHA

29 May, 1967.



The Middle East Situation.

For your information, the Ruler's main reaction to the present situation in the Middle East is dismay at Nasser's re-establishment of himself as leader of the Arabs, and a fervent prayer that H.M.G. will be able somehow to topple him from his eminence. At the same time, Sheikh Ahmed says he has been obliged to send Nasser a telegram of support for his stand against Israel. Many telegrams have been sent in recent days from Palestinians, other Arabs and members of the ruling family, and he could not stand idly by. He goes on to say that he does not intend to behave like the Kuwaitis, who have already sent Nasser private gifts totalling two million dollars and promised more. He has also been told that ex-King Saud has contributed three million dollars.

2. As regards Qatar, all is quiet, but the Palestinian contingent are (from this safe distance) urging war, the destruction of the Israelis and the re-occupation of their homeland. Most of the sheikhs are selfishly buying up all the rice and sugar they can find, and there is likely to be a temporary shortage. Generally speaking, the feeling is that the tension will relax shortly, but that Nasser will emerge with enhanced prestige.

3. I am copying this letter to the Consul-General at Muscat and the other Political Agents.

(R.H.M. Boyle)

H.G. Balfour-Paul, Esq.,
British Residency,
Bahrain.


Agreed (dm.)

3/1.

1. Ruler.
2. Mr. Portu from BB.
3. P.A.

CONFIDENTIAL

1. Encls - very important.
2. P.A.



Copy/Cat A

(1073/23/67)

FROM: Kuwait

To: Bahrain

Telegram No: 147

Date: 29 May, 1967

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office Tel No. 202 of 29 May, R F 2 to Bahrain, Washington, Baghdad and saving to UKMIS, New York.

My Tel No 197: Palestine.

The Governor of Ahmadi yesterday asked the Kuwait Oil Company

- (A) To provide tents for police and army guards,
- (B) To tighten up control of access to vital points, and
- (C) To vet their staff with a view to keeping out potential saboteurs.

2. Kuwaiti trade unions have recently issued warnings that they would act to prevent the use of Kuwait's oil against the Arabs. The approach to the K.O.C., together with the Foreign Minister's repeated assurances to me that sabotage would be prevented, suggests that the Kuwait Government take such threats seriously and have decided that the best defense against sabotage would be to combine closer protection of the installations with an ostentatious steppage of oil experts. The Minister of Commerce (a friendly member of the older generation of the Ruling family) told me privately today that in certain circumstances the Government would have to cut off the oil. He was confident that if they did so, they could control the situation here in all other respects.

Distribution

File
All P.A.'s
G.G.M.

Dr. Paulin logan + J

29 MAY 67
1091

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO DOHA TELEGRAM NO.96 OF 28 MAY AND TO ABU DHABI (195),
DUBAI (267), MUSCAT (168) AND SAVING TO BAHRAIN AGENCY (79).

MIDDLE EAST SITUATION.

YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT ALL FOUR MINESEWEEPERS IN GULF HAVE LEFT OR ARE LEAVING HERE FOR ADEN TO STAND BY FOR POSSIBLE REQUIREMENT IN TIRAN STRAITS. THERE ARE NO FRIGATES AT PRESENT IN GULF.

2. I HOPE THAT FUTURE PRESS PUBLICITY IN UNITED KINGDOM CAN AVOID
REFERENCE TO FACT THAT SHIPS COME FROM GULF, AND THUS AT LEAST
REDUCE WHATEVER REACTIONS ARE CAUSED LOCALLY BY INVOLVEMENT OF UNITS
FROM AN ARAB STATION. THEY ARE OF COURSE PART OF FORCES AT DISPOSAL
OF MIDDLE EAST COMMAND AT ADEN.

3. YOU SHOULD NOT INITIATE DISCUSSION. IF TAXED, YOU SHOULD BASE YOURSELF ON FOREIGN OFFICE GUIDANCE NO.115 (ALREADY SENT) AND ESPECIALLY ON FOLLOWING EXTRACT FROM NO.116 (FULL TEXT BY BAG):

QUOTE. H.H.G. ALONG WITH MANY OTHER GOVERNMENTS EXPRESSED THEIR SUPPORT FOR FREEDOM OF PASSAGE THROUGH STRAITS OF TIRAN IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON 4 MARCH 1957. AS PRESIDENT NASSER HAS NOW DECLARED HIS INTENTION OF DENYING THIS FREEDOM BY PREVENTING PASSAGE OF ISRAELI FLAGSHIPS AND EXERCISING CONTRABAND CONTROL OVER OTHERS, H.H.G. ARE SUPPORTING ACTION IN SECURITY COUNCIL TO DEAL WITH PRESENT DANGEROUS SITUATION AND ARE ALSO CONSULTING OTHER INTERESTED GOVERNMENTS ON MEANS OF ASSERTING FREEDOM OF PASSAGE. UNQUOTE.

4. POLITICAL AGENT BAHRAIN IS EXPLAINING POSITION IN CONFIDENCE TO RULER WITH OBJECT OF FORESTALLING PUBLIC REACTION BY HIM TO NEWS ON BASIS OF INADEQUATE KNOWLEDGE. I DO NOT WANT TO GIVE ADDITIONAL

3. YOU SHOULD NOT INITIATE DISCUSSION. IF TAXED, YOU SHOULD BASE YOURSELF ON FOREIGN OFFICE GUIDANCE NO.115 (ALREADY SENT) AND ESPECIALLY ON FOLLOWING EXTRACT FROM NO.116 (FULL TEXT BY BAG):

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4. POLITICAL AGENT BAHRAIN IS EXPLAINING POSITION IN CONFIDENCE TO RULER WITH OBJECT OF FORESTALLING PUBLIC REACTION BY HIM TO NEWS ON BASIS OF INADEQUATE KNOWLEDGE. I DO NOT WANT TO GIVE ADDITIONAL CURRENCY TO STORY THAT SHIPS COME FROM GULF, IN HOPE THAT WITH THEIR ARRIVAL AT ADEN SHORTLY THEY WILL BE LINKED WITH ADEN RATHER THAN BAHRAIN. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE ONLY GIVE FACTS TO OTHER RULERS, AND IF CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANT TO THEIR COMMANDANTS OF POLICE IF YOU CONSIDER ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY FOR OBJECT DESCRIBED IN FIRST SENTENCE ABOVE.

5. TELEGRAPH OF 27 MAY CARRIES STORY THAT MINESEWEEPERS ARE ON WAY TO GULF OF AQABA. INFORMATION HERE IS ONLY THAT THEY ARE GOING TO ADEN. NO DOUBT ANY MOVEMENT INTO RED SEA WILL BE DECIDED LATER IN LIGHT OF CONSIDERATIONS SET OUT IN QUOTATION IN PARA 3 ABOVE.

CRAWFORD

COPY TO C.C.P.G.

To Parl ¹⁰⁰ ~~100~~ X

33 Saving

29 MAY 67
1091

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO 359 OF 28 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO KUWAIT TEHRAN H.C. ADEN (PERSONAL) AND SAVING TO BAHRAIN AGENCY DOHA DUBAI ABU DHABI AND MUSCAT.

FROM PARSONS.

RESIDENCY TELNO 358: MINESWEEPERS.

I SAW THE RULER THIS AFTERNOON AND EXPLAINED THE POSITION, DRAWING ON THE RELEVANT PASSAGES IN GUIDANCE NO 116. I EMPHASISED THAT, IN SPITE OF PRESS SPECULATION TO THE CONTRARY, THE MINESWEEPERS HAD BEEN ORDERED TO ADEN ONLY.

2. THE RULER REACTED STRONGLY. HE SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD H.M.G'S MOTIVES BUT THAT HIS PEOPLE WOULD INTERPRET THIS MOVE AS THE USE OF BAHRAIN AS A BASE FOR SUPPORT OF ISRAEL. HE ASKED ME TO EXPRESS IN THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE TERMS THE NEED TO AVOID FURTHER PUBLICITY ABOUT THE MINESWEEPERS. IF THE NEWS SPREAD HERE HE WAS CONVINCED THAT THERE WOULD BE ANTI-BRITISH DEMONSTRATIONS IN BAHRAIN AND PROBABLY WORSE. BAGHDAD RADIO HAD ALREADY EXCITED THE BAHRAINIS BY THREATENING THAT THE IRAQI AIR FORCE WOULD BOMB THE BRITISH BASES IN BAHRAIN IF THEY WERE USED AGAINST THE ARABS. HE HAD REDUCED PRESSURE BY HIS TELEGRAM TO THE ARAB LEAGUE BUT THE LAWYERS, GRADUATES ETC WERE PRESSING HIM TO DO MORE. SINCE I HAD BRIEFED HIM, HE WOULD DO HIS BEST TO TEMPORISE IF TACKLED ABOUT THE MINESWEEPERS ON THE STRENGTH OF RECENT PRESS REPORTS. HE WOULD PLEAD IGNORANCE AND POUR SCORN ON THEIR AUTHENTICITY. BUT FURTHER PUBLICITY, PARTICULARLY FROM LONDON, WOULD PUT HIM IN AN IMPOSSIBLE POSITION. HE DID NOT EVEN INTEND TO TELL HIS BROTHER, THE HEAD OF POLICE AND PUBLIC SECURITY. HE ASKED ME TO TELL ONLY THE COMMANDANT OF POLICE FOR HIS PRIVATE INFORMATION.

3. I AGREE WITH THE RULER'S ASSESSMENT. SO FAR THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE EXCITEMENT ABOUT THE CRISIS BUT NO PUBLIC MANIFESTATIONS SUCH AS DEMONSTRATIONS, PROCESSIONS OR ACTS OF HOSTILITY

FROM PARSONS.

RESIDENCY TELNO 358: MINESWEEPERS.

I SAW THE RULER THIS AFTERNOON AND EXPLAINED THE POSITION, DRAWING ON THE RELEVANT PASSAGES IN GUIDANCE NO 116. I EMPHASISED THAT, IN SPITE OF PRESS SPECULATION TO THE CONTRARY, THE MINESWEEPERS HAD BEEN ORDERED TO ADEN ONLY.

2. THE RULER REACTED STRONGLY. HE SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD H.M.G'S MOTIVES BUT THAT HIS PEOPLE WOULD INTERPRET THIS MOVE AS THE USE OF BAHRAIN AS A BASE FOR SUPPORT OF ISRAEL. HE ASKED ME TO EXPRESS IN THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE TERMS THE NEED TO AVOID FURTHER PUBLICITY ABOUT THE MINESWEEPERS. IF THE NEWS SPREAD HERE HE WAS CONVINCED THAT THERE WOULD BE ANTI-BRITISH DEMONSTRATIONS IN BAHRAIN AND PROBABLY WORSE. BAGHDAD RADIO HAD ALREADY EXCITED THE BAHRAINIS BY THREATENING THAT THE IRAQI AIR FORCE WOULD BOMB THE BRITISH BASES IN BAHRAIN IF THEY WERE USED AGAINST THE ARABS. HE HAD REDUCED PRESSURE BY HIS TELEGRAM TO THE ARAB LEAGUE BUT THE LAWYERS, GRADUATES ETC WERE PRESSING HIM TO DO MORE. SINCE I HAD BRIEFED HIM, HE WOULD DO HIS BEST TO TEMPORISE IF TACKLED ABOUT THE MINESWEEPERS ON THE STRENGTH OF RECENT PRESS REPORTS. HE WOULD PLEAD IGNORANCE AND POUR SCORN ON THEIR AUTHENTICITY. BUT FURTHER PUBLICITY, PARTICULARLY FROM LONDON, WOULD PUT HIM IN AN IMPOSSIBLE POSITION. HE DID NOT EVEN INTEND TO TELL HIS BROTHER, THE HEAD OF POLICE AND PUBLIC SECURITY. HE ASKED ME TO TELL ONLY THE COMMANDANT OF POLICE FOR HIS PRIVATE INFORMATION.

3. I AGREE WITH THE RULER'S ASSESSMENT. SO FAR THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE EXCITEMENT ABOUT THE CRISIS BUT NO PUBLIC MANIFESTATIONS SUCH AS DEMONSTRATIONS, PROCESSIONS OR ACTS OF HOSTILITY AGAINST FOREIGNERS. BUT IT ONLY NEEDS A SPARK TO PRODUCE THE SITUATION WHICH THE RULER FEARS.

PO PASS PRIORITY TEHRAN 17 AND H.C. ADEN PERSONAL 19.




Re

Mr 27/5

British Residency,

BAHRAIN.



S E C R E T

26 May, 1967

Dear Bill,

We have not received any guidance on the Middle East situation and I can only ask you to listen to the B.B.C.

2. A summary of our information as at 0900 hours on 21 May is attached. All the information on Kuwait is graded secret and we view it with considerable scepticism. The section on Bahrain is confidential and the remainder is unclassified.

3. You will probably have heard on the radio and seen the papers Government instructions in regard to British subjects in the Middle East but these do not apply to our area.

4. I am copying this letter to all the Political Agents.

Yours ever Edward

(E. B. Henderson)

D.C. Carden, Esq.,
MUSCAT.

S E C R E T



S E C R E T

SUMMARY

BRIEFING SHEET AS AT 0900 Hrs. 25 May, 1967

In brief the situation appears to have worsened only to the extent that the Western powers have received a set-back in the United Nations which may encourage the UAR to believe that it can act without fear of UN actions against here. The Security Council adjourned to debate on the UAR-Israel situation pending the return of U Thant from Cairo and refused to set a day for resumption. U Thant is in fact returning today and there will therefore probably be a meeting today.

The situation on the ground may be considered to have improved because there has been no military action and perhaps the longer that goes by without shooting the less likely shooting becomes. Both sides appear to be ignoring incidents of a provocative nature.

Egypt says that she has mined the Gulf of Aqaba and will prevent access with planes and ships as well. However, Egypt has said that on no account will escorted ships be attacked or stopped.

On 20 May Israel informed US that she would go to war if UAR attempted to block Gulf. US has said that she will take all action both inside and outside UN to keep Gulf open.

Kuwait

Kuwait Commando is at 6 hours notice to move by sea to Egypt on tankers!

Mubarak gloomy and accepts war inevitable.

In Kuwait a Commando battalion (240 men) was ordered to be ready at the airport at 1800 hours on 25 May. A "Brigade" (really a Battalion group) plus 12 tanks has been earmarked to move on "oil tankers"! to Egypt. An armoured car regiment armed with Vigilants is earmarked to move by land via Iraq to the Israel theatre. These intentions are being viewed with some reserve.

Bahrain

Locally there is considerable interest in the UAR/Israel situation. There is no evidence of intention to cause trouble at the moment but students plan to hold peaceful "Arab unity" demonstrations in three weeks time when the examinations are over. Food prices in the Suk have risen a little and there is bitterness against the merchants on this account. There is no evidence of Anti-Jewish feelings of any importance.

Shaikh Isa has sent a telegram of support to the UAR on 25 May.

S E C R E T

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